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In this dissertation I analyze the quality choices of a group of producers.
In the first essay I use mechanism design to study the interaction of asymmet-
ric information and the democratic process in the quality choices of a group of
heterogeneous producers facing an opportunity to gain from establishing a repu-
tation for their quality products. I find an asymmetry in the possible equilibria
between the high and the low quality majorities. The quality level provided by
the group with a low quality majority is lower than the first best, and the mi-
nority producers get rents. With high quality majority, if demand and group
conditions are favourable, the quality level provided by the group is higher than
the first best and the minority‘s type type left with rents. Otherwise, the quality
level provided by the group is first best and no rents are left to the low-quality
producers in the minority.
The second essay proposes a methodology to measure the characteristics of
intermediate products when quality is multidimensional. It uses a general rep-
resentation of the multioutput technology via directional distance functions and
constructs quality indicators based on differences. The quality indicators may
be used to evaluate firms’ output taking into account the whole set of quality
attributes. I explore the relationships among the different quality attributes and
the yields by a systematic investigation of the disposability properties of the tech-
nology. In addition, I show how aggregate quality may vary with the production
level.
The third essay designs an optimal payment system for a group of produc-
ers implementing it empirically. In the essay I show how to implement the first
best through higher prices for better quality commodities, deriving the optimal
pricing schedule. I take into account producers’ heterogeneity by modelling inef-
ficiency and illustrating how technical efficiency interacts with producers’ ability
to produce output for a given level of inputs and hence affects revenues. The
technology and the technical efficiency of producers are then estimated with a
stochastic production function model. The estimation results are then used to
simulate the pricing scheme.
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In 1996 the European Union introduced a reform of the fruit and vegetable com-
mon European market to finance both the setting up and operations of Producers‘
Organizations (PO). According to the EU policy goals, POs should plan produc-
tion in order to meet demand, decide and enforce quality standards, help reducing
production costs and promote environmental-friendly technology adoption.
In many countries around the world there exist some producers‘ groups set
up for the same purposes. For example, in Canada for maple syrup producers;
in Colombia, for coffee producers; in Italy and France, for wine producers. This
form of market regulation is not new even to the European Union. Indeed, in the
60s and 70s specific laws promoted the establishment of Producer Organizations
granting them the power to regulate market transactions. But with the new
intervention and the public funds made available the European Union is placing
greater emphasis on the role of these organizations in the fruit and vegetable
markets. In addition, the EU Commission is considering this policy instrument
also for the reform of other agricultural sectors.
This type of market regulation is reminiscent of the Marketing Orders that
were initiated after the 30s for different perennial crops in the US, especially
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in California. Following years of falling incomes for farmers, the US Congress
in 1937 enacted the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act that allowed the
majority of producers of certain crops to set up Marketing Orders whose rules
could be extended to all the producers and handlers, and whose main objectives
were the orderly marketing and the quality regulation of products.
Traditionally, the main economic analysis of agricultural policies has centered
on quantity, price, and risk implications of different policies. A growing part of
the literature now deals with quality issues. A market failure for quality provision
is often the starting point for the analysis of some form of public regulation, even
though it is often far from clear whether public intervention can in fact contribute
to its solution.
In this dissertation I analyze some of the problems of the self-regulation by a
group of producers. First, I model a producers’ group looking at the democratic
choices of its members and find the impact on economic welfare. Second, I look at
the problem of multidimensionality of quality in commodities and how to compare
firms along different quality dimensions. Finally, I consider the problem of how a
group can design an optimal payment scheme for quality provision by members
or upstream firms.
1.0.1 First Essay
The analysis proposed in the first essay (Quality and Self-Regulation in Agri-
cultural Markets) is concerned with the welfare effects of self-regulation by Pro-
ducer‘s Organizations (PO) Using the advances of the economics of incentives, it
studies the interaction of asymmetric information and the democratic process in
the quality choices of a group of heterogenous producers. With a simple model
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of adverse selection it presents the pricing rules and the quality provision in a
group of producers facing an opportunity to gain from their collective capacity
to establish a reputation for their quality products.
The essay explicitly considers the democratic process through which quality-
based reward schemes are decided upon and enforced in the PO. It distinguishes
between a constitutional phase, in which each potential participant votes on
whether to form a PO and the rules by which the PO will be run, and a working
phase, in which the rules, including quality regulation, are enforced by the PO.
The essay makes the choice of the PO‘s pricing mechanism endogenous, ex-
tending previous analyses in which the remuneration schemes were either ex-
ogenous or not implementable because of the heterogeneity among producers.
It compares different equilibria, according to which type of producer is in the
majority and to different demand and technology parameter values. For each
equilibria, it determines the profit levels for both types of producers and the
resulting quality provided by the different producers and by the group.
The analysis describes the outcome of the group‘s democratic process and
expresses it in terms of mechanisms (or optimal contracts), that is a payment for
producers and a quality level provided by the group. It may easily be extended to
consider producers that are heterogeneous in size or efficiency, like in the tradition
of the agricultural cooperatives literature.
I consider a situation in which only one group can be formed. This analysis is
therefore relevant for the USMarketing Orders‘ experience or for the cases allowed
by the EU regulation in which Producers‘ Organizations rules can be extended
to all producers in a definite region. In addition, it applies to all those examples
of self-regulation by producer‘s groups when there is no competition from other
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groups, e.g., the collective management of appellation contrôlée, either because
of granted legal authority or for other economic or physical reasons.
When the PO uses an efficient constitutional rule, i.e., it is allowed to offer a
different mechanism to each type, I find an asymmetry in the possible equilibria
between the high and the low quality majorities. If market demand and produc-
ers’ differences allow the group to form, the quality level provided by the group
with a low quality majority is lower than the first best. In addition, the high
quality producers in the minority are left with some rents above their reservation
utility.
When high quality producers are the majority, two different equilibria may
emerge. If demand conditions are favorable and the group not very heterogeneous,
the quality level provided by the group is higher than the first best and the
minority‘s type left with some rents. If demand and group conditions are not
very favorable and the group still forms, the quality level provided by the group
is the same as in the first best but the low quality producers in the minority are
left with no rents.
1.0.2 Second Essay
In the second essay (Quality production and quality indicators in intermedi-
ate products) I tackle the problems faced when comparing firms for their out-
put which quality is defined along many dimensions. Measuring and evaluating
the right attributes of raw materials, commodities, and intermediate products
is a common problem in many sectors of the economy. In this essay I propose
a methodology to measure the characteristics and composition of intermediate
products, i.e., grapes for wine production, and I pursue two objectives.
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First, with the methodological contribution, I address the issue of how to
measure quality attributes for intermediate goods using a general representation
of the technology. In this study I model the quality attributes with a multioutput
technology, using a general representation of technology based on directional dis-
tance functions. These are a generalization of the radial distance functions which
have been used to give a single-valued representation of production relations in
case of multiple inputs and multiple outputs.
Directional distance functions indeed can be seen as an alternative and more
general way to represent technology and to compare and measure input, output
and productivity aggregates. The quality aggregate measures we propose using
directional distance functions may be used to evaluate firms’ output taking into
account the whole set of quality attributes. These alternative measures thus
can be compared with the standard practice in the industry of using only one
attribute, for instance sugar content used to measure the quality of grapes for
wine production.
In addition, as for the second objective, I characterize the technology by
investigating the relationships among the different quality attributes and the
production level. This objective is pursued with a systematic investigation of
the disposability properties of the technology, which allows to show that some
quality attributes are substitute, while others are complement in production. In
the essay I find evidence of a significant trade-off between quantity and aggregate
quality for the years considered and for both varieties investigated. Moreover,
for sugar and total acidity, two major quality components of grapes, for most of




The third essay (Technology estimation and non-linear pricing for quality) shows
how to design an optimal payment system for a group of producers and how
to implement the first best through higher prices for better quality commodi-
ties. The payment systems for raw commodities and intermediate products define
one of the most critical relationships of many vertically related industries, since
they establish how revenues are distributed among growers and processing firms.
Intermediate products payment systems also have a pivotal role in setting the
incentives that growers and processing firms face: not only do they heavily in-
fluence the incentives to improve technical efficiency, they also have far-reaching
implications for investment decisions.
In the essay I show how to design an optimal payment system for a group
of producers using mainly production data information. I first show how it is
possible to implement the first best through higher prices for better quality com-
modities deriving the optimal pricing schedule. I take into account producers’
heterogeneity by modeling inefficiency and illustrating how technical efficiency in-
teracts with producers’ ability to produce outputs for a given level of inputs and
hence affects revenues. The technology and the technical efficiency of producers
are then estimated with a stochastic production function model. The estimation
results are then used to simulate the pricing scheme.
The essay combines a theoretical model for contract design under symmetric
information for a group of producers with the contributions of the literature
on the parametric estimation of technology using Stochastic Frontier Analysis
(SFA). I use the pricing scheme with a specific dataset for market, weather, and
soil quality conditions to show the impact on the choices and payments received
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by a group of farmers involved in grapes production in Italy. The model and the
methodology however are general enough to be implementable for other groups
and other industries as well.
The pricing scheme depends on the quality-quantity trade-off in production,
which varies across cultivars and across years, and it provides higher prices for
quality when the trade-off between quality and quantity is higher. Indeed, when
quality is more "costly" to produce in terms of reduced quantity, the optimal pric-
ing scheme should reward quality more in order to induce its efficient production
by firms.
I then illustrate how to implement it empirically by a parametric estimation
of the production technology via a restricted production function. It designs a
pricing scheme for quality, after taking into account the quality characteristics
and market demand for the commodity. Moreover, in th essay I illustrate how, by
implementing this remuneration scheme, a downstream firms, e.g., a cooperative,
can give incentives to input supplier firms to provide better quality commodities.
It uses the pricing scheme with a specific dataset for market and productive
conditions to show the impact on the choices and payments received by a group
of farmers involved in grapes production in Northern Italy.
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Chapter 2
Quality and Self-Regulation in Agricultural
Markets
2.1 Introduction
In 1996 the European Union (EU) introduced a reform of the fruit and vegetable
common European market to finance both the setting up (50% of initial expen-
ditures) and operations (2% of annual expenditures) of Producers‘ Organizations
(PO). According to the EU policy goals, POs should plan production in order
to meet demand, decide and enforce quality standards, help reducing produc-
tion costs and promote environmental-friendly technology adoption.1 Advocates
of the regulation claim that this approach to market organization should make
producers more responsible for their actions and help the agricultural sector to
bargain with an increasingly concentrated retail sector. In addition, by allowing
an orderly marketing, it should help consumers too.
In many countries around the world there exist some producers‘ groups set
up for the same purposes. For example, in Canada for maple syrup producers;
1See Appendix A.1.1 for more details about the EU regulation.
8
in Colombia, for coffee producers; in Italy and France, for wine producers. This
form of market regulation is not new even to the European Union. Indeed, in the
60s and 70s specific laws promoted the establishment of Producer Organizations
granting them the power to regulate market transactions. But with the new
intervention and the public funds made available the European Union is placing
greater emphasis on the role of these organizations in the fruit and vegetable
markets. In addition, the EU Commission is considering this policy instrument
also for the reform of the wine and milk sectors.
This type of market regulation is reminiscent of the Marketing Orders that
were initiated after the 30s for different perennial crops in the US, especially
in California. Following years of falling incomes for farmers, the US Congress
in 1937 enacted the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act that allowed the
majority of producers of certain crops to set up Marketing Orders whose rules
could be extended to all the producers and handlers, and whose main objectives
were the orderly marketing and the quality regulation of products.
The Marketing Orders‘ experience in recent years has been subject to a con-
siderable array of criticism because of their adverse welfare effects for consumers
and sometimes for producers. Indeed, in the best case scenario, when the Mar-
keting Orders perform properly, they give market power to the producers at the
expense of consumers (USDA, 1981; Shephard, 1986; Jesse, 1987). It would then
seem difficult to justify this intervention in the economy if not by the usual income
distribution or political-economy arguments.2
2A different feature of the regulation envisioned for the European market makes the compar-
ison with the US experience not completely appropriate. Indeed in Europe PO‘s participation
is voluntary, while in the US, once the Order is established, participation by producers and
handlers is compulsory. But where the European regulation assigns to POs the power, when 23
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The analysis proposed in this essay is concerned with the welfare effects of
the regulation and its focus is centered mainly with quality related issues. With
the voluntary participation of producers, the supply-control task is likely to be
relatively unsuccessful. If successful, it would be subject to antitrust provisions,
as recently has happened in Europe in some agricultural and food markets (Gobbo
and Cazzola, 1996). Quality control, on the other hand, seems the most likely
tool for the regulation of the market. It can be more easily enforced, and its
determination is probably the most relevant decision for these organizations. In
addition, it is an interesting aspect of the more general problem of heterogeneity
among economic agents and the design of economic policies.
Traditionally, the main economic analysis of agricultural policies centers on
quantity, price, and risk implications of different policies. A growing part of the
literature now deals with quality issues. A market failure for quality provision
is often the starting point for the analysis of some form of public regulation,
even though it is often far from clear whether public intervention can in fact
contribute to its solution. Previous analyses of the welfare effects of quality
regulation enforced at the Order‘s level in the form of a minimum-quality standard
show that it can not be welfare increasing. The results are related to the case
when quality is observable (Bockstael, 1984) or to exogenous unobserved (by
consumers) characteristics (Chambers and Weiss, 1992).
The paper focuses on self-regulation by PO‘s as an alternative to market or
public intervention. The trend is toward less Government intervention in the
economy, and recent findings in the literature show that in some situations self-
of producers agree, to extend the rules on quality standards and production technologies to all
producers in a region, it resembles the US Marketing Orders experience.
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regulation can be an effective way to improve quality provision both with respect
to the market outcome and to public intervention (Gehrig and Jost, 1995). In
general, as a rule of thumb, self-regulation can never work when there is a conflict
between what is best for a rational self-regulated industry and what is best for
social welfare (Fletcher, 1993).
The approach of the paper is the explicit consideration of the democratic
process through which quality levels must be decided upon and enforced in the
PO. It distinguishes between a constitutional phase, in which each of the par-
ticipating producers votes on the best remuneration scheme for quality, and a
working phase, in which quality regulation must be enforced at the PO‘s level.
The second phase, the working of the group of producers, is analyzed taking into
consideration the incentives of heterogeneous producers, i.e., the constraints rep-
resented by the voluntary participation and the asymmetric information about
individual producers, in the spirit of the mechanism-design literature. The results
can then be compared with those resulting from the first- best.
In the agricultural cooperatives literature, the efficiency and fairness of dif-
ferent pricing mechanisms are the subject of a lively debate. One of the main
contributions (Sexton, 1986) shows why it may be inefficient to have a marginal
pricing rule and that it may be preferred to have also some additional lump-sum
fees or rebates, even though these latter might not be feasible because of het-
erogeneous membership. Vercammen et al. (1996) shows the different pricing
mechanisms with heterogeneous producers and asymmetric information. In their
work, the choice of the different mechanism is exogenous, and no consideration
is given to the democratic process with which the group decides upon the rules.
The analysis in the paper describes the outcome of the group‘s democratic
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process and expresses it in terms of mechanisms (or optimal contracts), that is a
payment for producers and a quality level provided by the group. It may easily
be extended to consider producers that are heterogeneous in size or efficiency,
like in the tradition of the agricultural cooperatives literature.
We consider a situation in which only one group can be formed. This analysis
is therefore relevant for the US Marketing Orders‘ experience or for the cases
allowed by the EU regulation in which Producers‘ Organizations rules can be
extended to all producers in a definite region. In addition, it applies to all those
examples of self-regulation by producer‘s groups when there is no competition
from other groups, e.g., the collective management of appellation contrôlée, either
because of granted legal authority or for other economic or physical reasons.
The next section introduces a simplified model that tries to capture the main
features of the situation at hand. It is a model of hidden information, with two
types of producers - high and low-quality - with a relatively simple production
technology. Section three explains the results for the case in which the PO can
freely implement an efficient pricing mechanism (separating mechanism) and the
majority in the group is of high-quality producers. In the fourth section we derive
the results when the PO is composed of a majority of low-quality producers. In
the fifth section, with a numerical example we compare the different results in
terms of the resulting profits for both types of producers. The last section closes
with some conclusions.
2.2 The Model
Consider an agricultural commodity, i.e., an orange, an apple, etc., that can be
thought of as an experience good. Its quality can vary and it is not known by
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consumers before consumption. The problem of asymmetric information could be
alleviated by a brand or a label which would help to establish reputation for higher
quality and restore confidence in the market. Agricultural firms have usually a
relatively small size, and since marketing investments have big economies of scale
we assume that a single producer can not profitably set up an individual brand.3
The problem is for a group of farmers to decide whether or not to form a
Producers Organization (PO) with common rules about production and trade of
products. If a PO is formed, a management committee will be formed to execute
the agreement. The PO needs to maintain the reputation for the brand and the
group so it requires costly effort - i.e., quality provision - from the producers-
stakeholders. Every producer is expected to supply the good at some specified
quality level and the management is in charge of the monitoring and the enforce-
ment of the rules. We assume the management has no divergent interests with
the firm, i.e., we astray from Agency problems with the management.
The group is made of n heterogeneous producers. Some have better out-
side opportunities and some have better skills, i.e., lower costs of producing
high-quality products. For the purpose of the paper, we assume for simplic-
ity that producers can be of 2 types: θH denotes the high-quality type and θL
the low-quality. High-quality means that the producer has a lower marginal cost
of production for quality.4 For convenience, we assume n is an odd number and
3The depiction of the following game in general resembles the working of a marketing coop-
erative. A group of producers can seize an opportunity only through collective action: either
some large investments with increasing returns, or an increase in bargaining power, or the
establishment of a brand with some collective reputation or other marketing programs.
4Lewis et al.(1989) suggest that producers may have different costs and different outside
opportunities.
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nL + nH = n.
The production technology for different producers can be represented using a
technology set in the following way:
Tθi = {(x, q) : x can produce q | θi},
where x ∈ <+ is a vector of inputs that producers choose, and q ∈ <+ is the
quality level. We normalize production level to unity, so we can work only with
quality levels. Producers‘ choices can be indirectly represented with their cost
function:
c(q, θi) = minx{wx : (x, q) ∈ Tθi},
wherew is the vector of input prices. To allow for heterogeneity among producers,
we assume type θi member‘s cost of production, c(q(θi), θi), to be twice differen-
tiable, strictly increasing, strictly convex in q and without fixed costs. In addition,
we express the better skills of producers of type θHas: cq(q, θ
H) < cq(q, θ
L) for
all q, that is the marginal cost of quality is everywhere higher for type θL.
We consider risk-neutral producers whose preferences are separable in income
and effort and whose profits for the production of a unit of good of quality q are:
π(θi) = y(q(θi))−wx, where y(q(θi)) is the price each producer receives from the
PO for a unit of product of quality q(θi).
In this paper, we consider only hidden information: each producer has private
information about his own type. To simplify things, we assume that the PO can
perfectly observe and verify the quality level provided by each producer. Given
this assumption, the PO can ensure that the payment to the producers should
be a function of the quality provided, y(q).
The PO sells producers‘ commodity on the market and the price it receives
is related to the quality that the consumers or buyers expect. Ultimately, the
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formation of consumers‘ expectations is a rather critical choice to be made, but
at this point for the purpose of exposition it suffices to simplify by assuming that
the consumers‘ willingness to pay is a function of the average quality of the good
marketed by the PO.5 If q(θi) represents the quality of the good produced by the
producer of type θi, the average quality from the n producers participating in




i), with i = L,H, and the consumers‘
willingness to pay equal to p(Q). It has a general form - with p0(Q) > 0 and
p00(Q) ≤ 0 - to accommodate for different market structures.6
One feature of the group is that it is a polity: any PO that is formed must be
governed through a democratic process or some collective choice mechanism to
decide upon the rules that govern the group, i.e., no dictatorial ruling is allowed.
To keep things simple we consider the case in which the decisions are made
according to majority rule. Here we are interested in the rules that affect the
economic behavior of the producers: in particular the payments for the quality
level provided by the different producers, which must be decided and offered in
advance to all producers.
The potential n members meet together to decide whether to form the PO
and how to run it. If the PO is formed, the producers would pool together their
5Even though this assumption is quite standard in the literature, for example on quality and
international trade (Chiang and Masson, 1988), it is not devoid of criticism. Indeed, as Tirole
puts it, it leads to bootstrap equilibria in which reputation matters because consumers believe
it matters (Tirole, 1988: 123).
6It is important to consider different market structures since it has been recognized that the
higher the level of coordination or collusion in an industry is and the higher the tendency to
set the minimum quality standard too high for the social welfare optimum is (Leland, 1979;
Shaked and Sutton, 1981; Bockstael, 1987).
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production under the collective brand and would receive a price in the market
according to the level of quality they provide. Individually, from the PO each
producer would receive according to what quality of commodity he has provided.
Each individual behaves in his own interest and would like to see the PO adopting
the policies that better suit his own needs. So he votes for those proposed rules
on how the PO should reward producers that best suit his own interests.
Producers are heterogeneous and have different preferences. Each producer
can expect that what he can get from the PO is ”bounded” from above and
from below. Indeed, he cannot receive less than what he would get from his
outside opportunities, because otherwise he would be better off not participating;
and he cannot receive more than what is allowed by the fact that the PO must
break- even. Even though we do not consider explicitly the voting process in this
paper, for the purpose of illustration it is reasonable to think that among the
implementable mechanisms each producer independently votes for the one that
is the best for himself. Given the assumption about types, it is sensible to think
that two contracts emerge, one that is optimal for low-type and one for high-type
producers. The pricing mechanism that is then decided at the PO‘s level is the
one that is voted by the majority of the producers.
The idealized situation can be translated into a game which can be represented
in the following way (fig. 2.1). Nature at the beginning of the game decides the
distribution of the n producers between the two types: nL producers of type θL
and nH producers of type θ
H . Farmers have private information about their own
type, but the distribution of types (Nature‘s choice) is not known. If nL > nH ,
there is a low-quality majority, while if nH > nL the majority is of high-quality
producers. At this stage no one knows which type is the majority.
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feasible contracts and 
vote for the welfare 
maximizing one.
Producers execute
their contracts and 
payoffs are realized.
The first phase is the constitutional choice, and it is represented by the
period 1. The producers vote and agree on a set of initial rules - the constitution
- which specifies the democratic rules of the producers‘ organization, the fees
to be paid, the rights and obligations of each agent. The constitution can be
considered as a long-term contract that all agents in the group must agree upon to
participate and that should specify how to handle future unforeseen contingencies.
We assume that producers vote for what is best for their own interest and the set
of rules and regulations that gets the majority of the votes wins. Producers at the
constitutional stage know their own type, but they do not know the parameters
of the distribution of the other producers types.
The next is the working phase, or period 2 in fig. 2.1. Producers can either
reject or accept the contract. If they reject the contract they remain at their
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reservation utility.7 If they accept the contract, they start to work with the PO
and they must comply with its rules, from which follows the outcomes and payoffs
for each of them.8
This one-shot game can be solved by backward induction. The optimal con-
tract in the first phase can be found taking into account the incentives in the
second phase. We use mechanism-design because it allows to take into account
differences in types. Also, it is a powerful framework that enables to characterize
a very broad class of policy rules or instruments, and it might allow to draw
general results. In contrast, models on self-regulation are usually case specific.
Without imposing too much restrictions on the structure of the model, either in
the demand or cost side, mechanism design might allow to derive more general
conclusions and it might also help to explain the available results in the literature
as special cases.
A mechanism in our case is the combination of payments to and quality level
provided by producers. Before starting the analysis we mention one result that
usually holds for mechanism design problems like the one we are considering. The
revelation principle (Myerson, 1979) allows to focus on direct revelation mecha-
nisms, mechanisms constructed so that it is in each producer‘s dominant strategy
to tell the truth, provided that one takes into account the presence of asymmetric
information. That is to say, one can design a contract in which producers tell the
7Here we assume that producers prefer to stay in the PO when offered a contract that
drives them to their reservation utility. One could argue that the PO could offer ε (small
enough) above the reservation utility to induce the producer to participate. We also rule out
the possibility of collusion among any subset of producers.
8At this stage, we consider the case in which all n producers must be given enough incentives
to participate. This may not always be the case, since n can be endogenous.
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truth, i.e., it is implementable, provided it is incentive compatible. Hence, any
payment schedule that the producers adopt has to satisfy:
y(θL)− c(q(θL), θL) ≥ y(θH)− c(q(θH), θL), (2.1)
y(θH)− c(q(θH), θH) ≥ y(θL)− c(q(θL), θH).
From (2.1) follows the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Any mechanism (y(θi), q(θi)) that satisfies eq. (2.1) must also satisfy:
y(θH) ≥ y(θL),
q(θH) ≥ q(θL)
Note at this point we are working only with dominant strategies and we do not
consider yet the problem of the group dynamics, in particular the expectations of
what other producers are doing. Among the contracts that are implementable,
producers have to figure out those that are feasible, i.e., those that satisfy eq.
(2.1) and rationality or participation constraint like the following:
y(θi)− c(q(θi), θi)) ≥ u(θi) = 0, (PCi)
which says that each producer participates on a voluntary basis and so must
receive at least its reservation utility, which at this stage for the purpose of





i) ≥ F. (BC)
np(Q) is the revenue - net of processing costs - that the PO receives from selling
the members‘ good in the market and is a function of the average quality Q. The
aggregate revenues from the products sold in the market minus the payments to
the producers must cover the fixed costs F for the Producer Organization.
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• A benchmark: the first-best.
The outcomes of the game played in the following sections may be compared
with the equilibrium that would result without the PO. One possible benchmark
could be the market equilibrium, provided there is full information. Another
comparison would be the case of a regulator with perfect observability of quality
and a utilitarian social welfare function with unitary weights.9 In both cases,
the first-best equilibrium would be that each producer receives a price that is a
function of the quality he provides, or the following first order conditions must
be satisfied:
p0(Q) = cq(q∗(θL), θL), (FB)
p0(Q) = cq(q∗(θH), θH).
According to (FB), the regulator would induce both types to produce at their
marginal cost, i.e., it would be the first-best provision. This result is driven by
the observability of quality: since the payment is based on an observable and
verifiable characteristic, the first-best can be obtained. The same outcome would
result in a competitive market provided quality was observable.
Example 1 Suppose we have the following functional form for demand and cost
functions. A linear demand p(Q) = a+bQ and a quadratic cost function c(q(θi), θi) =
9We are assuming the Agency cares mostly about producers‘ welfare - we do not consider yet
the effects on consumers‘ - and does not discriminate between different types of producers. The
first assumption seems in line with most of the interventions made by Government Agencies
dealing with agricultural regulations, i.e., Departments or Ministries of Agriculture. The second
is neutral in the sense that many interventions seem to favor small producers - even though
these are not necessarily the low-quality type - and some favor the more efficient producers.




θi[q(θi)]2, such that c(q(θL), θL) = L
2
[qL]2 and c(q(θH), θH) = H
2
[qH ]2 where qL
and qH are the quality level chosen respectively by type θL and type θH. The
marginal cost for the low-quality and the high-quality producers are then the fol-
lowing: cq(q(θL), θL) = LqL and cq(q(θH), θH) = HqH. Note that H < L. With
these functional forms the (FB) conditions may be expressed as:
b = LqL
b = HqH
with the solutions being qL = b
L




In this and the next section, we derive the optimal mechanism for the cases in
which one of the two types is in the majority and decides the mechanism with no
constitutional constraints. The resulting (separating) mechanisms, one for the
low-quality and the other for the high-quality producers, are then compared to
the first-best. All scenarios have the common constraints that each producer‘s
participation is on a voluntary basis, that each type should pick the mechanism
intended for him, and that the PO must break even.
The first case we consider is when Nature draws nH > nL and so the majority
is of high-quality producers. At the constitutional stage, they have to pick the
best of implementable and feasible contracts. In this case the majority of the
votes goes to the optimal contract selected by high-quality types, that is the
program that has the objective the maximization of their profits (π(θH)) and is







L)− c(q(θL), θL) ≥ y(θH)− c(q(θH), θL), (2.2)
(ICH) y(θ
H)− c(q(θH), θH) ≥ y(θL)− c(q(θL), θH),
(PCi) y(θ






The choice variables y(θi), q(θi) must satisfy Lemma 1, that is y(θH) ≥ y(θL)
and q(θH) ≥ q(θL). (PO) is the maximand and represents the profits of the
producer that is in the drawn majority. (ICL) and (ICH) are the incentive
compatibility constraints: since the management can not verify the producers‘
cost of production, the POmust offer a payment y(θi) based on observable quality
to induce each producer to select himself and pick the mechanism designed for
him.
(PCi) are the participation or rationality constraints of the two types. Outside
opportunities are denoted by u(θi) and which for simplicity‘s sake we normalize
both to zero. (BC) is the break-even constraint: the net aggregate revenues
minus the payments to the producers should cover the fixed costs F .
Following Grossman and Hart (1983), Weymark (1986) and Chambers (1997),







y(θH) | ICL, ICH , PCi, BC)
ª− c(q(θH), θH)¾ . (2.3)
The high-type producer first chooses the payment scheme that maximizes the
total payments to his type θH while satisfying all the constraints, and then finds
the efficient level of quality to provide. Following the steps adopted in Weymark
(1986) and Chambers (1997), it can be shown that the PO’s budget constraint
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(BC) is binding; if not, the PO could still increase the maximand without vio-






, is illustrated in fig. 2.2. If a solution to the first stage exists
then it must be in this line.
Equation (2.1) gives the incentive compatible constraints that must be satis-
fied, that is:
c(q(θH), θL)− c(q(θL), θL) ≥ y(θH)− y(θL) ≥ c(q(θH), θH)− c(q(θL), θH). (2.4)
These are represented in fig. 2.2 as the two lines above the bisector for a fixed
q and given strict inequalities in Lemma 1. The payments to producers that
satisfy both the BC and the IC are then those in the BC line between the two
ICs. The last constraint to consider in this first step is the low-quality type
producers‘ participation constraint which can be represented as a vertical line
with the intercept y(θL) = c(q(θL), θL).
We consider only two cases. The first is when the participation constraint is
not binding, i.e., it is to the left of point B. The second case is when the low-
quality type’s participation constraint is binding, that is it is to the right of or
at point B but to the left of point A. The third case is when the participation
constraint cuts the BC to the right of point A, i.e., there is no feasible solution
to the optimization problem. We analyze them in this order.
2.3.1 Participation constraint non-binding
In this subsection we analyze the case in which the PC cuts the BC to the left and
above point B. Since the objective is to maximize type θH ‘s welfare, the relevant
point to consider is B. In the first step, the relevant constraints that are binding
are the budget constraint and the low-quality producer‘s incentive compatibility
23












constraint (the PO has to avoid that the low-type ”poses” as a high-type). We
then have the following:
c(q(θH), θL)− c(q(θL), θL) + y(θL) = y(θH), (2.5)
np(Q)− F − nLy(θL) = nHy(θH),
from which we obtain y(θH) = [c(q(θH), θL) − c(q(θL), θL)]nL
n
+ p(Q) − F
n
and
y(θL) = y(θH) + c(q(θL), θL) − c(q(θH), θL). As this latter equation shows, the
payment for the low-quality type makes him just indifferent between his payment
scheme and the one intended for the high-quality should he, the low-type, pose
as high-type. In Guesnerie and Seade‘s (1982) terminology, this would represent
an upward link in the payment-quality schedule.
In the second step, the problem is the choice of the efficient quality levels.
From Lemma 1 we know that q(θH) ≥ q(θL), and so we can define an auxiliary
variable α ≥ 0 such that q(θH) ≥ q(θL) + α and which reduces the problem
















i), we obtain the following first order con-








H), θL)− cq(q(θL), θL)]nL
n









− cq(q(θH), θH) ≤ 0,
α ≥ 0,
where p0(Q) and cq(·) are the first derivatives with respect to q. After some
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manipulations and assuming interior solutions for both variables10 we obtain the
following solutions:
p0(Q)− cq(q(θH), θH) = nL
n
[cq(q(θ
L), θL)− cq(q(θH), θL)], (2.7)
p0(Q) = cq(q(θL), θL).
The optimal pricing mechanism requires low-quality types producing at the
point at which their marginal cost equals the marginal price the PO receives from
the sale of the commodity. At the same time, high-quality types produce up to
a point above their marginal cost, since cq(q(θ
L), θL)− cq(q(θH), θL) ≤ 0 implies
p0(Q) ≤ cq(q(θH), θH). Note that the distortion for the high-quality types is
higher the wider the cost differences with the low-type are and the more numerous
the group of low-type producers is. When both types‘ costs are similar and low-
quality types are few the distortion would be lower.
Proposition 1 The Producers’ Organization with a high-quality majority and
an efficient remuneration scheme overall produces a higher average quality level
than the first-best.
Proof. For a heuristic proof, we follow Chambers (1997). Respectively from



















10To assume interior solutions for the auxiliary variable implies there is no bunching of types.
A result originally due to Guesnerie and Seade (1982) shows that an optimal mechanism with
only two types cannot involve bunching. See Appendix A.1.3 for a formal proof.
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which represent the slope of the curves L and H represented in fig. 2.3, and
which are straight lines only for exposition convenience. Curve L cuts curve H
from above. The points lying on the curves satisfy the (FB) conditions. The
point denoted by the coordinates q∗(θL) and q∗(θH) satisfies (FB) simultaneously.
On the points below the curves, the marginal price in greater than the mar-
ginal cost, while on the points above the curves the marginal cost is higher than
the marginal price. To be consistent with eq.(2.7) a point must be on curve L but
above curve H since p0(Q) < cq(q(θH), θH). A suitable candidate could be point A:
a quality combination for the two producers types consistent with eq. (2.7) would
imply the high-quality type θH to produce more quality, i.e., q(θH) > q∗(θH) and
the low-quality type to produce less quality than the first-best q(θL) < q∗(θL).
Using Lemma 1, we may conclude that eq. (2.7) implies a spreading of quality
provision, or in other words that q(θH) > q∗(θH) > q∗(θL) > q(θL). This spread-
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∗(θi)). Since the price func-









or that the average quality provided by the group when the majority is of high-
type producers is higher than the first-best.
To see it in another way, consider fig. 2.4 which shows the marginal cost
curves for the two types and the marginal price schedule, all as a function of the
quality level. In the first-best, the quality level picked by the two types is denoted
respectively by q∗(θL) and q∗(θH). The average quality provided by the group is
given by the weighted (by their relative number ni
n
) average of the two first-best
quality levels and is represented by Q∗. Now, notice that another way of putting
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eq. (2.7) is cq(q(θL), θL) = p0(Q) < cq(q(θH), θH). With a separating mechanism
and high-quality majority, high-quality types would produce at a higher level of
quality than the first-best, since p0(Q) < cq(q(θH), θH). The quality provided by
the PO would then be the weighted average of the first-best level for the low-type
but of a higher than the first-best level for the high-quality type , i.e., a higher
level than the first-best overall, assuming the same relative number for the two
types.
Example 2 Using the same functional form specified above (linear demand and










cq(q(θ L), θ L)
cq(q(θ H), θ H)
q*(θ L) q*(θ H)
p’(Q*)
Q*
The solution of the system of the two equations is qL = b
L
and qH = bnH
nH−LnL . It





















Apolicy that would implement such an optimal mechanism could be a minimum-
quality standard tailored to keep the low-quality types just above their reservation
utility and a premium for high-quality products that would be lucrative only for
high-quality producers. The rule just described could end up being a group that
commercializes only products that are devoid of any blemishes. Any consumer
used to buying fruits would recognize that among the commodities traded by
those Orders with high-quality reputation it is almost impossible to find some-
thing different from a less than almost perfect product.
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2.3.2 Participation constraint binding
Now we analyze the case in which the low-quality type‘s participation constraint
cuts the budget constraint to the right and below point B. In the first step, the
relevant constraints to consider now are the budget constraint and the low-quality
producer‘s rationality constraint. We then have the following:
y(θL) = c(q(θL), θL), (2.10)
np(Q)− F − nLy(θL) = nHy(θH),






c(q(θL), θL) and y(θL) =
c(q(θL), θL). As this latter equation shows, the payment for the low-quality type
leaves him with no rents.
In the second step, the problem is the choice of the efficient quality level. We
define the auxiliary variable α ≥ 0 such that q(θH) ≥ q(θL) + α to reduce the











c(q(θL), θL)− c(q(θH), θH)
¾
. (2.11)




i), we obtain the following first order




















− cq(q(θH), θH) ≤ 0, α ≥ 0,
where again p0(Q) and cq(·) are the first derivatives with respect to q. After some
manipulations we obtain the following solutions:
p0(Q) = cq(q(θH), θH), (2.12)
p0(Q) = cq(q(θL), θL).
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According to the equation above, when the high-quality types are in the ma-
jority and decide the optimal mechanism, given that the rationality constraint
for the low-quality types in the minority is binding, they offer a payment that is
equal to the minority type’s cost of production and such that the choice for the
quality level is not distorted with respect to the first-best. That is to say that
the group produces an average quality that is equal to the first-best.
2.3.3 No feasible solutions
In this section we establish for what technology and demand parameter values
we can expect the rationality constraint for the minority‘s type to be binding. In
addition, we consider when it is not feasible to form a group. To help us in this
analysis, let us go back to fig. 2.2. We can notice that at point B the payment
for the low-quality type is such that y(θL)−c(q∗(θL), θL) = y(θH)−c(q∗(θH), θL),
i.e., the low-quality type is indifferent between the payment/quality combination
intended for him and that intended for the other type. Note also that the quality
level chosen is that corresponding to the first-best, i.e., no distortions for the








, which can be plugged back to the previous equation to obtain the




[c(q∗(θL), θL)− c(q∗(θH), θL)]. Call it yB(θL)
since it is the payment for type θL at point B. Again, note that we are considering
the quality level (at individual and group‘s level) corresponding to the first-best.
If we now consider the payment for the low-quality type corresponding to the same
quality level, i.e., the first-best, but when the rationality constraint is binding and









[c(q∗(θL), θL)− c(q∗(θH), θL)] ≥ c(q∗(θL), θL). (2.13)
When this inequality is satisfied it is indeed feasible for the group to leave
some rents to the minority type‘s producers. If violated, it is better for the group
to drive the minority‘s types to their reservation utility. The term on the left of
the inequality can be interpreted as the size of the opportunity to be taken by
the group via the collective action, which is a function of the demand parameters,
minus the costs of doing it. These latter depend on the fixed cost component,
spread among all the producers, and on the differences between the two types. As
the reader may recall, the differences in costs, weighted by the relative number
of the high-quality producers, are indeed important in determining the incentive-
compatible payment for the minority‘s type.
The term on the right of the inequality is the payment for the minority‘s
type when his rationality constraint is binding. This inequality says that when
the ”size of the cake” is big enough, then it is optimal for the majority to leave
some rents to the minority‘s producers. Vice-versa, when there are not big op-
portunities to be taken or the group is relatively heterogenous, in terms of cost
differences and relative number of producers, it is optimal for the majority to
leave the minority‘s producers at their reservation utility in order to increase the
group’s welfare.
Now consider when it is never feasible for a high-quality majority to form a
group in the first place. This may happen if the minority type‘s participation
constraint is to the right of point A in fig. 2.2. At this point, the payment schedule
makes the high-quality type indifferent, i.e., y(θH) − c(q∗(θH), θH) = y(θL) −









, which can be substituted in the previous equation to




[c(q∗(θL), θH)− c(q∗(θH), θH)]. Call
this yA(θ
L). Now consider the payment for the low-quality type corresponding
to the same quality level but when the rationality constraint is binding. The
minority type‘s producers get y(θL) = c(q∗(θL), θL), and we can form the following
inequality:
yA(θ





[c(q∗(θL), θH)− c(q∗(θH), θH)] ≥ c(q∗(θL), θL). (2.14)
When this inequality is satisfied the group may form, otherwise it can not.
Note that yB(θL) and yA(θL) differ only in their cost term inside the brackets,
which is bigger (in absolute value) for yB(θ
L). This leads us to consider the
following cases.
- Case 1 : yA(θL) ≥ yB(θL) > c(q∗(θL), θL). For these demand and technology
parameter values, the most favorable for the group, the group may form and the
minority receives some rents.
- Case 2 : yA(θ
L) ≥ c(q∗(θL), θL) ≥ yB(θL). In this case the group still forms
but it does not leave rents to the minority‘s types.
- Case 3 : c(q∗(θL), θL) > yA(θL) ≥ yB(θL). Given these parameter values,
the opportunity to be taken via the collective action is too small and/or the
producers are too heterogenous for the group to form.
2.4 Low-Quality Majority
In this case Nature draws nL > nH and low-type producers have the majority.
The pricing rule is then crafted in order to enhance low-quality producers‘ welfare
subject to the high-quality minority members voluntary participation in the PO.
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The Board of Directors enforces a pricing mechanism that can be represented as






L)− c(q(θL), θL) ≥ y(θH)− c(q(θH), θL), (2.15)
(ICH) y(θ
H)− c(q(θH), θH) ≥ y(θL)− c(q(θL), θH),
(PCi) y(θ






where the maximand represents the profits of the low-quality type and the con-
straints are those defined in eq. (2.1). Note that the choice variables y(θi) and
q(θi) must satisfy Lemma 1. In this case the relevant participation constraint is
that of type θH whom must be ensured enough profits in order to participate.
As was done in the previous case, the problem can be decomposed in two steps.







y(θL) | ICL, ICH , PCH , BC
ª− c(q(θL), θL)¾ . (2.16)
Using the arguments we gave in the previous case, it can be shown that
the PO‘s budget constraint is binding. Eq.(2.4) gives the incentive compatible
constraints that must be satisfied and that are represented in fig. 2.2. In addition,
the participation constraint to consider is the high-quality type‘s, represented by
a horizontal line with the intercept y(q(θH)) = c(q(θH), θH). Consider three
cases: the first is when the participation constraint is not binding, i.e., it is below
point A. The second case is when the high-quality type’s participation constraint
is binding, that is it is above point A but below point B. We analyze these cases
34
in the following subsections and we argue that only the first and the third are
relevant for this majority.
2.4.1 Participation constraint non-binding
In this subsection we analyze the case in which the PCH cuts the BC below
point A. Since the objective is to maximize type θL‘s welfare, the relevant point
to consider is A. In the first step, the relevant constraints that are binding are
the budget constraint and the high-quality producer incentive compatibility con-
straint (the PO now has to take into account the incentive for the high-type ”to
pose” as a low type). We have the following:
y(θH) = y(θL) + c(q(θH), θH)− c(q(θL), θH), (2.17)
nLy(θ
L) = np(Q)− F − nHy(θH),





the first equation in the system of eq. (2.17) represents the payment to the high-
quality producer and says he must be just indifferent between his payment and
the one intended for the low-quality type (downward link). The second step of the











where the auxiliary variable α ≥ 0, defined as before as q(θH) = q(θL) + α by
virtue of Lemma 1, simplifies it to a simple unconstrained nonlinear program.
In order to solve the maximization problem, we obtain the following first order
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H), θH)− cq(q(θL), θH)]nH
n









After some manipulations and assuming interior solutions we obtain the fol-
lowing:
p0(Q)− cq(q(θL), θL) = nH
n
[cq(q(θ
H), θH)− cq(q(θL), θH)], (2.19)
p0(Q) = cq(q(θH), θH).
When low-quality producers have the majority, their choice of the pricing
mechanism induces high-quality producers to produce at their marginal cost, and
offer them a payment that leave them just indifferent between it and the pay-
ment intended for low-quality types. Low-quality producers, since cq(q(θ
H), θH)−
cq(q(θ
L), θH) > 0 implies that p0(Q) > cq(q(θL), θL), produce less than the first-
best .
Proposition 2 The average quality provided by the group when the majority is
of low-type producers and it uses an efficient remuneration scheme is lower than
the first-best.
Proof. This can be seen by returning to fig. 2.3 and using the same ar-
guments of the previous section which are taken from Chambers (1997). A
point consistent with eq. (2.19), must be on curve H and below curve L, since
p0(Q) > cq(q(θL), θL), e.g., point B. The quality combination for the two produc-
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ers types consistent with eq. (2.19) would imply the high-quality type θH to pro-
duce more quality and the low-quality type to produce less than the first-best. Us-
ing Lemma 1, eq. (2.19) implies a spreading of quality provision, or that q(θH) >
q∗(θH) > q∗(θL) > q(θL), which together with eq. (2.19) and the convexity of




















∗(θi)). Since the price function is strictly









Fig. 2.4 again may help to see it in another way. The weighted average of the
first-best level of quality for the high-quality type θH and the lower level (than
the first-best) of low-type is lower than the overall average quality provided in
the first-best.
Example 3 With linear demand and quadratic cost functions, eq. (2.19) becomes
the following:
b− LqL = nH
n
(HqH −HqL),
b = HqH .
The solution is then qH = b
H
and qL = bnL





















The Producers Organization produces at a lower quality level, since the ma-
jority of producers - the low-quality type - is relatively inefficient at providing
quality. In this way they maximize their profits and have the high-quality mem-
bers making some positive profits. A policy that could implement this optimal
mechanism would pay a relatively high price to low-quality products and would
have a relatively low premium for high-quality ones.
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2.4.2 No feasible solutions
In the case of low-quality majority, the minority type‘s participation constraint
can never be binding. To see it, consider that if the high-quality type is left
with no rents, i.e., y(θH)− c(q(θH), θH) = 0, he may pose as a low-type and get
y(θL)−c(q(θL), θH) > 0. The fact is that the high-quality type can always pretend
to be a low-quality type and get higher profits than this latter since he is more
productive. So we would have y(θL)− c(q(θL), θH) > y(θH)− c(q(θH), θH) ≥ 0.
But this would contradict the incentive compatibility constraint for the high-
quality type, i.e., y(θH) − c(q(θH), θH) ≥ y(θL) − c(q(θL), θH). The only way
to leave the high-quality type at no rents would be to offer a payment/quality
combination that would make the low-quality to earn negative profits. But this of
course in not reasonable. With a low-quality majority, the high-quality minority‘s
producers will be always left with some rents above their reservation utility.
The problem then is for what parameter values it is feasible to form a group
in case the low-quality producers are more numerous. This would not be fea-
sible were the participation constraint of the minority‘s type (the high-quality
producer) above point B. At this latter point, the payment schedule leaves the
low-quality type indifferent, i.e., y(θL) − c(q∗(θL), θL) = y(θH) − c(q∗(θH), θL),












[c(q∗(θL), θL)− c(q∗(θH), θL)]. Call this yB(θH). Now consider the
payment for the high-quality type corresponding to the same first-best quality
level but with a binding rationality constraint, i.e., y(θH) = c(q∗(θH), θH). We
can form the following inequality:
yB(θ





[c(q∗(θL), θL)− c(q∗(θH), θL)] ≥ c(q∗(θH), θH). (2.20)
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When this inequality is satisfied the group may form, otherwise it can not.
We may then have the following cases.
- Case 1 : yB(θ
H) ≥ c(q∗(θH), θH). For these demand and technology pa-
rameter values, the most favorable for the group, the latter may form and the
minority receives some rents.
- Case 2 : c(q∗(θH), θH) > yB(θH). Given these parameter values, the group
cannot form.
2.5 A numerical example
In the previous sections we show that when a group forms and decides on which
payments schemes and quality levels to enforce for each producer it may face
different situations, depending on the external (market demand and process-
ing/marketing costs) and internal (cost differences and relative number of pro-
ducers ) conditions. When these conditions are not very favorable to the group,
the majority‘s better choice is to drive the minority producers to their reser-
vation utility. When the conditions though are more favorable, the majority‘s
better choice is to leave some positive profits to the minority‘s types. This is of
course not out of generosity but it is a needed choice for the majority in order to
provide an incentive compatible payment scheme.
Another result worth noticing is the asymmetry between the low-quality and
the high-quality majority with respect to whether the rationality constraint is
binding. The explanation for this asymmetry is relatively simple. When the
low-quality producers are in the majority, they find convenient to have the high-
quality producers in the group since these latter contribute to increase the average
quality of the commodity and so the price that the group can receive. But since
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the high-quality types are more efficient, they have to be ”bribed” to stay in the
group. In other terms, they can not be driven to their reservation utility because
they could just mimic the low-quality producers and earn more profits.
In the case of high-quality majority though, this is true only when the op-
portunities to be seized by the collective action are relatively big and so the
low-quality types must be left with some rents. If not, when the two types are
relatively similar, offering to the low-quality type a payment that drives him to
his reservation utility would not be incentive-compatible. The reader may also
wonder why the high-quality producers should want to keep the low-quality pro-
ducers in the group. The fact is that they would prefer in most cases to have the
low-quality producers in the group, even though this implies a lowering of the
average quality and then of the average price the group receives, because they
can extract some of the profits of the minority and keep it for themselves.
A numerical example can make all this clearer. Using the same functional
forms introduced before, we now show the results of some simulations (tables 2.1-
2.4). We have big cost differences, in tables 2.2 and 2.4, when the high-quality
type has a cost of producing quality that is 50% less than the other type; we have
small cost differences when the difference is 25% (tables 2.1 and 2.3). We also
want to take into account the group heterogeneity: when the group is composed
of 80% of producers of one type we consider it to be a homogeneous group, e.g.,
tables 2.1 and 2.2; otherwise, with a composition of 60% of the predominant type
of producers we consider it to be a heterogeneous group (see tables 2.3 and 2.4).
We then have four possible scenarios. Note that for exposition convenience, we
are not considering the fixed cost F for the goup.
Consider the first case, which we may consider the best case scenario since we
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have small cost differences and a homogeneous group (table 2.1). The first column
indicates the variables we find in the following columns. The next four columns
are for the high-quality majority. Starting with the second column, we find the
results for the first-best, then for the group when the high-quality majority leave
rents to the minority, for the group when no rents are left to the minority, and
the last (the fifth) column for when the majority decides to form a group of its
own. Columns 6-9 report the same for the low-quality majority.
Consider the last two rows of each column, which report the profit level for
the two types of producers in the different situations. Take the case of the high-
quality majority. They may try to offer a payment with no informational rents to
the low-quality type, but this is not incentive-compatible: the low-quality could
mimic the high-quality and obtain a profit of π(θL) = 3.0. Then the majority of
high-quality types will offer an incentive-compatible contract to the low-quality
producers, with π(θL) = 2.88, and obtain a profit π(θH) = 4.07. The alternative
for the high-quality producers would be to form a sub-group of only their own type
and in this case they would receive a profit of π(θH) = 4.0.11 The equilibrium of
the game (highlighted by bold and underscored characters) with this majority and
these parameter values is to leave some rents to the minority‘s type. The same
equilibrium results if, given these parameter values, the majority is of low-quality
producers, to give π(θL) = 3.29 and π(θH) = 3.79.
Table 2.1 also shows why the high-quality producers get a higher profit when
they are with the lower-quality producers than when they are alone. The fact
11When we consider the stand-alone scenario, i.e., when there is a sub-group of only one
type, we make a there ain’t enough room for the two of us in town assumption. That is to say,
it is possible to form only one sub-group which might be composed of the producers who would
be in the majority.
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is, as we explain above, that when in the majority the high-quality producers
can extract some surplus from the low-quality producers. Indeed, the average
price received by the group is p(Q) = 7.14 but the low-quality producers receive
a payment, still incentive-compatible, of only y(θL) = 5.13. The difference, equal





to give 0.5, is then taken by the high-quality producers who receive a
payment of y(θH) = 7.14 + 0.5 = 7.64, which allows them to get a higher profit
than were they to decide to go for their own sub-group (stand-alone).
Also note that when standing alone the high-quality producers would pick a
quality level that is equal to the first-best (q(θH) = 2) while when in the group
and having the majority they would produce more (q(θH) = 2.18) because of the
distortion we showed in the previous sections. One last thing to note is that in
some cases, notably when there are big cost differences between the two types,
i.e., cases 2.2 and 2.4 in the same number tables, the high-quality majority finds
it optimal to offer a payment that leaves the minority type at its reservation
utility
The same reasoning can be applied to the case of low-quality majority. In
this case though, to leave no rents to the high-quality producers in the minority
is never incentive compatible. So the high-quality type is always left with some
positive profits when the majority is of low-quality types, no matter the scenario
in our simulation. This last result illustrates the asymmetry in the payment
possibilities between the two majorities.
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2.6 Concluding remarks
Using the advances of the economics of incentives, this paper studies the interac-
tion of asymmetric information and the democratic process in the quality choices
of a group of heterogenous producers. With a simple model of adverse selection
we present the pricing rules and the quality provision in a group of producers
(Producers‘ Organization) facing an opportunity to gain from their collective
capacity to establish a reputation for their quality products.
This paper makes the choice of the PO‘s pricing mechanism endogenous, ex-
tending previous analyses in which the remuneration schemes were either ex-
ogenous or not implementable because of the heterogeneity among producers.
It compares different equilibria, according to which type of producer is in the
majority and to different demand and technology parameter values. For each
equilibria, we determine the profit levels for both types of producers and the
resulting quality provided by the different producers and by the group.
When the PO uses an efficient constitutional rule, i.e., it is allowed to offer a
different mechanism to each type, we find an asymmetry in the possible equilibria
between the high and the low-quality producers’ majorities. If market demand
and producers differences allow the group to form, the quality level provided by
the group with a low-quality majority is lower than the first-best. In addition,
the high-quality producers in the minority are left with some rents above their
reservation utility.
When high-quality producers are the majority, two different equilibria may
emerge. If demand conditions are favorable and the group not very heterogeneous,
the quality level provided by the group is higher than the first-best and the
minority’s type is left with some rents. If demand and group conditions are not
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very favorable but the group still forms, the quality level provided by the group
is the same as in the first-best but the low-quality producers in the minority are
left with no rents.
The model presented in this paper may be extended to consider the case of
competition between different Producers‘ Organizations, to make it more relevant
to analyze the regulation that the EU is already financing for the fruit and veg-
etable sectors and that is considering for the future reform of the wine and milk
sectors. A richer set of results could also be obtained by considering the trade-
off between quality and quantity in the producers‘ production process. Many
producer groups in agricultural markets are able to restrict output claiming it
can increase produce quality. But whether this is true remains an open question,
both theoretically and empirically.
Last thing to note is that the model may also be modified to consider different
mechanisms that may be used by Producers Organizations at the constitutional
stage. For example, in the tradition of the egalitarian and democratic principles
of cooperatives, it could consider the effects of an equal treatment for all remu-
neration scheme. This might give interesting insights in explaining why many
cooperatives use mechanisms that may be fair but probably not very efficient.
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Table 2.1: Small cost differences and homogeneous group
HIGH Quality Majority LOW Quality Majority
FB Rents No rents Alone FB Rents No rents Alone
nH 8 8 8 8 2 2 2 2
qL 1.5 1.5 1.5 - 1.5 1.41 1.5 1.5
qH 2 2.18 2 2 2 2 2 -
Q 1.9 2.05 1.9 2 1.6 1.53 1.6 1.5
p(Q) 6.7 7.14 6.7 7 5.8 5.59 5.8 5.5
yL 4.5 5.13 2.25 - 4.5 5.29 6.5 5.5
yH 6 7.64 7.81 7 6 6.79 3 -
cL 2.25 2.25 2.25 - 2.25 1.99 2.25 2.25
cH 3 3.57 3 3 3 3 3 -
πL 2.25 2.88 0 (no IC*) u = 0 2.25 3.29 4.25 3.25
πH 3 4.07 4.81 4 3 3.79 0 (no IC**) u = 0
*(πL=3 if he poses); **(πH=3.8 if he poses)
Table 2.2: Big cost differences and homogeneous group
HIGH Quality Majority LOW Quality Majority
FB Rents No rents Alone FB Rents No rents Alone
nH 8 8 8 8 2 2 2 2
qL 1.5 1.5 1.5 - 1.5 1.33 1.5 1.5
qH 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 -
Q 2.7 3.5 2.7 3 1.8 1.67 1.8 1.5
p(Q) 9.1 11.5 9.1 10 6.4 6 6.4 5.5
yL 4.5 0.5 2.25 - 4.5 5.28 6.88 5.5
yH 9 14.25 10.81 10 9 8.89 4.5 -
cL 2.25 2.25 2.25 - 2.25 1.78 2.25 2.25
cH 4.5 8 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 -
πL 2.25 -1.75 0 (IC) u = 0 2.25 3.50 4.63 3.25
πH 4.5 6.25 6.31 5.5 4.5 4.39 0 (no IC*) u = 0
*(πH=4.38 if he poses)
Legend. FB: first-best. Rents: rents to minority. Alone: one type’s group.
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Table 2.3: Small cost differences and heterogeneous group
HIGH Quality Majority LOW Quality Majority
FB Rents No rents Alone FB Rents No rents Alone
nH 6 6 6 6 4 4 4 4
qL 1.5 1.5 1.5 - 1.5 1.29 1.5 1.5
qH 2 2.57 2 2 2 2 2 -
Q 1.8 2.14 1.8 2 1.7 1.57 1.7 1.5
p(Q) 6.4 7.43 6.4 7 6.1 5.71 6.1 5.5
yL 4.5 4.81 2.25 - 4.5 5.01 8.17 5.5
yH 6 9.17 9.17 7 6 6.77 3 -
cL 2.25 2.25 2.25 - 2.25 1.65 2.25 2.25
cH 3 4.96 3 3 3 3 3 -
πL 2.25 2.56 0 (no IC*) u = 0 2.25 3.36 5.92 3.25
πH 3 4.21 6.17 4 3 3.77 0 (no IC**) u = 0
*(πL=3 if he poses); **(πH=3.81 if he poses)
Table 2.4: Big cost differences and heterogeneous group
HIGH Quality Majority LOW Quality Majority
FB Rents No rents Alone FB Rents No rents Alone
nH 6 6 6 6 4 4 4 4
qL 1.5 1.5 1.5 - 1.5 1.13 1.5 1.5
qH 3 9 3 3 3 3 3 -
Q 2.4 6 2.4 3 2.1 1.88 2.1 1.5
p(Q) 8.2 19 8.2 10 7.3 6.63 7.3 5.5
yL 4.5 -28.25 2.25 - 4.5 5.08 9.17 5.5
yH 9 50.5 12.17 10 9 8.95 4.5 -
cL 2.25 2.25 2.25 - 2.25 1.27 2.25 2.25
cH 4.5 40.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 -
πL 2.25 -30.5 0 (IC) u = 0 2.25 3.81 6.92 3.25
πH 4.5 10 7.67 5.5 4.5 4.45 0 (no IC*) u = 0
*(πH=4.38 if he poses)
Legend. FB: first-best. Rents: rents to minority. Alone: one type’s group.
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Chapter 3
Quality production and quality indicators in
intermediate products
3.1 Introduction
Measuring and evaluating the right attributes of raw materials, commodities, and
intermediate products is a common problem in many sectors of the economy. In
food industries, for instance, it is well known that the necessary condition for
the making of a good wine is the availability of grapes with the right attributes.1
The same argument can be put forth for the characteristics of milk for cheese
production, of fruits for juices, of beets or canes for sugar, of beans for coffee,
and many others. In addition, this problem is of interest also in other industries:
for example, the quality of chips is important for the computer industry, like that
of ores for steel production, of steel for construction works, and of crude oil for
1Most practitioners would argue that the making of a good wine is more an art than the
mere result of scientific or technological efforts. Truth is that a necessary condition to make
a good wine is the use of good grapes. Indeed, an expert winemaker can obtain some decent
wine even from lousy grapes, but surely she would make a much better wine from good grapes,
where by good grapes we mean those with the right components and quality attributes.
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refined oil, just to name a few.
In this study we propose a methodology to measure the characteristics and
composition of intermediate products, i.e., grapes for wine production, and we
pursue two objectives. First, with the methodological contribution, we address
the issue of how to measure quality attributes for intermediate goods using a
general representation of the technology. Although there are other instances of
this problem in the literature, especially in that dealing with hedonic prices, to
the best of our knowledge there are no contributions that address explicitly this
topic on the production side.2 In this paper we model the quality attributes with
a multioutput technology, using a general representation of technology based
on directional distance functions. These are a generalization of the radial dis-
tance functions which, since Shephard’s contributions, have been used to give a
single-valued representation of production relations in case of multiple inputs and
multiple outputs (Chambers, Chung and Färe, 1996, 1998).
Directional distance functions indeed can be seen as an alternative and more
general way to represent technology and to compare and measure input, output
and productivity aggregates (Chambers, 2002). The quality aggregate measures
we propose using directional distance functions may be used to evaluate firms’
output taking into account the whole set of quality attributes. These alternative
measures thus can be compared with the standard practice in the industry of
using only one attribute, for instance sugar content used to measure the quality
of grapes for wine production.
Second, we characterize the technology by investigating the relationships
2For food industries, one contribution considers food safety as a dimension of quality and
represents it with a multioutput model of the technology (Antle, 2000).
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among the different quality attributes and the production level. This objec-
tive is pursued with a systematic investigation of the disposability properties of
the technology, which allows to show that some quality attributes are substitute,
while others are complement in production. We also find that many of the dis-
posability properties are not stable across years, presumably because of different
weather conditions, and between crop varieties. Moreover, for sugar and total
acidity, two major quality components of grapes, for most of the years considered
the trade-off with yields occurs at lower production levels in Chardonnay than
Merlot.
We also investigate on whether aggregate quality and quantity are substi-
tutes. This assumption on the technological relationship may appear reasonable
to the reader and to many practitioners, but no empirical work has established
its nature.3 In the paper we find evidence of a trade-off between quantity and
aggregate quality for the years considered and for both varieties investigated.
The next section reviews the literature that addresses the issue of how to
take into account quality in the production process. Then we introduce the
notation, the model and the empirical implementation algorithms we use in the
study. In section five we illustrate the data we use, based on production practices
and output results of two relatively well known grape varieties, Chardonnay and
Merlot. Section six presents and discusses the results. Section seven concludes
the paper with the suggestions for further research work.
3However, there is a vast literature in enology investigating these and other relationships
using multivariate statistics (for a review see, e.g., Jackson and Lombard, 1993).
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3.2 Review of the literature
The problem of taking into account the quality attributes of different goods has a
long tradition in economics, and the most well established efforts in this direction
are probably those of the hedonic pricing literature in the context of the Consumer
Price Index statistics. The question in this case is how to adjust consumer (or
industry) prices for increases in the quality of goods, such as computers, cars,
and other durable goods (Triplett, 1990).4
The hedonic pricing literature uses regression techniques to relate the (market)
prices of different “models” or versions of a commodity to differences in their
characteristics or “qualities”. The earliest references of this technique come from
agricultural economics, with the early work of Waugh on vegetable prices and
Vail on fertilizers (Griliches, 1990). However, to the best of our knowledge, no
hedonic study has been undertaken to estimate the production technology, the
main point of hedonic prices techniques being the use of market prices to identify
consumers’ preferences.
One of the first attempts to incorporate quality attributes in a model of pro-
ducer behavior is a paper that views process and quality change as outcomes of
a firm’s optimization problem (Fixler and Zieschang, 1992). This contribution
shows how a market-determined price-characteristics locus can be used to adjust
the Tornquist output- and input-oriented multifactor/multiple output productiv-
ity indexes of Caves, Christensen and Diewert (CCD) (1982) for changes in input,
output and process characteristics. Using radial distance functions, it shows how
the quality adjusted indexes proposed are the product of two indexes, a quality
4Another vast literature deals with the valuation of enviromental quality (see, e.g., Bockstael,
Hanemann and Kling, 1987).
50
index and a CCD-type Tornqvist productivity index.
Extending the work on productivity of CCD, Färe et al. (1992) define an
input-oriented Malmquist productivity change index as the geometric mean of
two Malmquist indexes as defined by CCD, and develop a nonparametric activity
analysis model to compute productivity using linear programming. In a subse-
quent paper, Färe, Grosskopf and Roos (1995) extends this productivity index
by incorporating attributes into the technology. Studying a panel of Swedish
pharmacies, they use the attributes together with ratios of distance functions to
measure the service quality of each pharmacy. By further imposing a multiplica-
tive separability assumption on the distance functions, they are able to decompose
the Malmquist productivity change index into three components, namely quality
change, technical change and efficiency change.
Another application of the same idea, i.e., of decomposing economic indexes
into various components, is the paper by Jaenicke and Lengnick (1999). Merging
the soil science literature on soil-quality indexes with the literature on efficiency
and total factor productivity indexes, they isolate a theoretically preferred soil-
quality index. In addition, using common regression techniques they shed light
on the role of individual soil quality properties in a linear approximation of the
estimated soil-quality index.
A different but somewhat related strand of the literature deals with the en-
vironmental impacts in the measurement of efficiency and productivity growth.
Färe et al. (1989) indeed started what has become now a relatively vast litera-
ture extending efficiency measurement when some outputs are undesirable. 5 The
5The first contribution that takes into account bad outputs is probably the work of Pittman
(1983), who extends the approach of CCD, specifies a modified Tornqvist output index and
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central notion of this paper, and of many that followed (for a recent application
and partial survey see Ball et al., 2004), is that of weak disposability of outputs.
To credit firms or industries for their effort to cut off on pollutants, technology is
modeled so that it can handle the case when the reduction of some (bad) outputs
requires the reduction of some of the other outputs and/or the increase of inputs.
Besides the concept of output weak disposability, an interesting and useful
idea for our setting is the directional distance function, a generalization of the ra-
dial distance function introduced to production economics by Chambers, Chung
and Färe (1996) who extended and adapted the idea of the translation functions
of Kolm (1976) and Blackorby and Donaldson (1980), and of the benefit func-
tion introduced in consumer theory by Luenberger (1992, 1994). The directional
distance function allows to compare different firms and to measure their distance
from the frontier of the technology moving along a preassigned direction. In this
fashion it is possible to evaluate the performance of the firms that need to increase
the production of the good outputs and decrease that of bad outputs (Chung,
Färe and Grosskopf, 1997).
The first attempt to use the directional distance function to take into account
the quality of outputs in a different context, i.e., health services, is a paper by
Dismuke and Sena (2001). They consider the mortality rate as a (bad) quality
attribute of the hospital production process and use directional distance functions
to calculate a Luenberger-Malmquist productivity index. They are then able to
decompose the productivity index into a quality index, plus a technical change
and efficiency change components.
In this paper we use the idea of the directional distance function to incorporate
uses dual data on pollutants’ shadow prices to adjust the revenue shares.
52
quality attributes into the technology, but we depart from the models reviewed
above in the construction of an indicator instead of an index. In fact, following
Chambers (1998 and 2002), we use the directional distance function to construct
an indicator, that is an output aggregator that is expressed in difference forms
rather than in ratio forms like in the case of the more traditional Malmquist
productivity index. This difference stems from the property of the directional
distance functions, which make the Luenberger indicator translation invariant in
outputs, to contrast with the property of homogeneity of degree zero in outputs of
the Malmquist index coming from the linear homogeneity of the output distance
function à la Shephard (1970).
We propose an indicator based on directional distance functions for different
reasons. First, as explained above, we compare firms based on the distance from
the frontier along a preassigned direction which reflects the preference and needs
of the buyer or downstream firm with respect to the quality attributes. Second, it
may be the case that to be valuable to a downstream firm, the composition of the
raw material has to be close to an “ideal” bundle of attributes preferred by the
buyer. In other words, in some instances the composition has to be well balanced
and some of the attributes have to be within a certain range.6 The choice of the
6In the paper we refer to quality attributes. In the literature, quality is usually associated
with vertical differentiation, that is the situation in which, given the same price for the good,
all consumers unambiguosly prefer more to less of a certain attribute. The other case is that of
horizontal differentiation, in which case there is not such a unique ordering among consumers
(see, e.g., Tirole, 1988). In our paper we use quality generically, but according to the above
definition it would be more appropriate to call it quality only when it is always better for the
buyer to have more of the attributes. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to use it when
there is a need for a well balanced composition of the raw commodity.
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direction allows then to take this into account and evaluate the quality attributes
produced by a pool of suppliers according to buyers’ needs.
3.3 Notation and model specification
Let x ∈ <N+ be a vector of inputs, y ∈ <+ the output level, i.e., the yield, and
s ∈ <M+ a vector of quality attributes. We treat attributes as outputs, and we can
think of the vector (y, s) as the output vector.7 The technology can be defined
in terms of a set T ⊂ <N+ ×<+ ×<M+
T =
©
(x ∈ <N+ , y ∈ <+ s ∈ <M+ ) : x can produce (y, s)
ª
.
In words, the technology consists of all output and attributes that are feasible for
some input vector. T satisfies the following properties (modified from Chambers,
2002):
T.1: T is closed;
T.2: Inputs are freely disposable, i.e., if (x0,−y,−s) ≥ (x,−y,−s) then
(x,y, s) ∈ T ⇒ (x0, y, s) ∈ T ;
T.3: Outputs are weakly disposable, i.e., if (x,y, s) ∈ T and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 then
(x, θy, θs) ∈ T ;8
T.4: Doing nothing is feasible, i.e., (0n, 0, 0m) ∈ T .
Related to T are the input set, V (y, s) = {x : (x, y, s) ∈ T}, and the output
set, Y (x) = {(y, s) : (x, y, s) ∈ T}.
7In the following of the text, we use interchangeably yields, production level, or output to
mean the scalar y, while we use quality attributes to refer to s. When we use outputs we refer
instead to the output vector (y, s).
8The more common alternative of output free disposability would be T.3A: Outputs are
freely disposable, i.e., if (x,−y0,−s0) ≥ (x,−y,−s) then (x,y, s) ∈ T ⇒ (x, y0, s0) ∈ T .
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Following Chambers, Chung, and Färe (1996, 1998), and Chambers (2002),
we can define the directional technology distance function as:
−→
DT (x,y, s;gx, gy,gs) = max{β ∈ < : (x− βgx, y + βgy, s+ βgs) ∈ T},
gx ∈ <N+ , gy ∈ <+, gs ∈ <M+ , (gx, gy,gs) 6= (0N , 0,0M),
if (x − βgx, y + βgy, s + βgs) ∈ T for some β and dT (y, s,gy,gs) =inf{δ ∈
< : (y + δgy ∈ <+, s + δgs ∈ <M+ )} otherwise. Note that (gx, gy,gs) is a
reference vector of inputs and outputs which determines the direction over which
the distance function is determined.
−→
DT (x,y;gx, gy,gs) represents the maximal
translation of the input and output vector in the direction of (gx, gy,gs) that
keeps the translated input and output vector inside T .
The properties of the directional distance function are the following (Luen-
berger 1992, 1994, 1995; Chambers, Chung, and Färe 1995, 1996):
1.
−→
DT (x−αgx, y + αgy, s+ αgs;gx, gy,gs) = −→DT (x,y, s;gx, gy,gs)− α;
2.
−→
DT (x,y, s;gx, gy,gs) is upper semi-continuous in x and y jointly;
3.
−→




DT (x,y;gx, gy,gs), λ > 0;
4. (y0 ≥ y, s0 ≥ s) =⇒ −→DT (x,y0, s0;gx, gy,gs) ≥ −→DT (x,y, s;gx, gy,gs);
5. x0 ≥ x =⇒−→DT (x0,y, s;gx, gy,gs) ≥ −→DT (x,y, s;gx, gy,gs);
6. if T is convex,
−→
DT (x,y, s;gx, gy,gs) is concave in (x, y, s).
As shown by Chambers, Chung, and Färe (1996), all known (radial) distance
and directional distance functions can be depicted as special cases of the direc-
tional technology distance function. One example, which will be used in this
paper, is the directional output distance function (Chambers, Chung, and Färe
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1998), which can be defined as:
−→
DO(x, y, s;0
N , gy,gs) = max{β ∈ < : (x, y + βgy, s+βgs) ∈ T}, (3.1)
gy ∈ <+, gy 6= 0, gs ∈ <M+ , gs 6= 0M ,
if (x, y+βgy, s+βgs) ∈ T for some β and −∞ otherwise. −→DO(x, y, s;0N , gy,gs)
represents the maximal translation of the output vector in the direction of (gy,gs)
that keeps the translated output vector inside T . Notice that under the assump-
tion of output free disposability, the directional output distance function is a
complete representation of the technology (Chambers, Chung, and Färe 1998):
−→
DO(x,y, s;0, gy,gs) ≥ 0 ⇔ (y, s) ∈ Y (x).
If we assume instead weak disposability of outputs, the directional output dis-
tance function can be a proper representation of technology only with an appro-
priate choice of g. Indeed, when gy = y and gs = s, then we can always recover
the output set Y (x) from
−→
DO(x,y, s;0, y, s) (see Chambers, Chung and Färe,
1996, for a proof in the case of the directional input distance function).
3.3.1 The Luenberger Quality Indicator
In this paper we are interested in constructing an index - more precisely, an in-
dicator in the case of the directional distance function - of quality attributes of
the output. The general purpose of an index is that it can create a summary
measure of inputs or outputs that can be used to evaluate how these aggregate
quantities vary across firms (or time). For our purposes, we start from the direc-
tional output distance function, and we change notation to accommodate for the
quality attributes of the intermediate product, i.e., sugar content, pH, etc. We
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can then write the directional quality distance function with the following:
−→
DQ(x,y, s;0
N , 0,gs) = max{β ∈ < : (x, y, s+ βgs) ∈ T}, (3.2)
gs ∈ <M+ , gs 6= 0M .
Notice that this quality distance function is a modified version of the directional
output distance function: in this latter, the production level y is expanded as
well, while in the former only the quality attributes vector is expanded.
As a matter of comparison, it is useful to compare the directional quality
distance function with the Shephard (radial) quality distance function, which is
defined as the following
DQ(x,y, s) = inf
θ
{θ > 0 : (x, y, s
θ
) ∈ T},
and represents the minimum (technically, the infimum) that the quality bundle
can be expanded and still be feasible. Again, this is a modified version of the
radial output distance function, in which also the production level y is expanded.
It is worth reminding the reader that the Shephard distance function is related
to the directional quality distance function when gs = s, i.e., when the direc-
tion is given by the firms’ choices of quality attributes, by the following (see,








The basic idea of the quality indicator is to have a summary measure of
quality attributes that may be used to see how these qualities vary over space
(or over time for that matter). For our purposes, we need to compare in-
put/output/attributes combinations of different suppliers, i.e., firms. Let us
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suppose we want to compare a firm i = 1 to a reference firm i = 0. Adapt-
ing the indicators suggested by Chambers (2002), we can define the 1-technology
Luenberger quality indicator for (x1, y1, s1, s0) by the following:
Q1(s0, s1, y1,x1) =
−→
D1Q(x
1,y1, s0;0N , 0,gs)−−→D1Q(x1,y1, s1;0N , 0,gs). (3.4)
Q1(s0, s1, y1,x1) represents the difference between the amount that it is possible
to translate s0 and s1 into the direction gs and still keep both quality bundles
in the output set of firm 1, i.e., we are referring to firm’s 1 technology or input-
output bundle (x1, y1).
We can illustrate the indicator with a graphical representation. In figure
3.1, in the attributes’ space we represent two quality output sets, S(x1, y1) and
S(x0, y0),9 consistent with (x1, y1) and (x0, y0) respectively, that is the input
vector/output level of the observation under consideration and of the reference
firm, respectively. We also represent firm 1’s quality bundle, s1, with its two
quality components, i.e., s11 and s
1
0, together with the base s
0 and its two quality
components, s01 and s
0
0. For exposition simplicity, for the direction we use a simple




1,y1, s0;0N , 0,gs): it is the distance from s0 to the outer contour




1,y1, s1;0N , 0,gs) is the distance from s1, in the same direction,
to the outer contour of S(x1, y1). Given the picture, relative to the output set
of firm 1, S(x1, y1), the distance of firm 1 is lower and hence firm 1 has higher
quality than the reference firm 0.
Looking at it in another fashion,
−→
D1Q(x
1,y1, s0;0N , 0,gs) may be seen as rep-
resenting the number of units of the reference vector, gs, that can be added to s0
9We can define the quality output set as the following S(x,y) = {s : (x, y, s) ∈ T}.
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while using the input-output bundle for firm 1, (x1,y1). It can be a positive num-
ber, meaning that the input-output bundle of firm 1 is consistent with a “higher”
quality level than that of firm 0. Or it can be a negative number, in which case
it is consistent with a “lower” quality level. So if Q1(s0, s1, y1,x1) > 0 we can
conclude that quality is higher for firm 1 than for firm 0 from the input-output
perspective of firm 1, i.e., using firm’s 1 technology, since we consider (y1,x1).
The 0-technology Luenberger quality indicator for (x0, y0, s1, s0) is defined by
the following:
Q0(s0, s1, y0,x0) =
−→
D0Q(x
0,y0, s0;0N , 0,gs)−−→D0Q(x0,y0, s1;0N , 0,gs). (3.5)
Note that in this case we are computing the indicator from a different basis of
comparison, i.e., from firm 0’s perspective, since we consider its input-output
bundle (x0,y0). If Q0(s0, s1, y0,x0) > 0, the quality is higher for firm 1 than firm
0, using as a reference firm 0’s technology or input-output bundle (x0, y0).
As it is the case with the more common Malmquist index, the choice of the
technology to use as a comparison can affect the results. In other words, it may
happen that a firm results more productive when compared to one technology
and less when compared to another technology. For instance, in figure 3.1 firm 1
results more productive with the quality indicator referring to firm’s 1 technol-
ogy, and less productive when referring to the firm’s 0 technology. It would be
better to have an indicator that is invariant to the technology chosen to make the
comparison. A natural compromise then is to take the average of these two in-
dicators (Chambers, 1998). Thus the Luenberger quality indicator is the average
of Q1(s0, s1, y1,x1) and Q0(s0, s1, y0,x0):








Given figure 3.1, relative to the quality set of firm 0, S(x0,y0), the distance of firm
0 is lower and hence firm 0 has higher quality than the other firm 1. Referring to
the technology S(x1,y1),10 s1 is closer to the frontier than s0. Taking the average
of the two differences in the distances calculated gives the Luenberger quality
indicator in eq. (3.6).
3.4 Activity analysis and empirical implemen-
tation
For the estimation of the production technology, parametric and non-parametric
methodologies are available. Among these latter, Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) employs linear programming to construct a piecewise linear representation
of the frontier technology.11 DEA constructs a convex hull around the observed
inputs and outputs of the firms in the sample. In the output space, for instance,
DEA traces the transformation curve of the outputs that can be produced with
a certain level of inputs. With DEA, the inputs-outputs observed in a sample
can then be used to measure the distance of each observation from the frontier,
and the distance function measures are then employed for the calculation of
productivity indexes, like the quality productivity indexes or indicators proposed
in this study.
Although no specific functional forms are assumed in DEA, the shape of the
10See the broken lines in figure 3.1, refering to the distance from the technology of firm 0,
S(x0,y0), to be compared with the solid lines referring to S(x1,y1).
11DEA is deterministic and does not impose any functional form on the technology. For
a comparison of strengths and weaknesses of different methods the reader can refer to Lovell
(1993) and Murillo-Zamorano (2004).
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production frontier is influenced by the assumptions regarding the returns to
scale and the disposability of inputs and outputs. Constant returns to scale
(CRS) means that an increase in inputs leads to a proportional increase in the
outputs. On the other hand, variable returns to scale (VRS) implies that an
increase of the inputs leads to a non proportional increase in outputs, with an
initial tract in which returns are increasing and then with decreasing returns. As
other possibilities, the technology could have non-decreasing returns (NDRS) or
non-increasing returns (NIRS).
Using the techniques of activity analysis, various technologies can be con-
structed from the K observed, feasible activities. For instance, the technology
associated with a cross-section sample of firms, under constant returns to scale
(C), strong disposability of inputs (S), output (S) and quality attributes (S) re-
spectively, is the following (modified from Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell, 1994)
T =
(
(xk0 , yk0 , sk0) :
KX
k=1
zkyk ≥ yk0 ,
KX
k=1
zkskm ≥ sk0m, m = 1, ...,M, (3.7)
KX
k=1
zkxkn ≤ xk0n, n = 1, ..., N,
zk ≥ 0, k = 1, ...,K} ,
where we have K observations of inputs, output level and quality attributes, i.e.,
(xk, yk, sk), with k = 1, ...,K firms. Notice that, regarding returns to scale,
zk ≥ 0 in the last constraint imposes CRS. To have a technology with variable
returns to scale, one needs to change the last constraint to
PK
k=1 zk = 1. For a
technology with NDRS, the last constraint above would need to be changed to
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PK
k=1 zk ≥ 1, while a NIRS technology would be characterized by
PK
k=1 zk ≤ 1
(Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell, 1994: 50)
DEA allows also to evaluate the distance of each firm in the sample from the
best practice frontier. The distance from different specifications of the technology
represents a measure of the technical efficiency of production units12 and forms
the basis for the construction of the quality indicators proposed in this study.
Referring to a technology with constant returns to scale (CRS), the linear pro-
gram problem to solve in order to compute the directional quality distance
function in eq. (3.2), for each observation k0, is the following
−→
DQ(xk0 ,yk0 , sk0 ;0
N , 0,gs) = max β :
KX
k=1
zkyk ≥ yk0 , (3.8)
KX
k=1
zkskm ≥ sk0m + βgs, m = 1, ...,M,
KX
k=1
zkxkn ≤ xk0n, n = 1, ..., N,
zk ≥ 0, k = 1, ...,K,
where gs is the direction vectors for the quality attributes. In this study we will
consider different direction vectors for gs, as we explain shortly. In the case of
variable returns to scale (VRS), the linear programme to solve for the directional
quality distance function would have the last constraint changed to
PK
k=1 zk = 1.
To investigate whether there are significant differences between the different
returns to scale or, more generally, between different specifications of technol-
12The radial distance function à la Shephard is related to the technical efficiency à la Farrell
by the following: θ = 1DO(x,y,s) , where θ is the Farrell technical efficiency and DO(x, y, s) is the
radial Shephard measure defined in the text (see, e.g., Färe and Primont, 1995).
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ogy or quality indicators, we proceed along two different venues. First, following
the arguments put forth by Banker (1996) for the cases in which no particular
assumptions can be made regarding the distribution of the measures to be inves-
tigated, such as our directional efficiency measures or the indicators based on it,







, for j = 1, ..,K,
where FV (Ij) and FC(Ij) are the empirical distributions, respectively for a vari-
able (V ) or constant (C) returns to scale specification of the technology, and Ij
are the calculated distance from the specified technology. Second, we employ
another test, the Mann-Whithney test, that also allows to establish on whether
two samples are from the same distribution. Both methodologies, called KS and
MW respectively in the text, are used to test the null that the two distributions,
i.e., specifications, are the same against the alternative hypothesis that they are
different.
3.4.1 The disposability properties of the technology
In our explorative study of the technology, we look at the output disposability
properties of the sample of observations under consideration. While we do not
have a priory reasons to expect congestion on the input side, i.e., no need to
test for input weak disposability, on the output side we decide to test whether
the technology presents either strong or weak output (or quality attributes) dis-
posability. Strong disposability of outputs (SDO) assumes that it is possible to
reduce each output (or quality attribute, in this study) individually without the
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need to reduce the other outputs or increase the use of inputs. This implies that
the outputs are “goods”, i.e., with a non negative marginal costs, and that out-
puts are substitutes. Weak disposability of outputs (WDO), on the other hand,
means that in order to reduce one output it is necessary to reduce other outputs
as well (or to increase inputs). This case is relevant, for instance, when one out-
put is pollution and the other is a good, or when outputs are complements. This
latter aspect is more relevant for our study, since we want to characterize the
relationships among different outputs in the production process.
For instance, consider two quality attributes, s1 and s2. If we represent their
relationship with the output set, i.e., the collection of output vectors that are
obtainable from the input vector, we can have different situations (figure 3.2).
For instance, the tract 0ABCD represents the frontier of a strongly disposable
technology, and s1 and s2 are strongly disposable or substitutes in the production
process. On the other hand, 0EBCD represents a weakly disposable technology,
in which the output s1 is weakly disposable, i.e., it is the congesting or comple-
mentary output. It may happen that some of the outputs are strongly disposable,
while others are weakly disposable.
On the input side, strong disposability of inputs (SDI) assumes that all the
inputs can be increased without reducing the outputs, i.e., there is no congestion,
and the marginal product of inputs is non-negative. The alternative would be
weak disposability of inputs (WDI), when increasing one input needs to be ac-
companied by an increase in the same proportion of all the other inputs to keep
the same output level, i.e., there is congestion. In this study we concentrate on
the output side and thus we just assume SDI.
To characterize the output disposability properties of the technology for our
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observations, we pursue an investigative strategy in different stages. First, we
test A) whether jointly all outputs, that is production level (yields) and qual-
ity attributes, are weakly disposable (H1: W ) against the null that they are all
strongly disposable (H0: S). To do so, we compare the distribution of the direc-
tional quality distance measures computed with eq.(3.8) to those computed with
weak disposability of outputs via a linear programme like the following
−→
DQ(xk0 ,yk0 , sk0 ;0
N , 0, gs) = max β :
KX
k=1
zkyk = yk0 , (3.9)
KX
k=1
zkskm = sk0m + βgs, m = 1, ...,M,
KX
k=1
zkxkn ≤ xk0n, n = 1, ..., N,
zk ≥ 0, k = 1, ...,K,
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by doing the relative statistical tests of KS and MW. Notice that in this linear
programing formulation, the equality sign (=) in the first and second constraint
imposes WDO on the technology (Chambers, Färe, and Grosskopf, 1996). In an
analogous manner, the inequality sign (≤) in the third constraint imposes SDI,
while an equality constraint would impose WDI.13
To explore further the disposability properties of each output, i.e., yields and
quality attributes, taken individually, we test B) whether each of them is weakly
disposable (H1: W i) against the null that they are all jointly strongly disposable
(H0: S). For instance, to test whether the output level, i.e., the yields, is weakly
disposable, we calculate the alternative (H1) in which only the yields are WDO
by computing the following
−→
DO(xk0 ,yk0 , sk0 ;0
N , 0,gs) = max β :
KX
k=1
zkyk = yk0 , (3.10)
KX
k=1
zkskm ≥ sk0m + βgs, m = 1, ...,M,
KX
k=1
zkxkn ≤ xk0n, n = 1, ..., N,
zk ≥ 0, k = 1, ...,K,
and we test it against the null (H0) of all outputs being SDO computed via eq.
(3.8).
13Notice also that we compute the distance imposing CRS, when usually the disposability
tests are performed using a VRS technology (see, e.g., Färe et al., 1994). As will be presented in
the text, however, our data show that the true technology is CRS and no detectable differences
emerge between the two different scale specifications of the technology. We thus believe that
imposing the CRS specification gives the same results and it is innocuous for our purposes.
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Furthermore, to investigate the relationships of each individual quality at-
tribute with the production level, for each quality attribute we check C) whether
i) the quality attribute is weakly disposable with the output level, and the
output level is weakly disposable with the quality attribute as well (W siy);
ii) the quality attribute is weakly disposable with the output level, but the
output level is strongly disposable with the quality attribute (W si);
iii) the quality attribute is strongly disposable with the output level, but the
output level is weakly disposable with the quality attribute (W y);
iv) neither the quality attribute is weakly disposable with the output level,
nor the output level is weakly disposable with the quality attribute (S).
To ascertain which is the true one among these four different cases, we con-
struct the tests in the following fashion. First, we look at the disposability prop-
erties of the output level with regard to the quality attribute by looking at the
H1 that both yields and the quality attribute are weakly disposable (H1: W siy)
by computing the following
−→
DQ(xk0 ,yk0 , sk0 ;0
N , 0,gs) = max β :
KX
k=1
zkyk = yk0 , (3.11)
KX
k=1
zksk1 = sk01 + βgs1,
KX
k=1
zkskm ≥ sk0m + βgsm, m = 2, ...,M,
KX
k=1
zkxkn ≤ xk0n, n = 1, ..., N,
zk ≥ 0, k = 1, ..., K,
where, for instance, for the quality attribute we consider sugar (s1), and we test
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it against the null that only sugar is weakly disposable (H0: W si), that is by
computing the following
−→
DQ(xk0 ,yk0 , sk0 ;0
N , 0,gs) = max β :
KX
k=1
zkyk ≥ yk0 , (3.12)
KX
k=1
zksk1 = sk01 + βgs1,
KX
k=1
zkskm ≥ sk0m + βgsm, m = 2, ...,M,
KX
k=1
zkxkn ≤ xk0n, n = 1, ..., N,
zk ≥ 0, k = 1, ..., K,
Second, we then look at the H1 that both yields and the quality attribute are
weakly disposable (H1: W siy) by computing eq. (3.11) against the null that only
the output level is weakly disposable (eq. 3.10). The distributions computed with
eq. (3.11) and (3.10) can be either different (call it case a) or the same (case b).
In an analogous manner, those computed via eq. (3.11) and (3.12) are different
(case c) or the same (case d). Thus, there can be four possibilities, combining
cases a/b with cases c/d.
When a and c occur together, we have that the quality attribute and the
output level are both weakly disposable. In other words, they are complements
in production (this corresponds to the case i), orW siy, above). With a and d, the
quality attribute is weakly disposable, i.e., complement, with the output level,
but not the other way around (case ii or W si). The opposite would be with b
and c, when the yields would be a complement with the quality attribute but not
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vice-versa (case iii or W y). The last possibility, with b and d, is when both the
quality attribute and the output level are substitute of each other (case iv or S).
3.4.2 The quality indicators
To compute the quality indicator proposed in eq. (3.6), we need to use and
compute four different quality directional distance functions of the type of eq.
(3.2). Notice however that we are using cross-section data set to model tech-
nology and thus there is a single reference frontier.14 For instance, to compute
−→
DQ(x
1,y1, s1;0N , 0,gs) of eq. (3.4), that is the directional quality distance func-
tion of the observation under consideration k0 referring to its own input-output
























kn ≤ x1k0n, n = 1, ..., N,
zk ≥ 0, k = 1, ...,K,
where the superscript 1 refers to the fact that we use the inputs-output bundle
of the firms under examination, (x1,y1). In the case of
−→
DQ(x
1,y1, s0;0N , 0,gs),
14In other words, there is only one enveloping technology, i.e., the left-hand side summation
terms in the equations to follow, for all the four directional quality distance functions of eq.
(3.6). For this reason we drop the superscript attached to the
−→
DQ(·) in the calculation of the
quality indicator. What changes is then only the input /output bundle, i.e., (x1, y1) or (x0, y0),
and the quality bundle, that is s1 or s0.
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km ≥ s0k0m + βgs, since we are now
referring to the quality attributes bundle of the base, (s0), but still using the
























kn ≤ x1k0n, n = 1, ..., N,
zk ≥ 0, k = 1, ...,K,









N , 0,gs), we need to com-
pare the quality attributes of each observation to the input vector and quantity
























kn ≤ x0k0n, n = 1, ..., N,
zk ≥ 0, k = 1, ...,K.



































kn ≤ x0k0n, n = 1, ..., N,
zk ≥ 0, k = 1, ...,K.
Notice that for the computation of the directional quality distance function
and thus the construction of the quality indicators, the direction vector gs has
to be specified. First, we consider the average attributes content of the grapes for





and m = 1, ..,M .
Another direction we consider is given by the ideal composition of the interme-
diate good. According to industry practitioners, for some raw commodities it is
important to have a well balanced composition. For this reason, we compute also
the Luenberger indicator in which the direction vector is represented by the ideal
composition of the grapes.16
15In this case we get the same results for each observation since we compare the reference
observation, i.e., the “base”, to itself K times.
16For the case at hand, as for the ideal composition, we consider the maximum amount of
sugar in the sample. Indeed, sugar is always preferred in greater quantity, i.e., the more the
better, since it could be a limiting factor for the quality of wine. In addition, we set the values
for pH, total acidity, potassium, malic and tartaric acidity equal to the ideal values indicated in
the literature and by the industry. For Chardonnay (plain), we have total acidity=7, pH=3.2,
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The choice of the reference observation, the “base”, allows for different op-
tions. One could use the average of the observations, i.e., compare the single



















The drawback of this option is that it may lead to an unrealistic artificial tech-
nology, or, in other words, to a not feasible input/output combination. Another
possibility could be the minimum quality composition required by the law or by
industry standards, the one that all firms should provide as a minimum require-
ment. Or one could choose other bases. However, the point to bear in mind is
that any of these choices is arbitrary and should be made according to the prob-
lem at hand. In this study we compare each observation to the “average firm”
mainly for expositional convenience. Since the production process depends on
the weather and other conditions over which the firms have only partial control,
we believe that having a base that is the average of the observations, and hence
a “moving” reference, is better suited to illustrate how different firms relate to
each other. The alternatives, like for instance the minimum required standard
set by the industry, would probably be better suited if one were interested also
in seeing the effects of different environmental conditions on the ability to reach
these standards.
tartaric acidity=6, malic acidity=2, potassium content=1.8. For Merlot (for aging vintages),
the values are the following: sugar=max in the sample, total acidity=5.8, pH=3.1, tartaric
acidity=6, malic acidity=1, potassium content=1.9 (Bertamini, 2001).
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As a last possibility to consider, and choice to be made, we compute the
directional quality distance functions for the construction of the quality indicators
considering also a technology weakly disposable in quality attributes. In other



























kn ≤ x1k0n, n = 1, ..., N,
zk ≥ 0, k = 1, ...,K,
where the second constraint now has an equality sign. It is worth reminding the
reader that with weak disposability of outputs, it is only with the choice of a
direction vector equal to the observation that the directional distance function is
a proper representation of the technology. In other words, when gs is equal to
the average or to the ideal composition of grapes, we cannot be sure on whether
from the directional quality distance function one can recover the true technology.
However, we report also these results for illustrative purposes.
In summary, we will compute four different quality indicators. Two of them
with a strong disposable (in quality attributes) technology, with a direction vector
equal to the average (“average”) or to the ideal composition (“ideal”) of grapes.
The other two would have a WDO (in quality attributes) technology, and with
the same direction vectors as before, i.e., average and ideal.
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3.4.3 The quality-quantity trade off
To investigate the relationships between the production level and the different
quality attributes, we proceed along two different venues. First, we consider each
quality attribute and output individually and we construct the output trans-
formation curve, i.e., the isoquant in output or quality space. To do so, we first
calculate a modified version of the directional quality distance function in eq.(3.8)
for a fixed level of inputs, output or quality attributes. Indeed, since we work
on a two-dimensional space, to represent the product transformation curve, for
instance, between the sugar content and total acidity, we need to hold all the
inputs and the other quality attributes at a fixed level, e.g., at their mean value.
In other words, for the construction of the output transformation curve between
sugar (s1) and acidity (s2), we run the following
−→
DQ(xk0 ,yk0 , sk0 ;0






zksk1 ≥ sk01 + βgs1,
KX
k=1
zksk2 ≥ sk02 + βgs2,
KX
k=1
zkskm ≥ sm, m = 3, ...,M,
KX
k=1
zkxkn ≤ xn, n = 1, ..., N,
zk ≥ 0, k = 1, ...,K,
in which we expand the two outputs under consideration, holding the inputs
and the other outputs at their mean value, respectively xn, y and sm, with m =
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3, ...,M .17 We then find the points on the output transformation curve by adding
to each observation, i.e., sk1 and sk2, respectively the quantity (bβkgs1) and (bβkgs2),
where bβk is the calculated individual distance from the frontier, and gs1 and gs2
are the directions for the quality attribute s1 and s2 respectively.
Notice that the technology in eq. (3.18) above is specified with constant
returns to scale and with output strong disposability. As a further investigation,
we calculate and represent the output transformation curve for an output weak
disposable technology.18 We then illustrate the output transformation curves for
the main outputs referring to both technology specifications.
For the second investigation, that is to evaluate the trade-off between output
quantity and aggregate quality, a natural choice is to look at the relationship
between the quality indicators introduced in this study and the yields. To do
this, we consider the different options used for the direction vector gs, and a
technology with weakly disposable output and quality attributes, i.e., the most
flexible technology, and we show the relationship via a graphical representation
and by looking at how the value of the indicators change with yields.
3.5 The Data
To implement empirically the methodology presented in the previous sections we
use data provided by the “Istituto Agrario di San Michele all’Adige”, located in
Trento, near the Alps, in the North-East of Italy, about 200 miles from Venice.
During the last few years, different trials were undertaken to investigate the best
17Notice that in the computations of eq. (3.18) some observations may become infeasible
when compared to the mean of many quality attributes and inputs.
18In this case, the second and third constraint of eq. (3.18) becomes an equality.
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agronomic practices and varieties to match the potential of different production
zones. The data we employ were collected during the years 1994, 1995 and 1996
for Chardonnay, a white grape variety, and Merlot, a red grape one. The data
set is an unbalanced panel: some of the observations are found in different years,
but due to incomplete and missing data having a balanced panel would lead to
too few observations.
Thus we treat each observation individually in a series of cross-section esti-
mations, one for each year. In other words, we cannot use the panel dimension
for all the observations and hence we consider each variety with a cross section
of data, repeating the estimations for the three years for which data is available.
For Chardonnay the number of observations with complete data is greater than
Merlot: for the white variety we can use n=614 total observations, divided in
214, 187 and 213 respectively for the years 1994, 1995 and 1996. For Merlot,
the total number of 325 observations is divided, over the three years considered,
respectively, in n=78, 127 and 120.
The data available are experimental agricultural data, in the sense that the
purpose of the trials was to estimate the effect of different production areas
on grape production subject to the same agronomic practices regarding labour,
fertilizer, pesticides, etc. In other words, all parcels were treated with the same
amount of fertilizers, pesticides, labour, etc. For each parcel, data are available on
altimetry, the number of vines per hectare, and the number of buds per branch. In
addition, there are three categorical variables: the depth of the roots (a measure
of the depth of usable soil), from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 3; the water
reservoir, in the range 1-4; and total calcium, starting from a minimum of 1 to a
maximum of 5 (tables 3.1-3.3).
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We also have data on weather conditions, but it is coming from a unique
meteoric station, and so we have only variation over the years. However, as it
is standard practice among practitioners, only the conditions of the last 40 days
before harvest time are considered important and hence used in this study. In
the period 1994-1996 that we consider, harvest time was about the first week of
September for Chardonnay, and the third week of September for Merlot, with a
lag between the two varieties of 12-18 days, depending on the year. Since harvest
time is different, we in fact have different data on weather conditions between
the two varieties. The information available for weather conditions are related to
humidity and temperature, measured as the average of the 40 days considered.
In addition, rainfall, radiation, hours of sun, and temperature excursions,19 are
all considered as the total summation over the last 40 days before harvest time
(tables 3.1-3.3).
For the grapes obtained in the different experimental fields, we have data on
production per hectare plus other information on different attributes, such as
sugar content (measured in degrees Brix), tartaric acid, malic acid, potassium,
pH, and total acidity (tables 3.1-3.3).
3.5.1 Chardonnay
On average, Chardonnay trials were conducted on higher fields compared to Mer-
lot: the average height above the sea level was around 260 meters against above
200 for Merlot. It is well known among practitioners that in general Merlot is
more productive than Chardonnay. This explains that the number of vines per
19Temperature excursion is the difference between the maximum and the minimum daily
temperature.
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hectare was higher for Chardonnay, around 3200, compared to 2700 for Merlot.
This latter variety, however, presented more buds per branch over the years.
For the roots depth, water reservoir and total calcium, there were not signifi-
cant differences between the two varieties and not much variations over the years
considered.
Weather conditions show that for Chardonnay in 1994 the pre-harvest season
was hot — a mean temperature of 22◦ C — with low humidity, relatively rainy but
with high radiation, sun hours and temperature excursions. In other words, 1994
was relatively hot and dry, a situation which practitioners normally associate with
a good harvest in terms of sugar (and hence alcohol content in wines). On the
other hand, 1996 was more humid, colder and with low radiation, sun hours and
temperature range, a situation in which it may be easier to find higher acidity in
the grapes for the wine production. The year 1995 presented weather conditions
that were something in between those of 1994 and 1996, with particularly low
rainfall.20 (tables 3.1-3.2)
On the production side, in 1994 Chardonnay presented an average yield (14.5
t/ha) but relatively high in sugar content and low in total, tartaric and malic
acidity, and in potassium content, as one would have expected by looking at the
weather conditions of the pre-harvest season. In 1996, on the other hand, the
higher yields (mean of 18.2 t/ha) presented less sugar content but more total,
tartaric and malic acidity, and potassium content. In 1995, Chardonnay had the
lowest average yield with more total acidity and high malic acidity.
To summarize, looking at Chardonnay over the period of three years, one may
conclude that in the area under consideration high temperatures led to production
20We do not have information on whether irrigation was possible and practiced in these plots.
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with more sugar content and less acidity, while a more humid and colder weather
led to more production but with less sugar content and more acidity. Thus
considering the limitations of looking at only the means of the observations, one
may argue that there is a trade-off between sugar and yields, on one hand, and
sugar and total acidity on the other.
3.5.2 Merlot
Although there was a difference of about two weeks, the weather in 1994 for
Merlot was like that of Chardonnay (this is not the case, as we will see shortly,
for 1995 and 1996). Thus 1994 was relatively dry but rainy, with relatively high
temperatures (20.7◦ C on average) and high radiation, sun hours, temperature
excursions. 1995 and 1996 were relatively similar in terms of weather conditions:
however, 1995 was most humid and with the lowest of radiation, sun hours, and
temperature excursions. 1996, on the other hand, had the lowest rainfall and
average temperature.
On the production side, 1995 was the year in which yields were the lowest
but sugar content and acidity were the highest, together with tartaric and malic
acidity. Potassium content, on the other hand, was the lowest of the three years
under consideration. In 1996, potassium content and yields were the highest but
sugar content and tartaric acidity the lowest. In 1994, production for quantity and
quality attributes was between that of 1995 and 1996, but with the lowest levels of
total and malic acidity. To conclude, one may summarize the situation for Merlot
by noting that the colder weather conditions led to high production levels, with
potassium but not sugar content. In addition, low radiation, temperature range
and sun hours led to both sugar and acidity. With all the cautions needed when
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considering only average data, it seems that sugar and acidity are not output-
substitutes for Merlot, differently from Chardonnay, at least in 1995 when they
both reached the highest level.
We pay a closer look at production, sugar content, total acidity and potassium
content, since they are among the important aspects of grapes production, looking
also at their distribution.21 Overall, Merlot is more productive in terms of both
grapes production and sugar content (figures 3.3 and 3.5).
Considering the production per hectare of grapes over the entire period, Mer-
lot is statistically more productive than Chardonnay (1% significance level (s.l.)),
but in 1995, the year with the lowest production level, there were no statistically
significant differences between the two varieties (figure 3.3).
It then appears that when weather conditions are not the ideal ones, the red
and the white grape variety under consideration do not show big differences in
terms of yields. On the other hand, when there are favorable conditions, Merlot
shows all its potential and produces significantly more than Chardonnay. Indeed,
the year 1996 appears to have been the most productive year for both varieties
(figure 3.4), with Merlot reaching an average of 22 tons per hectare (up from 14
in 1995) and Chardonnay reaching 18 tons/ha (up from 13 in 1995, see also tables
3.1-3.3).
Merlot, as expected, is more productive also in terms of sugar content. Over
the period 1994-1996 and for each year considered, Merlot has statistically sig-
nificant more sugar than Chardonnay (figure 3.5), with a significance level of
21The figures 3.3-3.10 show kernel estimates. To test the differences between cultivars or years
we performed the Mann-Withney test of equality of medians and the Kolmogoroff-Smirnoff test
of equality of distributions. Results of the tests are reported in the kernel figures. All figures
and tests were prepared using Stata 7.
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1% (except in 1994, the best year for sugar production in Chardonnay but only
an average year for Merlot, when s.l.=5%). Opposite to the case of production
per hectare seen above, however, 1996 is the year with the lowest sugar content
(figure 3.6 and tables 3.1-3.3). Even though we are considering average data, it
appears that yields and sugar go in opposite directions, i.e., they are substitutes,
and when conditions are very favorable to one they are not favorable to the other.
The differences between varieties are statistically significant also with regard
to total acidity and potassium content. Chardonnay shows consistently signifi-
cantly more total acidity than Merlot (figure 3.7). For both varieties, the worst
year for acidity is 1994, which is however the best for sugar production, at least
in Chardonnay. Their best for acidity, however, is 1995 for Merlot and 1996 for
Chardonnay (figure 3.8).
For potassium content, Merlot, over the period 1994-1996 and for each year
considered, contains significantly (s.l. at 1%) more of it than Chardonnay (figure
3.9). For both varieties, 1994 is the year with the lowest mean values, while 1996
is that with the highest (figure 3.10).
Total acidity and potassium content thus appear to be associated with the
production level, i.e., they seem complement with yields. Indeed, in 1996 the
data show a very high production of grapes but with lower sugar content: Merlot
contains 19.8 degrees Brix, down from an average of 20.5◦ in 1995, while for
Chardonnay sugar content in 1996 was 19.2◦ Brix, down from 19.9◦ in 1994. In
1996, the production level and the content of potassium are highest for both
cultivars, as well as total acidity for Chardonnay, compared to the other two
years considered (figure 3.8).
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3.6 Results
In the sections that follow we report the results of the different computations
and estimations. We begin with the results on the returns to scale and the
disposability properties of the technology, computed with the directional quality
distance function with the direction vector equal to the ideal composition of
grapes, and we test for differences among the different specifications via the
KS and the MW tests. Then we report the results on the Luenberger quality
indicators. In the last sections, we show the findings of the analysis on the
quality-quantity trade-off. All computations were performed for each variety and
each year (cross-section). For all the results, we distinguish between the two
cultivars, Chardonnay and Merlot.
3.6.1 Analysis of Chardonnay
The Returns to Scale and Disposability Properties of the Technology
To characterize the properties of the technology emerging from the sample of
observations under consideration, we first consider the returns to scale. We
compute the directional quality distance function in eq. (3.8) and its variable
returns to scale specification, i.e., with the last constraint changed to
PK
k=1 zk =
1. Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff and Mann-Whithney tests introduced above,
we cannot reject the null that the two different specifications have the same
distribution (table 3.5). Indeed, for each of the years considered, the calculated
test statistics, for both MW and KS tests, are well above the usually employed
significance levels. For Chardonnay, the technology for each year thus appears
to have constant returns to scale. This is not surprising if we consider that each
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observation comes from an experimental plot, and that all the plots are more
or less of the same size. In other words, the relative size of the experiments is
relatively homogenous, without big variations among plots, and this may explain
the constant returns to scale properties of the technology.
To better characterize technology, we also look at the output disposability
properties of the sample of observations under consideration.22 As explained
in the preceding sections, first we test A) whether jointly all outputs are weakly
disposable.23 Then we test B) whether each output taken individually is weakly
disposable. Finally, we investigate the relationship of each quality attribute with
the production level (test C)).
Regarding the first test A), the joint test of output disposability, the results
reported in table 3.6 (first column) show that for all the years considered the
probability of error in saying that the two distributions are different is zero. In
other words, we can reject the null that for Chardonnay the technology is strongly
disposable for output and quality attributes jointly. It thus appears that the
technology is weakly disposable in all outputs for all the years. Considered all
together, the outputs thus appear to be complements in production.
Regarding the test B), on the disposability properties of each individual output
component against the null that of all being freely disposable, from table 3.6
(last column) we see that we cannot reject the null that the yields are strongly
disposable in the three years considered. For Chardonnay, it thus appears that
the level of production, i.e., the yields, is a substitute with other outputs, that
22In this study we are mostly interested on the output side of production. In addition, the
nature of the input data would probably not allow any meaningful test of input disposability.
23For all the disposability tests we use the directional quality distance funtion where for the
direction vector we choose the ideal composition of grapes.
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is the quality attributes.24 This is a result which may not be surprising, since
it could be expected that high production levels could be obtained only at the
“cost” of lower quality attributes (or viceversa).
For the other outputs, i.e., quality attributes, the results are more varied.
Sugar appears to be strongly disposable for all the years considered. Remem-
bering that strong disposability implies substitutability among outputs, while
weak disposability can also be used to model complementarity among outputs,
this result shows that the major quality component of grapes, i.e., the necessary
ingredient for alcohol content, is a substitute with the other outputs. This is
not surprising, since it is well known that Chardonnay is a white variety with
relatively lower yields and sugar potential. In addition, it may be grown in colder
climates to give wines rich in acidity and relatively low in alcohol.
Looking at total acidity, the results in table 3.6 show that it is mostly
strongly disposable. Thus, for all of the years considered, total acidity appears a
substitute with the others outputs. The same is true for pH, a measure of the
acidity of grapes,25 which appears strongly disposable for all the years considered.
Both malic acidity and potassium content, when tested individually, re-
sult weakly disposable for all the years considered. We thus may infer that malic
acid (and potassium content) are complements or joint with the other outputs,
and that increasing the other outputs, i.e., the yields and the other quality at-
tributes, for instance, goes together with increasing malic acidity and potassium
content. This joint ness, however, may be undesirable when one quality attribute
24In table 3.6, in bold are reported the calculated tests when they result below the 10%
significance level.
25In a scale from 0 to 14, a pH of 7 indicates a neutral environment. A pH below 7 indicates
acidity, while one above 7 shows alkalinity.
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is not very valuable in a particular commodity. This is the case, for instance,
for potassium content, which sometimes is preferred in limited amounts when
preparing some particular wines. In Chardonnay, the tests show that reducing
potassium content, according to the observations in the period 1994-1996, would
require also the reduction of other outputs. Regarding tartaric acidity, notice
that only in 1994, when performing a MW test, it results weakly disposable,
otherwise it appears to be strongly disposable.
To summarize, the investigation of the disposability properties of Chardonnay,
a white wine variety which may prefer a relatively cold weather where it can
produce relatively acid wines, shows that most of the quality attributes and
the production level are strongly disposable, i.e., substitutes, in the production
process. Only malic acidity and potassium content are weakly disposable, i.e.,
complements in the technology.
As a further exploration, we look at the disposability properties between each
quality attribute and the production level. We performed thus the tests outlined
in C), for which results are reported in tables 3.7−3.9, and we summarize the
findings in table 3.9.26 First, notice that the results in table 3.9 seems to replicate
those in table 3.6:27 malic acidity and potassium content are weakly disposable
26The results of table 3.9 summarize the tests C). Consider for instance total acidity for
Chardonnay in 1994. The resuls of table 3.7 show that we can reject the null that total acidity
and yields are jointly weakly disposable, when tested against the alternative that only total
acidity is weakly disposable. In table ??, we reject the null that total acidity and yields are
jointly weakly disposable, on the other hand, when tested against the alternative that only
yields is weakly disposable. Combining these two results confirms that total acidity and yields
are mutually strongly disposable, i.e., substitute, as summarized in table 3.9.
27As we will see, this is not the case for Merlot, for which there are some differences.
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with y, meaning that their presence in great levels implies a considerable produc-
tion level, but not necessarily the reverse. Looking at it another way, it means
that potassium and malic acidity are joint with production, and reducing either
one of them would need to be accompanied by a reduction of production level or
by an increase in inputs use.
Sugar, pH, and tartaric acidity, on the other hand, result strongly disposable,
i.e., substitutes with production, for all the years considered. In other words,
obtaining a high yields level would imply lowering their content. Total acidity
appears always strongly disposable with production level, apart from 1996, a
colder year in which total acidity (partially, i.e., with the MW test) appears
weakly disposable with production, that is complement with the production level.
The Quality Indicators
Given the results of the previous section, we compute the directional quality
distance functions needed for computing the quality indicators with a constant
returns to scale technology. Indeed, according to our results we can infer that the
technology of our observations is consistent with such a technology. Regarding
the output disposability properties, however, we calculate and compare the two
Luenberger quality indicators using both strong disposability and weak dispos-
ability of quality attributes.28 We report the summary results of the different
computations performed for each observation using different methodologies.
28Regarding this latter, we use weak disposability for all quality attributes instead of imposing
it only to those for which the previous disposability tests showed weak disposability because
it is the most flexible technology we can refer to. The alternative would be to impose WDO
only for those attributes for which the disposability tests did in fact show it to be the true
specification. The results however would not be significantly different.
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As a benchmark, we report first the results of the Luenberger quality indicator
computed with a direction vector equal to the average of the observations, when
quality attributes are strongly or weakly disposable (table 3.10). Then, we show
the results of the Luenberger indicators with the direction vector equal to the
ideal composition (“ideal”), again with strongly disposable and weakly disposable
(table 3.11) quality attributes. The distributions of these computed indicators
are represented with a kernel density estimation (figures 3.11-3.12).
Starting with the Luenberger “average” quality indicator, first of all notice
that in almost all cases the index is above zero, meaning that on average the
quality of the firms under consideration is higher than the average firm taken
as a reference (table 3.10). This means that a majority of observations have
an indicator, i.e., a quality content, above that of the average firm. This may
surprise the reader, but the average firm taken as a term of comparison is an
“artificial” one, in the sense that it was constructed by taking the average of
the observations over all the input and output dimensions. Thus it may well be
that the “average” firm, when using a multidimensional comparison, in fact may
result being below the average of the individual observations, i.e., comparisons.29
Relative to a technology strongly disposable in all outputs, the sample of firms
under consideration have more quality than the average firm, i.e., the indicator is
positive in all years considered. 1995 is the year with the highest mean values for
the quality indicator, showing also that the aggregate quality indicator is the least
dispersed. On the other hand, when referring to a weakly disposable technology,
the year with the highest average value of the quality indicator becomes 1996, with
29For instance, in 1994 there are 103 out of 214 observations that have a negative indicator,
while the remaining 111 have a positive quality indicator.
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an average value of the indicators quite different from that of the other years.
In addition, when going from a strong to a weakly disposable representation
of the technology, the average value of the indicator decreases for 199530 and
increases for 1994 and 1996. Thus, with the Luenberger quality indicator based
on the average direction, Chardonnay shows that referring to a weakly disposable
technology does not always lead to higher average values.
Considering the ideal composition instead, apart from 1994, the Luenberger
indicator seems to show lower quality than the previous Luenberger indicator
based on the average of the observations, suggesting that on average the group of
firms is getting lower values when evaluated with reference to a direction equal
to the ideal composition (table 3.11). This is understandable, since instead of
moving in an “average” direction we move towards the efficient frontier of the
technology along the direction given by the ideal composition of the grapes, and
hence a presumably more difficult venue to follow for the firms under considera-
tion. We can then observe that, using a strongly disposable specification of the
reference technology, in 1994 the sample of observations considered is on average
obtaining higher values for the quality indicators than the average firm, while
lower values in 1996 and on average the same performances in 1995.
When referring to a technology weakly disposable in outputs, the average
values for the quality indicator increase for 1994 and 1996, and remains the same
in 1995. More than with the Luenberger quality measures based on the average
direction, when the distance is measured from a frontier more tightly enveloped,
like in the case of weak disposability, the efficiency should not decrease.31
30In fact the average value for the sample of firms in 1995 is negative, even though not
significantly different from zero.
31This intuition is correct if we refer to the distance in
−→
D1O(x
1,y1, s1;0N , 0,gs). When re-
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As a further representation of the results, we show the distributions of the
different quality aggregators using a kernel approximation. In figure 3.11 we see
the two measures for different years using a strongly disposable representation
of the technology. The distributions appear rather similar among them, with
some differences across years. For instance, in 1994 the distributions have a
unique mode around the value of 0, and a bigger dispersion of the values above
0, i.e., a longer tail on the right. On the other hand, in 1995 the distribution
of the different quality aggregators is still asymmetric but with more dispersion
on the left side, i.e., for the values below 0. In 1996 the three distributions are
rather symmetrical (figure 3.11).
Performing the statistical test suggested by Banker (1996), the Kolmogorov-
Smirnoff (KS), we find only limited statistically significant differences among
the two distributions of the quality aggregators based on a strongly disposable
technology (table 3.12). Indeed, the distribution of the Luenberger indicator
based on the average direction does not appear different from that of the ideal
Luenberger indicator for all the years considered.
Slightly diverse appear the distributions of the different quality productivity
measures when computed with reference to a weakly disposable technology
(figure 3.12). In 1994 the two distributions appear to be bimodal, with a second
mode to the right of the principal mode centered around 0, the mean value. The
results of the KS test also show that with weak disposability the ideal and average
distributions are not different in any of the three years considered (table 3.12).
However, the comparison of the distributions obtained with strong disposability
ferring to the distance
−→
D0O(x
0,y0, s1;0N , 0,gs) or
−→
D1O(x
1,y1, s0;0N , 0,gs), however, things are
not so straightforward and intuitive.
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to those referring instead to weak disposability shows that results are different.
For both the average and ideal Luenberger indicators, their distributions are dif-
ferent when using different disposability properties of the technology, in 1994 and
1996. In 1995, using a strong or weak disposable technology does not seem to lead
to different results for the quality indicators. To summarize, with Chardonnay
the quality indicators show that results may vary over the years and across the
different directions. In addition, and perhaps most important, it is necessary to
correctly specify the technology, either freely or weakly output disposable, since
results may vary considerably.
The Quality-Quantity Trade off
The results summarized in table 3.9 are interesting also for the individual trade-
off, that is the relationship between individual quality attributes and the pro-
duction level. Results vary across years, but one can notice that, for most of
the years, in Chardonnay sugar, total acidity, pH and tartaric acidity are substi-
tutes with yields. Thus greater yields may come at the expenses of these quality
attributes. On the other hand, malic acidity and potassium content are comple-
ment with production levels. In particular, if one were required to have a lower
potassium content, it would presumably need to reduce production levels as well.
To investigate further the relationships among individual quality attributes
and yields, we look at the output transformation curves and at the output sets
of some of the major quality components. As explained in the previous sections,
we compute eq. (3.18) alternatively with output strong and weak disposability
in the second and third constraint, and with a direction vector equal to the ideal
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composition of grapes.32 We now present the results looking at the differences
across years, across cultivars, and across technology specifications.
Starting from the output transformation curves between yields and sugar,
in figure 3.15 we show the differences across years with a technology strongly
disposable in outputs. For Chardonnay, given the position of the frontiers, one
could argue that 1996 is a productive year in terms of yields while 1994 is a
productive one in terms of sugar content. Indeed, the output set for 1996 is the
furthest to the right, i.e., associated with higher production levels, while that of
1994 is the tallest.33 Notice also that in 1996 higher yields seem to come at the
expense of lower sugar content, given that the output frontier is the shortest in
the vertical dimension, that is with less sugar content. Also notice that the output
set of 1995 is included in that of 1994, meaning that the production frontier in
1995 was lower for both dimensions compared to 1994.
Another set of considerations, which can be derived also from figure 3.16, can
show that the trade-off between sugar and yields, which corresponds to the output
isoquant with a negative slope, begins at different production levels according to
the year. In 1994, the best for sugar, the trade-off begins just at around 10 t/ha,
in which sugar content is above 22◦ Brix, reaching about 20◦ Brix at around 25
t/ha. In 1995, the trade-off begins at around 15 t/ha with slightly less than 22◦
Brix, but the decrease is much faster: at 23-4 t/ha, sugar content is around 19◦
32For some observations, the computation of eq. (3.18) led to infeasible solutions.
33Notice however that there are only few observations on the far right of the frontier and
thus it could be that the mean values for the yields are lower in 1996 than 1994. For sugar
content, on the other hand, the horizontal tract is generated by many observations and hence
it is reasonable to expect that the year with the highest values, i.e., 1994, which has the tallest
frontier, should have also higher mean values for sugar content.
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Brix. In 1996, the substitutability between sugar and yields begins at around
13-4 t/ha, with less than 22◦ Brix, but the minimum of 19◦ Brix is only reached
at around 30 t/ha. Thus the trade-off between sugar and yields is different in
intensity and extension according to the year and its relative weather conditions.
In 1995 the yields were the lowest of the three years considered, and this can be
seen also from the fact that the output set of this year, the one that represents
yields and sugar, is included in that of 1994.
In figure 3.16 we report the comparison with Merlot for each year. Notice
that for 1995 and 1996 Chardonnay production frontiers are included in those
of Merlot: in other words, Merlot is more productive than Chardonnay for both
yields and sugar content. In 1994, however, Merlot is less productive in terms
of yields. From the data we have available and the observations at hand, we
may thus confirm what is relatively well known among practitioners: Merlot is a
cultival with high potential in terms of sugar and yields, at least when compared
to Chardonnay.
If we compare different technology specifications, that is the output transfor-
mation curves with a weak and a strong output disposable technology, we can
see that there are not big differences (figure 3.17), meaning that presumably the
data support the conclusion that yields and sugar content are strongly disposable,
confirming what resulted in the disposability tests presented before. For all the
three years, however, the left part of the weak disposable frontier appears to be
internal to the strong disposable frontier. Even if only slightly, then it appears
that yields are weakly disposable with respect to sugar content; in other words,
yields seem, over a production range up to around 10 t/ha, complementary to
sugar production. Thus for those observations with low production levels, sugar
93
- one of the most important quality attribute - and yields appear complements.
However, for most of the observations with production levels above 10 t/ha, yields
and sugar appear in fact substituttes.
Looking at total acidity and yields, one can notice that the situation for
Chardonnay is very different according to the year considered. Indeed, 1996
seems a very productive year, since the frontier is located outside those for the
other two years for both yields and total acidity. The least productive year is
1994, which frontier is the smallest, i.e., included in those of 1996 and, for acidity,
1995 (figure 3.19). In 1994, a hot and dry year not really favorable to acidity, the
production of acidity is indeed the lowest, as can be seen also from the height of
the output set, which is the shortest. Compared to Merlot, Chardonnay appears
to be more productive in terms of total acidity for all the years considered, and in
1994 also in terms of yields (figure 3.20).34 The findings for our observations thus
confirm that Chardonnay, a white grape cultivar, has more potential for acidity
that Merlot, the red one.
Looking at the different disposability specifications of the technology and
comparing the output isoquants derived with a weak and a strong output dispos-
ability specifications of the technology (figure 3.21), one can notice that yields
appear complement to total acidity production for all the years, and particularly
for 1995, in which yields are complement to acidity up to a production level of
about 13 t/ha. Even if much less pronounced, total acidity appears weak dispos-
able with yields in 1994 and 1995. Again, for low production levels this quality
34In fact, comparing the distributions of the yields we showed that Merlot was on average
more productive (even if only at the 10% s.l.) than Chardonnay in 1994. This illustrates that
it may sometimes be misleading to compare frontiers derived from few extreme observations
when looking at the output transformation curves.
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attribute, toal acidity, does not appear substitute with yields. As soon as the
production level reaches the levels that are more commonly found in the com-
mercial vineyards, i.e., around or above 15 t/ha, then high yields can be reached
only at the cost of lower total acidity.
Considering potassium and yields, it is interesting to notice that there are
little differences among the different years, i.e., the frontiers are very close in the
potassium direction (figure 3.23). It appears however that the frontier in 1996 is
the farthest to the right and the shortest, i.e., more yields and less potassium,
while it is the opposite for 1995, suggesting meaning that with a strongly dis-
posable specification of the technology yields and potassium content seems to go
in opposite directions. Comparing the two cultivars, their relative potential ap-
pears to depend on the years considered: in 1994 and 1996 Merlot appears having
more potential in terms of potassium content, while in 1995 mpost of Chardonnay
observations have more potassium than those of Merlot. Comparing different dis-
posability technology specifications, it appears that for 1994 and 1995 the yields
appear weakly disposable, i.e., complement in production, to potassium content,
but again for production levels up to 10 t/ha (figure 3.25).
Not very visually differentiated across years and between cultivars are the
output transformation curves of sugar and potassium content and so are not
reported here. However it appears of some interest to consider the comparison
between the weak and the strong output disposable specification of the technology
in 1995, when it appears that potassium is weakly disposable to sugar content
and not vice-versa (figure 3.27) Notice that in some cases, i.e., with some wines,
potassium may represent an attribute that is preferred in low quantity. The
results for 1995 show that to reduce potassium content one would also need to
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reduce sugar as well.
To test whether quantity is a substitute with aggregate quality, i.e., whether
there is a trade-off between quantity and aggregate quality, we look at the rela-
tionship between the Luenberger indicators and the yields. As can be seen from
figure 3.29, when the production level increases the quality indicators - both the
average and the ideal - seem to decrease. Indeed, this trend is confirmed when
comparing the average values of the indicators at different production levels (ta-
ble 3.13): going from below 10t/ha to above 20 t/ha indeed is accompanied by
a reduction of the indicators, which go from positive to negative average values.
Only in 1995, for the “ideal” quality indicator, the trend is not monotonic, since
the difference in the average values of the indicators between the production level
from below 10 to 10-20 t/ha is actually increasing. Although a more rigorous
testing would be useful, it appears that aggregate quality, as measured by the
quality indicators proposed in this essay, is decreasing with the yields.
3.6.2 Analysis of Merlot
The Returns to Scale and Disposability Properties of the Technology
Regarding Merlot, the red grape variety, results of the tests for returns to scale
confirms that, as in Chardonnay, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of constant
returns to scale (Table 3.5). More interesting however are the results on the
output disposability properties of the technology. Overall, that is testing for
all outputs jointly being weakly disposable against the null of strong disposability
(test A), we reject the null hypothesis of free disposability, as in Chardonnay. The
only exception is in 1994, in which the KS test does not detect any statistically
significant difference between WDO and SDO and thus we cannot reject the null
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of strong disposability of outputs (table 3.6).
Considering the disposability properties of each output individually (test B),
we can see that we can reject the alternative hypothesis that the yields are weakly
disposable in all the years considered. In other words, like for Chardonnay, in
Merlot the production level is strongly disposable, i.e., substitute, with other
outputs, that is the quality attributes. Sugar as well appears to be strongly
disposable for all the years considered, thus confirming that the (probably) major
quality component of grapes is a substitute for the other quality attributes and
production level. Consider however that Merlot has relatively higher yields and
sugar potential, contrary to Chardonnay, and thus it may be cultivated in hotter35
climates to give bodied and strong wines.
Looking at total acidity, the results show that it is mostly strongly dispos-
able (apart from 1995 - only with the MW test - when weather was colder and
yields the lowest of the period under consideration), indeed showing that acid-
ity in Merlot is a substitute for other quality attributes in most circumstances.
This is not an unexpected result when considering a productive red grape variety
like Merlot. pH and tartaric acidity, as already seen for Chardonnay, results
strongly disposable for all the years considered as well.
On the other hand, both malic acidity and potassium content appear
weakly disposable for some of the years considered: malic acidity for all the
years but only according to the MW test, K content in 1994 and 1995 but again
only according to the MW test. With the KS test they result strongly disposable.
Thus, although less pronounced than with Chardonnay, in Merlot malic acid and
potassium content in some instances are complements or joint with the other
35For sugar formation it is important to have hot temperatures and sunlight.
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outputs.
To synthesize, the disposability properties of Merlot, a red variety preferring
hotter weather conditions in which it can produces relatively strong and full
bodied wines, show that many of its quality attributes are strongly disposable, i.e.,
substitutes, in the production process. As in Chardonnay, but in fewer instances,
malic acidity and potassium content are weakly disposable, i.e., complements in
the technology, and therefore reducing their content in grapes may be obtained
only at the expenses of reducing also other outputs.
Similar results emerge when considering the disposability properties of each
individual attribute considered jointly with yields (table 3.9). Notice that, com-
pared to Chardonnay, in Merlot fewer attributes appear complements (weakly
disposable), while most of them are strongly disposable individually or jointly
with yields. In words, in Merlot more than in Chardonnay, being the former a
more productive variety in terms of yields, many attributes become substitute in
the production process.
The Quality Indicators
We report the summary results of the different quality aggregators for our red
grape variety. For the Luenberger “average” indicator with direction equal to the
average attributes of the observations, relative to a strongly disposable technol-
ogy, the sample of firms under consideration have more quality than the average
firm, i.e., the indicator is positive, in 1995 and 1996. In 1994 however, the qual-
ity index is below 0, showing that the average quality is lower than that of the
reference firm (table 3.10 top).
When referring to a weakly disposable technology, however, results are quite
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different (table 3.10 bottom). Indeed, the average values of the indicators decrease
and become more dispersed in 1994 and 1996. Thus, with the Luenberger quality
indicator based on the average direction, Merlot reinforce the results we have
seen for Chardonnay, showing that referring to a weakly disposable technology
may actually lead to lower average values for the quality productivity measures.
Considering the Luenberger indicator with the ideal composition as direction,
1994 appears the year with the lowest average values, i.e., the mean value of the
indicator is negative, implying that the group of firms has lower aggregate quality.
This appears to be true for both specifications of the technology, that is to say
under strong and weak disposability of outputs (table 3.11). However, with the
ideal Luenberger indicator the weak disposability specification of the technology
leads to an increase in the mean values of the indicator and a lower dispersion for
all the years considered. From this point of view, the Luenberger ideal indicator
seems more consistent (or stable) in keeping the ranking across years and across
technology specifications, at least when compared to the indicators measured
with the average direction vectors.
We also investigate the different quality measures by looking at their distri-
butions. In figure 3.13, using a kernel approximation, we see the two measures
for different years using a strongly disposable representation of the technology.
The distributions appear rather similar, with some differences across years. For
instance, in 1994 the distributions have a mode around the value of 0, a bigger
dispersion of the values above 0, and some increase in density just to the left of
the mode, i.e., for some values below average. In 1995 the two distributions how-
ever are rather symmetrical, while in 1996 the distribution of the different quality
measures is asymmetric with a long tail on the right side, i.e., more dispersion
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for the values above 0.
Looking for significant differences among the distributions by means of the
Kolmogorov Smirnoff’s (KS) test, we find only limited differences among the three
distributions of the quality productivity measures based on a strongly disposable
technology: like in Chardonnay, the distribution of the Luenberger indicator
based on the average direction is not different from that of the ideal Luenberger
indicator for all years (table 3.13).
More differentiated are the distributions of the quality aggregators when com-
puted with reference to aweakly disposable technology (figure 3.14). In 1994
and 1995 the mode of the ideal distribution appears to be to the right of the av-
erage distribution. The results of the KS test show that with weak disposability
the average Luenberger indicator distribution is different from that of the ideal
one for 1994 and 1996. The comparison of the distributions across technologies,
i.e., strong disposability versus weak disposability of outputs, shows that the
Luenberger ideal indicators with SDO are different from those computed with a
WDO technology for all the years considered. On the other hand, for the Lu-
enberger average indicators, their distributions are different when using different
disposability properties of the technology only in 1995. In 1994 and 1996, using
a strong or weak disposable technology does not lead to different distributions
for the quality indicator with average direction.
To summarize, the results of the quality productivity measures reinforce the
results found for Chardonnay. Using an output strongly disposable technology
leads to rather similar results, but referring to the presumably true technology,
with weak disposable outputs, leads to quite different results. Going from a
strong to a weak disposability specification of the technology increases aggregate
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quality scores consistently for ideal indicators, while it has mixed effects for the
Luenberger average indicator.
The Quality-Quantity Trade off
Considering the relationships among the major quality attributes in Merlot by
means of the output transformation curves, let us start with yields and sugar
content. Notice that there are major differences in production between 1996,
the most productive year in terms of yields, and 1994 and 1995, as can be seen
from the frontier that is much further to the right (figure 3.15). Compared to
Chardonnay, apart from 1994, a particularly bad year for Merlot, the red variety
results more productive than the white one (figure 3.16).
By comparing between disposability different specifications of the technology,
as in Chardonnay it appears that yields are slightly weakly disposable with respect
to sugar content, even though over a relatively short production span, i.e., up
to around 13 t/ha in 1994 and 1996 and only to 9 t/ha in 1995 (figure 3.18).
Indeed, the production level at which yields and sugar are substitutes, i.e., high
production begins to be at the expenses of lower sugar content and the isoquant
is negatively sloped, varies with the years. In 1994 it is at around 14 t/ha, and
similarly in 1995, while in 1996 it is only at about 20 t/ha. As can be seen
from the output sets, in 1996 production was much higher and apparently only
partially at the expense of sugar production. Indeed, the decrease from 22 to 19◦
Brix is at about 23 t/ha in 1994 but only at around 36 t/ha in 1996. Also notice
that Merlot results more productive than Chardonnay both in terms of yields
and sugar content, i.e., Merlot output sets include those of the white variety, for
1995 and 1996, while it is not unambiguously so in 1994 (figure 3.16).
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Interesting is also the relationship between total acidity and yields. Again,
1994 is the “worst” year, i.e., its output set is included in those of the other
years, while 1995 and 1996 are good for acidity and yields respectively (figure
3.19). Also notice that the output sets appear lower for Merlot than Chardonnay
in all the years, showing thus a lower acidity potential for Merlot than the white
variety (figure 3.20). Regarding the different specifications of the technology,
it appears that over a limited production span, up to 12-15 t/ha, yields are
weak disposable with respect to total acidity for all the years. Notice that the
substitutability, i.e., a negatively sloped isoquant, between acidity and yields thus
starts at around 15 t/ha for all the years considered (figure 3.22), relatively higher
than in Chardonnay.
Considering potassium and yields, as in Chardonnay, notice that there are
limited differences across years (figure 3.23). In 1996, however, the frontier is the
farthest to the right and the highest, i.e., more yields and more potassium. Con-
sidering a weak disposable technology, the comparison of the output isoquants
shows that for the three years considered the yields appear complement in pro-
duction, i.e., weakly disposable, to potassium content up to 10 t/ha in 1994 and
1995 and 15 t/ha in 1996 (figure 3.26).
As already seen for Chardonnay, the output isoquants regarding sugar and
potassium content for different years and between cultivars appear relatively
bunched together and so are not reported here. More interestingly, in all years
it appears that potassium is weakly disposable with sugar content and this effect
is more pronounced than in Chardonnay (figure 3.28). If for some specific wine
preparations one needs less potassium content, these results show that this could
be accomplished at the “cost” of lower sugar content as well.
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We test whether quantity is a substitute with aggregate quality, i.e., whether
there is a trade-off between quantity and aggregate quality for Merlot as well,
and we look at the relationship between the Luenberger indicators and the yields
(figure 3.30). The relationship however is not so clear, at least for 1994, when the
indicators are very dispersed, especially at lower production levels, and in 1995.
Only in 1996, when the production level increases the quality indicators, both
the average and ideal indicators appear to decrease. These non-monotonic trends
are confirmed when comparing the average values of the indicators at different
production levels (table 3.13). When going from 0-10 to 10-20 t/ha indeed all
indicators decrease only in 1996, while in 1994 and 1995 they increase. However,
when increasing the production levels above 20 t/ha, then for all the years and
indicators their values decrease, showing the expected trade-off between quantity
and aggregate quality. To summarize, it appears that in Merlot the trade-off
between yields and aggregate quality is significant at higher production levels
than Chardonnay.
3.7 Concluding remarks
Quality is an important dimension in many industries and vertical relationships:
being able to produce what downstream firms and consumers prefer is a nec-
essary condition for competing in the marketplace. In this study we present
a systematic analysis of the relationships among different quality attributes and
production levels using some of the recent developments of production economics.
Looking at the output disposability properties, we are able to characterize the
technology of two common grapes variety, Chardonnay and Merlot. We can ob-
serve which attribute is substitute with others and with production levels, and
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which is complement in production. The information can then be used to con-
sider different practices to improve production on those aspects that are more
sought after by the industry.
In addition, since it is becoming important to assess intermediate products in
terms of their quality attributes content, we present a methodology to evaluate
the relative performance of firms in producing these quality attributes. We com-
pare two different measures of aggregate quality based on directional distance
functions. These two measures have a different direction vector and represent
the major contribution of this study in the relevant literature.
The directional distance functions, a generalization of the radial distance func-
tion, have the advantage of allowing the researcher to compare firms in a pre-
assigned direction. Thus we can compute an indicator setting the direction vector
equal to the average of the group, resembling the idea of yardstick competition
within the group of firms under consideration. For the other measure we con-
sider a direction which is the ideal composition of the intermediate good, i.e., the
direction vector is set equal to the ideal composition of the grapes, thus mea-
suring firm’s quality production in reference to what is the best defined possible
composition for the intermediate product under consideration.
In grapes for wine production, sugar content is important but it is not the
only quality attribute deemed relevant. It is still standard practice to remuner-
ate firms’ production with pricing schemes that consider explicitly sugar content,
but the industry is also trying to find more sophisticated mechanisms to consider
other quality attributes as well. Compared to the actual practice in the Ital-
ian wine industry of using only sugar content to adjust pricing for grapes, the
three measures introduced in the paper allow to take into account more of the
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quality components important for the wine industry. For the data set at hand,
at times the two measures give rather different results in terms of average re-
sults for the group and dispersion of firms around the mean. Moreover, we show
that there are significant differences among the two distributions using alterna-
tive specifications of the technology, thus emphasizing that the investigation of
the appropriate technology specification should precede the computations of the
quality productivity measures.
In the paper we are also able to test whether higher production per hectare
may be detrimental to specific quality aspects or to aggregate quality. It appears
that there is a trade-off between quantity and aggregate quality, which is more
significant for Chardonnay compared to Merlot. In addition, both sugar and total
acidity appear substitute with yields when production is above certain levels,
which however vary according to the years, presumably due to different weather
conditions. Moreover, this substitutability generally starts at lower production
levels in Chardonnay compared to Merlot, which thus appears a less productive
variety.
The paper can be improved along different dimensions. A possible exten-
sion, more geared towards industry applications, would be to investigate how one
can create incentives for the production of the right quality attributes given the
information about the technology. This is an important topic, which may be
of interest to suppliers, buyers, cooperatives, retailers, etc. How to compensate
producers for their efforts and how to give the right signal on the more valuable
attributes is indeed prone to increase the efficiency of supply chain relationships
and of food industries in particular.
In this study we have employed a rich data set of quality attributes, thus
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using information that may not be cheaply available in everyday industry practice.
Exploiting the properties of the technology and other appropriate methodologies,
it may be useful for industry applications to investigate whether the use of a more
limited set of variables may still provide sufficient information to give useful
incentives to producers. Moreover, the aggregate quality measures presented in
the paper needs to be compared with the single measures of quality that are
more commonly employed for evaluating the quality of raw commodities. Along
these lines, it could be useful to calculate the shadow prices of yield and quality
attributes. By calculating the shadow revenues of particular bundles, for instance,
one could possibly compare them with observed revenues in order to come up with
a quality efficiency measure expressed in monetary terms.
To conclude, it is worth reminding that the various measures may generate
pricing mechanisms with different incentive power and have different impacts in
terms of efficiency and inequality of revenues earned by participating firms. In-
deed, a more powerful incentive measure may increase efficiency but may also
cause greater inequality among producers. Greater inequality is often not valu-
able in some cooperatives or in other producer groups where equality of treatment
may be preferred, even if this may imply lower rewards for quality.
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Table 3.1: Inputs and Outputs
1994 n=214 1995 n=187
Variable Mean St.d. Min Max Mean St. dev. Min Max
Chardonnay Chardonnay
Altimetry 268.7 97.2 170.0 500.0 259.0 90.0 180.0 500.0
Vines 3199.0 776.0 1500.0 5000.0 3194.0 788.0 1500.0 5000.0
Buds 23.0 7.0 10.0 41.0 27.0 9.0 9.0 62.0
Roots 2.4 0.9 1.0 3.0 2.3 0.9 1.0 3.0
Water 2.3 1.0 1.0 4.0 2.2 1.0 1.0 4.0
Calcium 3.4 1.2 1.0 5.0 3.4 1.2 1.0 5.0
Humidity 58.0 - - - 62.0 - - -
Temp.* 22.6 - - - 20.1 - - -
Rainfall 172.2 - - - 61.7 - - -
Radiation 14045.0 - - - 11824.0 - - -
Sun hours 321.7 - - - 266.4 - - -
Temp. exc. 593.4 - - - 534.3 - - -
Sugar 19.9 1.4 15.7 25.4 19.6 1.4 13.2 22.8
Total ac. 8.7 1.7 5.6 16.1 10.6 1.8 6.7 15.5
pH 3.2 0.1 2.8 3.7 3.2 0.1 2.8 3.4
Tartaric ac. 6.5 0.8 3.6 8.9 7.9 0.8 5.9 10.0
Malic ac. 3.9 1.5 0.8 9.5 5.6 1.5 2.6 10.0
Potassium 1.5 0.2 0.8 2.3 1.6 0.2 1.2 2.3
Grapes/ha 144.7 58.5 32.0 356.7 134.0 56.8 14.8 362.0
107
Table 3.2: Inputs and Outputs - cont.ed
1996 n=213 1994 n=78
Variable Mean St. dev. Min Max Mean St. dev. Min Max
Chardonnay Merlot
Altimetry 260.0 91.0 180.0 500.0 210.0 65.7 180.0 450.0
Vines 3176.0 776.0 1500.0 5000.0 2748.0 704.0 1500.0 4100.0
Buds 31.0 11.0 8.0 89.0 29.8 8.5 7.0 58.0
Roots 2.4 0.9 1.0 3.0 2.3 0.9 1.0 3.0
Water 2.3 1.0 1.0 4.0 2.4 1.2 1.0 4.0
Calcium 3.4 1.1 1.0 5.0 3.3 1.4 1.0 5.0
Humidity 67.4 - - - 63.0 - - -
Temp.* 19.7 - - - 20.7 - - -
Rainfall 124.6 - - - 274.9 - - -
Radiation 10927.0 - - - 12349.0 - - -
Sun hours 253.7 - - - 281.7 - - -
Temp. exc. 509.9 - - - 549.2 - - -
Sugar 19.2 1.0 16.2 21.7 20.2 1.4 17.0 24.6
Total ac. 11.9 1.2 8.4 17.0 6.4 1.6 4.3 11.9
pH 3.2 0.1 2.9 3.6 3.6 0.2 3.1 4.0
Tartaric ac. 7.1 0.6 5.6 9.0 6.4 1.2 4.3 9.9
Malic ac. 5.7 1.1 3.3 8.1 2.8 1.2 1.2 6.3
Potassium 1.7 0.2 1.2 2.0 1.8 0.2 1.1 2.5
Grapes/ha 182.0 73.4 40.0 451.0 157.3 63.9 48.6 345.0
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Table 3.3: Inputs and Outputs - cont.ed 2
1995 n=127 1996 n=120
Variable Mean St. dev. Min Max Mean St. dev. Min Max
Merlot Merlot
Altimetry 203.7 53.7 180.0 450.0 203.3 54.8 180.0 450.0
Vines 2681.5 627.8 1800.0 4100.0 2650.0 618.9 1800.0 4100.0
Buds 28.9 9.6 12.0 61.0 37.6 14.4 16.0 97.0
Roots 2.5 0.8 1.0 3.0 2.5 0.8 1.0 3.0
Water 2.7 1.1 1.0 4.0 2.8 1.1 1.0 4.0
Calcium 3.5 1.2 1.0 5.0 3.4 1.3 1.0 5.0
Humidity 68.5 - - - 65.5 - - -
Temp.* 17.6 - - - 17.1 - - -
Rainfall 89.2 - - - 83.0 - - -
Radiation 9439.0 - - - 9470.0 - - -
Sun hours 214.9 - - - 220.0 - - -
Temp. exc. 477.0 - - - 504.9 - - -
Sugar 20.5 1.7 13.5 23.9 19.8 1.3 16.3 22.5
Total ac. 9.6 2.5 5.0 17.7 8.7 1.0 6.5 14.4
pH 3.4 0.1 3.1 3.9 3.5 0.5 3.2 8.4
Tartaric ac. 7.3 0.9 3.7 9.8 5.4 0.7 2.8 7.2
Malic ac. 3.9 1.1 1.7 8.0 3.7 0.7 2.1 6.9
Potassium 1.7 0.2 1.2 2.3 1.9 0.2 1.5 2.3
Grapes/ha 139.8 63.8 11.0 365.0 220.7 83.3 44.0 522.9
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Vines Vines per hectare no.
Buds Buds per branch no.
Roots Roots depth◦ 1-3
Water Water holding capacity◦ 1-4
Calcium Total calcium◦ 1-5
Humidity Mean humidity* %
Temp.* Mean temperature* ◦C
Rainfall Rainfall** mm.
Radiation Radiation** cal./sqcm.
Sun hours Sun hours** no.
Temp. exc. Temperature excursion** ◦C
Sugar Sugar content ◦Brix
Total ac. Total acidity gr./l.
pH pH 1-14
Tartaric ac. Tartaric acidity gr./l.
Malic ac. Malic acidity gr./l.
Potassium Potassium gr./l.
Grapes/ha Grapes production per hectare 0.1 t./ha
◦ Categorical variable
* Average conditions for the last 40 days before harvest
** Summation for the last 40 days before harvest
Table 3.5: Hyphotesis Tests for Returns to Scale
Mann- Whitney Kolmogorov- Smirnov
z Prob > |z|* D Corr. P-value*
Chardonnay
1994 -0.37 0.71 0.02 1.00
1995 -0.2 0.84 0.02 1.00
1996 -0.12 0.91 0.01 1.00
Merlot
1994 -0.46 0.65 0.03 1.00
1995 -0.2 0.84 0.02 1.00
1996 -0.48 0.63 0.03 1.00
H0: CRS; H1: VRS.
*: Prob. of error in rejecting the null hypothesis
that the distributions are the same.
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Table 3.6: Output Disposability Tests for All and Each Individual Output
All Sugar Total pH Tartaric Malic Potass. Yields
outputs content acidity acidity acidity
Chardonnay
1994 MW 0.00 0.78 0.37 0.30 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.46
KS 0.00 1.00 0.87 0.87 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.99
1995 MW 0.00 0.24 0.14 0.53 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.36
KS 0.00 0.88 0.54 0.99 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.98
1996 MW 0.00 0.25 0.15 0.53 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.38
KS 0.00 0.92 0.62 1.00 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.97
Merlot
1994 MW 0.00 0.35 0.66 0.65 0.60 0.06 0.06 0.62
KS 0.35 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.88 1.00
1995 MW 0.00 0.83 0.08 0.46 0.29 0.04 0.06 0.46
KS 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.99 0.95 0.22 0.29 1.00
1996 MW 0.00 0.65 0.14 0.51 0.58 0.08 0.13 0.22
KS 0.01 1.00 0.53 1.00 1.00 0.64 0.76 0.34
(Prob. of error in rejecting the null that the distributions are the same)
H0: Strong disposabiltiy of all outputs (yields and quality attributes).
H1: Weak disposabiltiy of the indicated output(s).
MW: Mann-Whitney test for equality of distributions.
KS: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions.
Table 3.7: Joint Disposability Tests of Yields and Individual Quality Attribute
Sugar Total pH Tartaric Malic Potassium
content acidity acidity acidity content
Chardonnay
1994 MW 0.46 0.36 0.43 0.81 0.57 0.57
KS 0.99 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1995 MW 0.30 0.42 0.52 0.35 0.61 0.61
KS 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.00
1996 MW 0.99 0.83 0.95 0.98 0.81 0.86
KS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Merlot
1994 MW 0.76 0.76 0.59 0.58 0.69 0.69
KS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1995 MW 0.51 0.45 0.46 0.40 0.66 0.40
KS 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99
1996 MW 0.59 0.47 0.61 0.60 0.69 0.57
KS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(Prob. of error in rejecting the null that the distributions are the same)
H0: Strong disposability of all outputs but the indicated quality attribute.
H1: Weak disposabiltiy of the indicated quality attribute and yields.
MW: Mann-Whitney test for equality of distributions.
KS: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions.
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Table 3.8: Results of the Joint Disposability Tests of Yields and Each Individual
Quality Attribute
Sugar Total pH Tartaric Malic Potassium
content acidity acidity acidity content
Chardonnay
1994 MW 0.79 0.29 0.27 0.17 0.00 0.09
KS 1.00 0.87 0.87 0.63 0.01 0.27
1995 MW 0.17 0.15 0.70 0.26 0.00 0.01
KS 0.72 0.54 1.00 0.72 0.00 0.03
1996 MW 0.72 0.04 0.35 0.49 0.00 0.00
KS 1.00 0.22 0.92 0.97 0.04 0.02
Merlot
1994 MW 0.44 0.81 0.61 0.56 0.07 0.07
KS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96
1995 MW 0.89 0.08 0.46 0.24 0.09 0.05
KS 1.00 0.37 1.00 0.88 0.46 0.29
1996 MW 0.63 0.08 0.50 0.56 0.09 0.10
KS 1.00 0.53 1.00 1.00 0.64 0.76
(Prob. of error in rejecting the null that the distributions are the same)
H0: Strong disposabiltiy of all outputs but yields.
H1: Weak disposabiltiy of the indicated quality attribute and yields.
MW: Mann-Whitney test for equality of distributions.
KS: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions.
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Table 3.9: Results of the Joint Disposability Tests of Yields and Each Individual
Quality Attribute
Sugar Total pH Tartaric Malic Potassium
content acidity acidity acidity content
Chardonnay
1994 MW S S S S Ws Ws
KS S S S S Ws S
1995 MW S S S S Ws Ws
KS S S S S Ws Ws
1996 MW S Ws S S Ws Ws
KS S S S S Ws Ws
Merlot
1994 MW S S S S Ws Ws
KS S S S S S S
1995 MW S Ws S S Ws Ws
KS S S S S S S
1996 MW S Ws S S Ws Ws
KS S S S S S S
S: Strong disposability of the indicated quality attribute and yields (Y vs. S).
Ws: Weak disposability of the indicated quality attribute (Y <— S).
Wy: Weak disposability of yields (Y —> S).
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Table 3.10: Luenberger Quality Indicator - Average Composition
Strong Disposability of Quality Attributes
No. obs. Mean St. dev. Min Max
Chardonnay
1994 214 0.004 0.056 -0.137 0.349
1995 187 0.005 0.044 -0.216 0.130
1996 213 0.004 0.047 -0.173 0.164
Merlot
1994 78 -0.011 0.082 -0.188 0.286
1995 127 0.008 0.037 -0.145 0.151
1996 120 0.014 0.058 -0.083 0.451
Weak Disposability of Quality Attributes
No. obs. Mean St. dev. Min Max
Chardonnay
1994 214 0.006 0.071 -0.379 0.297
1995 187 -0.002 0.071 -0.439 0.303
1996 213 0.020 0.086 -0.257 0.515
Merlot
1994 78 -0.013 0.090 -0.215 0.352
1995 127 0.016 0.067 -0.222 0.207
1996 120 -0.001 0.070 -0.278 0.265
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Table 3.11: Luenberger Quality Indicator - Ideal Composition
Strong Disposability of Quality Attributes
No. obs. Mean St. dev. Min Max
Chardonnay
1994 214 0.006 0.091 -0.292 0.636
1995 187 0.000 0.085 -0.559 0.217
1996 213 -0.003 0.079 -0.503 0.238
Merlot
1994 78 -0.018 0.181 -0.517 0.739
1995 127 0.005 0.088 -0.581 0.494
1996 120 0.011 0.108 -0.306 0.869
Weak Disposability of Quality Attributes
No. obs. Mean St. dev. Min Max
Chardonnay
1994 214 0.017 0.069 -0.145 0.283
1995 187 0.000 0.073 -0.479 0.263
1996 213 0.021 0.066 -0.171 0.286
Merlot
1994 78 -0.003 0.053 -0.133 0.127
1995 127 0.014 0.064 -0.177 0.148
1996 120 0.020 0.054 -0.136 0.222
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Table 3.12: Kolmogorov-Smirnoff comparison between distributions
Average (SDO) Average (WDO) Average (SDO) Ideal (SDO)
vs. vs. vs. vs.
Ideal (SDO) Ideal (WDO) Average (WDO) Ideal (WDO)
Probability Probability Probability Probability
Chardonnay
1994 0.966 0.626 0.017 0.002
1995 0.976 0.717 0.307 0.123
1996 0.924 0.924 0.006 0.006
Merlot
1994 0.611 0.082 0.611 0.053
1995 0.986 0.786 0.022 0.015
1996 0.936 0.005 0.193 0.025
Prob. of error in rejecting the null that the distributions are the same
Average: gs = mean(s).
Ideal: gs = ideal(s).
Table 3.13: Average values of Quality Indicators at different production levels
Dir. Average Dir. Ideal
0-10 t 10-20 t > 20 t 0-10 t 10-20 t > 20 t
Chardonnay
1994 0.0278 0.0019 -0.0181 0.0354 0.0032 -0.0235
1995 0.0086 0.0080 -0.0169 0.0077 0.0083 -0.0222
1996 0.0290 0.0111 -0.0149 0.0350 0.0111 -0.0373
Merlot
1994 -0.0105 0.0039 -0.0414 -0.0148 -0.0028 -0.0515
1995 0.0125 0.0176 -0.0212 0.0065 0.0276 -0.0535
1996 0.0877 0.0240 0.0006 0.0928 0.0345 -0.0122
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Figure 3.16: Output Isoquants per year: Yields/Sugar
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Figure 3.17: Output Isoquants and Disposability - Chardonnay: Yields/Sugar
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Figure 3.18: Output Isoquants and Disposability - Merlot: Yields/Sugar
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Figure 3.21: Output Isoquants and Disposability - Chardonnay: Yields/Acidity
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Figure 3.25: Output Isoquants and Disposability - Chardonnay:
Yields/Potassium
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Figure 3.26: Output Isoquants and Disposability - Merlot: Yields/Potassium
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Figure 3.27: Output Isoquants and Disposability - Chardonnay:
Sugar/Potassium
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Figure 3.28: Output Isoquants and Disposability - Merlot: Sugar/Potassium
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Technology Estimation and Non-Linear Pricing
for Quality
4.1 Introduction
The payment systems for raw commodities and intermediate products define one
of the most critical relationships of many vertically related industries, since they
establish how revenues are distributed among growers and processing firms. Inter-
mediate product payment systems also have a pivotal role in setting the incentives
that growers and processing firms face: not only do they heavily influence the
incentives to improve technical efficiency, they also have far-reaching implications
for investment decisions.
For these reasons, measuring and evaluating the right attributes in raw ma-
terials, commodities, and intermediate products is a common problem in many
sectors of the economy (Barkley and Porter, 1996; Buccola and Iizuka, 1997; Ladd
and Martin, 1976). This happens to be true in food industries, where grapes are
used for wine production, milk for cheese, cane for sugar, beans for coffee, but also
in other industries, for instance with chips used in the computer industry, ores in
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steel production, steel in construction works, crude oil in refined oil production,
just to name a few examples.
In this paper we show how to design an optimal payment system for a group
of producers using mainly production data information. We first show how it
is possible to implement the first best through higher prices for better quality
commodities, deriving the optimal pricing schedule from a dual specification of
the problem, i.e., with a restricted revenue function. We find that the quality
choices of the optimal contract depend on the efficiency of producers and on
the technological relationship between quality and quantity. The optimal pricing
scheme, moreover, plainly mirrors market’s preferences for quality.
We take into account producers’ heterogeneity by modeling inefficiency and
illustrating how technical efficiency interacts with producers’ ability to produce
outputs for a given level of inputs and hence affects revenues. After reformulating
the pricing scheme in terms of primal measures, we estimate the technology and
the technical efficiency of producers via a stochastic production function model.
We hence use the estimation results to simulate the optimal quality choices and
pricing scheme.
This study combines a theoretical model for contract design under symmetric
information for a group of producers with the contributions of the literature on
the parametric estimation of technology using Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).
By combining the contributions of these two strands of the literature, we design
an optimal pricing scheme for a cooperative using an estimation of the technology.
We use the pricing scheme with a specific dataset for market, weather, and soil
quality conditions to show the impact on the choices and payments received by
a group of farmers involved in grapes production in Italy. The model and the
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methodology however are general enough to be implementable for other groups
and other industries as well.
The plan of the paper is the following. In the next section we explain the
relevance of the problem at hand and review some of the literature. In the fol-
lowing we introduce a model of the behavior of producers and the cooperative
and show what would be the first best pricing scheme. We then formulate the
pricing scheme in terms of a primal specification of the technology, i.e., a pro-
duction function, and of market demand information. We then show how to
implement it using stochastic frontier analysis. We illustrate the data used in
the empirical application in the following section. After introducing the results
of the technology estimation, we simulate the results of the estimated pricing
scheme and compare with the actual pricing schedule used by the group of pro-
ducers analyzed. To conclude, we highlight some possible improvements for the
methodology and directions for future research.
4.2 Facts and literature review
The wine-world market is characterized by two principal wine suppliers, the Eu-
ropean, based on the Appellation of Origin (AO) type of organization, and the
New World one, mainly promoted by new countries, with an organization based
on the type of grapes. Wines in the AO system are often made by blending spe-
cific and sometimes local grapes varieties; their grapes production is regulated,
with a maximum yield allowed per unit of land; and their production regions
are very delimited. In other words, wine-making in the European Union is very
regulated and based on tradition, with a big role assigned to local wines which
name is generally associated with the production region, e.g., Bordeaux, Chianti,
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Rioja. The AO system has proven successful in guaranteeing a good reputation
for many European wines and in assuring relatively high profits for wine produc-
ers, even for the relatively small vineyards typical of most European countries
(Berthomeau, 2002).
Having traditionally been the biggest producers and exporters of wine, coun-
tries like France, Italy, Spain and Portugal in the last few years have endured,
however, a tremendous growth of New World wine-makers. Indeed, the wine
producers of Australia, California, Chile, and other emerging wine producing
countries, are challenging the European leadership in world markets (Anderson,
2001; Economist, 1999). Common characteristics of the emerging wine producing
countries are the lack of detailed rules, i.e., the freedom to experiment with new
techniques; the bigger size of the farming, wine-making and trading operations,
much bigger than the European ones; the production and marketing of wines
according to single varieties, e.g., Chardonnay, sometimes associated with the
production region; and a very intense use of marketing investments.
Contrary to the New World countries, the wine industry in Europe is very
fragmented and appears relatively uninterested by the consolidation processes
that are taking place worldwide, especially in Australia and the USA (Economist,
2003; Marsch, 2003). Apart from some notable exceptions, e.g., the Champagne,
Bordeaux, or Tuscany regions, the wine industry in Europe is made of many small
firms, which may lack adequate capital for the required investments in new tech-
nologies and marketing policies (Saulpic and Tanguy, 2004). A partial solution
to the size problem, according to some practitioners, may be the collective orga-
nization by farmers through cooperatives. Indeed, cooperatives in the European
wine industry are very common and in some regions have a considerable market
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share of production and processing facilities.1
The cooperative movement in the wine sector, however, has been suffering for
a reputation for low quality,2 lack of investment, and often the inability to retain
the better members (Touzard et al., 2000). One of the critical problems for coop-
eratives is the remuneration of members’ raw commodities, e.g., grapes. Indeed,
in many instances cooperatives have been plagued by excess supply of grapes
of low quality which could only be processed to make relatively low quality and
cheap wines (Golan and Shalit, 1993). By producing low quality wines, producers
face tougher competition, often leading to losses or level of profits not high enough
to remunerate investments. Better members, i.e., members with raw commodi-
ties of better quality, often find more remunerative market outlets by leaving the
cooperative, which remains with the worst (quality) members. By changing re-
muneration schemes, it may be argued, cooperatives and other producer’s groups
may improve the quality of the raw commodities delivered by their members,
commanding higher prices for processed commodities and ensuring higher profit
levels for members (Jarrige and Touzard, 2001).
Starting with the paper by Sexton (1986), it has been recognized that it may
be better for the stability of a cooperative to use a non-linear pricing scheme.
Recognizing the private information regarding different members’ technology,
Vercammen et al. (1996) take into account asymmetric information and show
that a non-linear price could improve over the standard linear pricing even with
asymmetric information. Bourgeon and Chambers (1999) show that when the
1In the early 90s, for instance, in Italy the market share of cooperatives in the wine sector
was about 55%, in Spain 70%, and in France about 39-74% (Cogeca, 1998).
2“.. co-ops, which often lead to lowest-common-denominator wines - it’s hard to control the
quality of the grapes produced by members ..” (Echikson, 2005: P4).
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bargaining power of a group of farmers corresponds to its relative importance in
the farm population, the quantities produced are the first-best levels. Departures
from equal sharing, i.e., redistribution of surplus, appear when the bargaining
power of a group does not match its relative importance in the farm population.
Most of the contributions in this topic however consider the quantity choice
problem and its optimal remuneration. Few contributions deal with quality re-
muneration in a cooperative setting. Lopez and Spreen (1987) consider the case
of sugarcane cooperatives and compare two payment systems, a traditional and
a new one. With the traditional payment, the processing costs are pooled and
charged among producers proportionally to sugar production, while with the pro-
posed new method some costs are assigned to individual producers according to
their actual contribution to total operating costs. Lopez and Spreen show that
their method may improve efficiency almost two-fold.
The sugar cane industry is indeed an instance in which the use of different
payment systems is relatively well documented. There are indeed a number of
different types of payments which may be separated into three main broad groups:
fixed cane price systems, fixed revenue sharing systems, and variable revenue
sharing systems (LMC, 2002). In the fixed price system, still present in very
large sugar industries such as in China, India, and Pakistan, farmers receive a
fixed price per tonne of cane, with no premium or discounts paid for cane quality.
Its key weakness is the lack of a link with the actual sugar price and thus it
represents “.. a lopsided arrangement through which growers and millers do not
share price risk..” (LMC, 2002: 2).
Under the fixed revenue sharing system, revenues are shared on the basis of a
fixed percentage distribution between growers and millers. In this system, cane
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prices and mill margins are linked to sugar prices, but the fixed basis can weaken
the incentive to improve technical performance and cane quality for both growers
and millers. The variable revenue sharing system is the most sophisticated and is
based on a formula ensuring that, beyond a benchmark level of cane quality and
factory efficiency, growers are the residual claimants for cane quality improve-
ments and millers cash-in the improvements in sucrose recovery at the factory.
The system ensures that, at the margin, increased revenues from improvements
in cane quality accrue to the grower, while millers capture any gains from milling
efficiency (Larson and Borrell, 2001).
Touzard et al. (2001) consider the payment systems of the wine cooperatives
in South-France and distinguish them into three main groups. The more tradi-
tional system, still used in one sixth of the surveyed cooperatives, is mainly based
on sugar content, offering a linear price for sugar content based on the average
price for the wine sold by the coop.3 According to the authors, this first system is
easy to manage but it does not seem to recognize the diversity of grapes delivered
by the members and thus renders the cooperative a procurer of undifferentiated
raw commodities.
Amore commonmethod, found in around half of the cooperatives interviewed,
is used to remunerate varietal grapes such as Chardonnay, Merlot, etc. when they
are particularly appreciated in the market. It uses a modified formula of the above
mentioned method4 and thus it applies a quality concept which is a priory based
3For the ith producer, the remuneration is Ri = v (P − C)
X
j
(qij sij), where v < 1 is the
coefficient for the transformation grapes-to-wine, P is the average price at which the coopera-
tive sells the wine, C is the average cost for the transformation of the grapes, qij and sij are
respectively the weight and the sugar content for the jth plot.
4If we call A the first method, this second one is simply Abj , with bj > 1, for the premium
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on technical criteria without much consideration for the market effects.
Last, a third set of methods is used in one-third of cooperatives, and it differ-
entiates across different plots according to their contribution to the sales of the
cooperative.5 According to Touzard et al. (2001), this set recognizes the efforts
made by the member, but it is more difficult to implement since it requires more
information, and it leads to a greater inequality among members. In essence, it
creates tensions among members to the extent that it introduces market forces
into the cooperative.
A different strand of the literature considers how to use the results of contract
design under asymmetric information with a richer specification of the production
technology. Bogetoft (2000), for example, shows how to use DEA estimates of
the technology to design an optimal contract between a Principal and an Agent
or a group of Agents. In a related series of papers, he exploits this idea under
different information settings, that is with moral hazard and adverse selection,
and with single and multiple output specification.
In the next section we represent the choices facing producers and we show how
the efficiency parameter allow to distinguish among different producers and their
choices. We then introduce the technology, showing how the efficiency parameter
enters the primal representation of the technology which may be useful for the
empirical implementation. We the proceed with the empirical estimation of the
optimal pricing rule found in the theoretical section and expressed in terms of
varietal grapes.
5For the ith producer, the remuneration is Ri =
X
j
(qij (Pij − C)), where Pij is the price
at which the cooperative sells the wine coming from the jth plot, C is the average cost for the




A set of producers in a given region may sell their raw commodity into competitive
markets or deliver it to a cooperative to be processed and marketed collectively.6
After selling the processed product, e.g., wine, and subtracting processing and
marketing costs, the cooperative pays the members according to the quantity
and quality delivered. Suppose the N producers, i ∈ I = {1, .., N}, face the
same production conditions and transform a vector of inputs x ∈ <L+ into output
y ∈ <+ and s ∈ <+, where y is a scalar indicating the production level in terms
of quantity of output, i.e., total amount of grapes production per unit of land,
and s is the output attribute, i.e., the components of grapes, like for example
sugar content.7 In this study we are interested in using a pricing schedule for
grapes that takes into account their quality, i.e., sugar content. While a priory
we do not impose any form on this pricing scheme, to give some generality we
want to allow for the derivation of a possible non-linear pricing scheme. For
this purpose, following what is standard in the literature on non-linear pricing
(see, e.g., Wilson, 1993), we allow for producers’ heterogeneity and introduce an
efficiency parameter θ.
Producers are heterogeneous in the sense that some are more efficient than
6We consider the case of a cooperative but the analysis, with minor modifications, would
remain valid with any processing firm buying raw inputs from a pool of upstream firms.
7In many wine cooperatives sugar content is the single most important quality attribute
and the more the better to increase wine’s quality. This may be as well the case with proteins
content in milk for cheese production, sugar content in sugarcane cooperatives, etc.
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others, and are distinguished by their type or efficiency parameter θ. We assume
that the type of the producer, θ, is related to how effectively outputs (y, s) are
produced for a given input bundle x. For empirical tractability, it is convenient
to normalize the efficiency type over the support Θ ∈ (−∞, 0]. We can then
specify the technology in terms of the output set P (x, s, θ) defined as
P (x, s, θ) = {y ∈ <+ : x can produce y given (s, θ)} .
We assume that for all x in <L+, P (x,s,θ) has the following properties:
(P1) P (x,s,θ) is closed;
(P2) P (x,s,θ) is a convex set;
(P3) (y, s) ∈ P (x,s,θ) ⇒ (yλ, sλ) ∈ P (x,s,θ), 0 < λ ≤ 1.
(P4) P (x,s,θ) = P (x, s) + θ, with P (x, s) ≥ |θ|.
The first three properties are standard: (P1) and (P2) are regularity con-
ditions allowing to use duality theory, while (P3) allows outputs to be weakly
disposable. The last property, (P4), is the key to see the impact of the efficiency
type on production: an increase in the type causes an additive increase in the
output set, and P (x, s) ≥ |θ| avoids the possibility of producing negative output.
The problem for a representative farmer may be represented as the following:
max
y,s,x
{p(s)y −wx : y ∈ P (x,s,θ)} ,
where p(s) is the unitary payment, which may be contingent on quality level
s, received by the producer from the cooperative and w is the factor price for
inputs x. This program may be divided into two steps, the choice of the input
bundle and the choice of the output bundle. We concentrate on the output side,
in particular on the choices of quality by the farmers given the market prices
or the payments offered by the cooperative. We thus represent each producer’s
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technology by her restricted revenue function, R (p,x, s, θ),
R (p,x, s, θ) = max
y
{py : y ∈ P (x,s,θ)} , (4.1)
where p is the price received, s is the quality of the output, and θ the efficiency
parameter which is assumed to be distributed according to a G(θ) strictly increas-
ing and smooth on the support Θ. We also assume that producers are indexed
negatively according to their efficiency, i.e., Rθ (p,x, s, θ) < 0. In addition, we
assume that the efficiency parameter ranks both production and the marginal
revenue effect of quality, that is Rpθ (p,x, s, θ) < 0 and Rsθ (p,x, s, θ) < 0.
Notice that in the restricted revenue function of eq. (4.1) we are considering
the maximization over one output and hence we have the following
R (p,x, s, θ) = pmax
y
{y : y ∈ P (x,s,θ)} , (4.2)
= pR(1,x, s, θ),
that is, the revenue function is the output price times the production function.
Producers could sell their products to a competitive market, in which the
prevailing price would be pm, independent of the actions taken by the producers
or the cooperative. Analogously, it could be a situation in which the cooperative
does not pay according to quality but it only offers a linear price given a mini-
mum quality standard is reached. In any case, producers would choose quality s
according to the following:
Π (θ) = max
s
{R(pm,x, s, θ)} ,
which first order conditions for an interior solution are the following:
Rs(pm,x, s
∗(θ), θ) = 0,
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where Rs(·) = ∂R∂s (p(s),x, s, θ). The conditions for the choice of output are the
following:
y∗(θ) = Rp(pm,x, s∗(θ), θ),
and thus θ0 < θ implies that y∗(θ0) > y∗(θ).
Looking at the problem for the cooperative, we can suppose its management
has the objective of maximizing the members’ returns by the choice of payments.8
In other words, the group of producers’s management needs to design an optimal
payment schemes to induce members to deliver a quality raw commodity to the
cooperative according to market demand and at the minimum cost for them. The
management is considering giving an extra payment to members in exchange
for better deliveries, i.e., some quality requirements. We assume that s and y
are observable and contractible, and thus the cooperative may offer a payment
contingent on them, in particular on s. Since the optimal choice of s by the
farmer depends on her efficiency parameter, the price is also a function of the
efficiency parameter. In other words, p(θ) = bp(s(θ)).
The management of the cooperative is planning to offer a set of specific con-
tracts, {p(θ), s(θ) : θ ∈ Θ}, to the members. If these agree to participate, they
would receive an increased price for the delivery of better raw commodities. Oth-
erwise, they can sell their commodity to a competitive market or remain with
the old pricing scheme,9 in any case receiving Π(θ), their outside opportunity.
8See Appendix A.2.1 for the results of a survey of wine coops whose Directors and managers
where asked about their objectives.
9Wilson, in the context of Ramsey pricing, shows that it is possible to design non-linear
prices (for quantity) that leaves no consumers worse off than with previous linear prices, i.e.,
Pareto-improving tariffs.
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Hence, a farmer of type θ will participate voluntarily in such a scheme iff:
R(p(θ),x, s(θ), θ) ≥ Π(θ). (IR)
The cooperative’s problem is to design a pricing scheme that rewards quality
and breaks even. We assume that in the market for the processed commodity
the cooperative receives a price P (S(θ)) that is a function of the average quality




s (θ)R(1,x, s, θ) dG (θ)R
Θ
R(1,x, s, θ) dG (θ)
, (4.3)
where R(1,x, s, θ) = ∂R(p,x,s,θ)
∂p
is, by the envelope theorem, the optimal produc-
tion level chosen by the producers and hence
R
Θ
R(1, s,x, θ) dG (θ) is the total
production for the group of producers. Eq. (4.3) says that the average qual-
ity for the group of producers is the weighted average of the quality levels for
different types, with the weight given by the production for each type. The rev-
enue for the group of producers is then given by P (S(θ))
R
Θ
R(1,x, s, θ) dG (θ).
On the other hand, the net processing revenue is redistributed back to members
via the payments, and hence the total payments for the group of producers areR
Θ
p (θ)R(1,x, s, θ) dG (θ), i.e., the average price times the total production. The




s (θ)R(1,x, s, θ) dG (θ) /
Z
Θ
R(1,x, s, θ) dG (θ)
¶Z
Θ
R(1,x, s, θ) dG (θ) =
(4.4)
10To simplify, we consider this price to be net of variable processing costs and we assume
there are no fixed costs for processing facilities. We are aware of the literature on the equilibria
and different pricing schemes when there are fixed costs (see, e.g., Vercammen et al., 1996), but






p (θ)R(1,x, s, θ) dG (θ) .
We can simplify by assuming that
P = a+ b
µZ
Θ
s (θ)R(1,x, s, θ) dG (θ) /
Z
Θ
R(1,x, s, θ) dG (θ)
¶
(4.5)
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p (θ)R(1,x, s, θ) dG (θ) .
The break-even constraint in (BC) ensures that the net processing revenues are
redistributed back to members via the payments. LetQ (θ) = R (p (θ) ,x, s (θ) , θ)
be the producer’s return given the price-quality contract structure. Then, we












Q (θ) dG (θ) : (BC), (IR)
¾
, (4.6)
assuming there are N members. Because we are maximizing returns subject
to a budget constraint, we can avoid introducing a reservation utility constraint
except at the bottom of the efficiency distribution so that we can ensure everyone
participates voluntarily.
4.3.1 First best
We assume that producers in the competitive market face a price that does not
recognize the quality differentials.11 The cooperative on the other hand is envi-
11In some cases agricultural products are paid according to their characteristics. For instance,
when forward contracts are available, the commodities usually have to reach a minimum quality
154
sioning a pricing scheme that pays according to quality with a general pricing
scheme that likely sorts out producers with different efficiency parameters. Qual-
ity is costly and to ensure voluntary participation it needs to be paid. However,
even in the case of symmetric information, in which the cooperative can observe
the member’s type, the cooperative’s optimal policy must accommodate for the
break-even constraint to ensure that profits created are redistributed back to
producers.
Although the problem in eq. (4.6) involves choosing p and s for each type,
conventional maximization techniques can be used and hence we may write the








{Q(θ) + µ [aR(1,x, s, θ) + bs (θ)R(1,x, s, θ)− p (θ)R(1,x, s, θ)]} dG (θ) ,
(4.7)
where µ is a Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint. The Lagrange multi-
plier µ gives the shadow value of the increase in payments to each member type
from relaxing the constraint on the total revenues received by the group.
The management chooses p and s for each type, i.e., it chooses infinitely
many p(θ) and s(θ).12 Taking the first-order conditions for the choice variables
standard. With other contracts, the price may even be contingent on quality. However, for sim-
plicity we assume this is not the case here. Having members’ outside opportunities depending
on quality would require a different analysis, since there would most likely be type-dependent
outside opportunities.
12Wilson (1993, ch. 4) derives the optimal tariff starting from the demand profile (a rep-
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and assuming interior solutions we can have the following
∂L
∂p
= R(1,x, s, θ)− µR(1,x, s, θ) = 0, ∀θ (4.8)
∂L
∂s
= pRs(1,x, s, θ) + µ ((a+ b s (θ)− p (θ)) (Rs(1,x, s, θ))+






R(1,x, s, θ) + b
Z
Θ
s (θ)R(1,x, s, θ)−
Z
Θ
p (θ)R(1,x, s, θ) = 0, ∀θ.
Notice that from the first of these equations we get that µ(θ) = 1, and if we sub-





this last equation in the third equation above, and assuming that the following
is the unique solution, we obtain the following
µ(θ) = 1, (4.9)
s(θ) = −a
b
− R(1,x, s, θ)
Rs(1,x, s, θ)
,
p(θ) = −b R(1,x, s, θ)
Rs(1,x, s, θ)
.
The first equation in the system (4.9) says that the shadow value of the increased
revenue for the cooperative is equal to one, i.e., for each additional dollar received
by the group, its value is unitary. This is easy to see once we recognize that each
dollar received is distributed back to members. The other interesting equation is
the third one. Each member should receive a unitary payment for quality which
is dependent on what the group gets from a unit of quality, i.e., the coefficient
b, “corrected” by an adjustment factor which depends on the trade-off between
quantity and quality. Indeed, the denominator is the marginal impact on the
resentation of preferences that keeps more information than the aggregate demand regarding
consumers’ heterogeneity), but he also shows its equivalent derivation using the calculus of
variation and pointwise maximization.
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production level of an increase in quality, Rs(1,x, s, θ), impact which is most likely
negative, i.e., there is a trade-off between quality and quantity. This marginal
impact is “weighted” by the production level R(1,x, s, θ).
The third equation in the system (4.9) above says that if the denominator
is negative, i.e., there is in fact a trade-off between quality and quantity, then
the cooperative should pay members a greater price than the market unit price
for quality. In words, if the technology relationships are such that an increase in
quality calls forth a reduction in supply, then all producers are better-off when
offered a price for quality that is higher than what the market would pay for
quality. The higher the trade-off between quality and quantity and the higher
should be the price for quality.
4.4 Empirical implementation
To implement the pricing scheme derived in the previous section, we pursue the
following strategy. First of all, we take into account the heterogeneity among
producers borrowing from the literature on efficiency analysis. Indeed, since a
good deal of variability in the production choices is unaccounted for by the ex-
planatory variables considered, we believe that the analysis cast in the framework
of the efficiency literature can help in making the best use of the data available
for the estimation, that is in explaining producers’ heterogeneity. In the efficiency
literature on stochastic frontiers the distance of each firm from the frontier is ex-
pressed as a composite error term: one, a symmetric component, is the standard
white noise, normally distributed with zero mean, while the other asymmetric
component reflects firm’s inefficiency.
The dataset available is driving some of the choices for the empirical im-
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plementation. The data are provided by the “Istituto Agrario di San Michele
all’Adige”, located in the Northern Italian Alps. As we extensively explain in
a section to follow, members of the cooperative that participated in the exper-
imental study were implementing the agronomic practices suggested by the co-
operative’s agronomist, and responded to the economic incentives common to
all members. Indeed, their production was paid according to the schemes nor-
mally implemented by the cooperative for its members. Given the nature of the
data, to be described shortly, we find most appropriate to use a primal approach
estimating a restricted production function.13
4.4.1 The estimation of the technology
In this section we represent the choices of the members of the cooperative and
present the empirical strategy to estimate the technology. Given the data that are
available, and the theory we derived earlier, in particular eq. (4.2), a production
function estimation is the most suitable approach.
To proceed with the empirical implementation of the pricing rule derived in
earlier sections, we can show that the asymmetric production function is additive
as in the following
R(1,x, s, θ) = r(1,x, s, ) + θ, (4.10)
where R(1,x, s, θ) is the restricted production function, and r(1,x, s, ) and θ are
its two components. Indeed, the additive structure of the production function is
13An alternative would be to estimate the techology parameters via a dual approach, for
instance using a revenue function or better a profit function, but this approach would be based
mostly on economic data, which on the inputs side were not available for this study.
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related to property (P4) by the following
P (x, s, θ) = {y : R(1,x, s, θ) ≥ y} , (4.11)
= {y : r(1,x, s) + θ ≥ y} ,
= {y + θ − θ : r(1,x, s) ≥ y − θ} ,
= θ + {y − θ : r(1,x, s) ≥ y − θ} ,
= θ + P (x, s).
To be able to estimate the pricing rule derived earlier, we opt for a relatively
simple functional form for r(1,x, s) like the following













βslxl + βss, (4.12)
where xl are the inputs, and s is the sugar content of grapes. Notice that βlj = βjl.
With this functional form we have that






βslxl + βs. (4.13)



























and thus the optimal quality level as a function of the parameters to be estimated
is the following





















Notice that the optimal quality level depends on the demand parameters via
the term − a
2b
. In addition, there is a “correction factor” which depends on the
inefficiency term θ, and on the trade-off between quality and quantity as measured
by Rs(1,x, s, θ) =
LP
l
βslxl + βs. Since this latter is presumably negative, the
correction factor is negative and increasing with efficiency. In other words, we
should expect greater quality production the lower the trade-off with quantity
and the greater the efficiency of producers.
In order to obtain the optimal pricing rule in eq. (4.9), notice that with an
additive structure it becomes
p(θ) = −br(1,x, s(θ)) + θ
rs(1,x, s(θ))
, (4.16)




















Notice that to estimate eq. (4.17) (and eq. (4.15)), we need an estimate of b,
the unit price of sugar in the market, i.e., the marginal willingness to pay that
can be inferred from the aggregate inverse demand curve for quality, and of a,
the vertical intercept of the inverse demand curve for quality. Another important
piece of information is related to θ, for which we get an estimate bθi using the
stochastic frontier approach we will introduce shortly. Moreover, for the quality
s we use the optimal value computed with eq. (4.15). In addition, we need to
estimate the coefficients of the asymmetric production function to get bβ0, bβlj, bβl,bβsl, and bβs. Finally, notice that we compute the optimal quality level and the
optimal pricing schedule based on the average input values, xl.
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we obtain that the optimal pricing rule now becomes
p(θ) = a+ b s(θ). (4.18)
The optimal pricing schedule is a function of the optimal quality level, s(θ), and
hence of θ, the inefficiency parameter to be estimated. Once one estimates the
optimal quality level s(θ), eq. (4.18) above says that the optimal price schedule
is a linear function of the optimal quality, where all parameters of the pricing
schedule are those of the inverse market demand. In other words, it is worth
noticing that the optimal price thus reflects the market preferences for quality,
that is the inverse demand parameters (see eq. (4.5)). Thus in a group in which
the objective for the management is to maximize members’ welfare, the cooper-
ative offers a price schedule that exactly matches that faced by the group itself
on the market.
4.4.2 Econometric strategy
In this section we introduce the parametric estimation of the asymmetric pro-
duction frontier introduced in eq. (4.12) using cross-sectional data. In general,
we can specify the production frontier as the following (modified from Aigner,
Lovell and Schmidt, 1976; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000)
R(1,xi, si, θi) = r(1,xi, si;β) + θi, (4.19)
whereR(1,xi, si, θi) is the maximum (scalar) output of producer i, xi is the vector
of inputs used by producer, si is the quality of production, and r(1,xi, si;β) is
the production frontier where β is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
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In this formulation,R(1,xi, si, θi) is the maximum feasible value of r(1,xi, si;β)
if and only if θi = 0. When θi < 0, there is a shortfall of observed output from
maximum feasible output and this provides a measure of the efficiency of type θi.
Since in this deterministic frontier the entire shortfall of production is attributed
to the (technical) inefficiency, to recognize that random shocks can affect produc-
tion it is useful to use a stochastic production frontier like the following
R(1,xi, si, θi) = r(1,xi, si;β) + vi + θi, (4.20)
where r(1,xi, si;β)+vi is now the stochastic production frontier with vi a standard
noise component to incorporate the effect of random shocks on each producer.14
We choose a stochastic frontier since the random error component allows to ac-
count for measurement errors and other random factors, such as weather and
unobserved soil conditions, that are important in agricultural production like in
grapes production for wine-making.
The stochastic frontier models thus acknowledge the fact that random shocks
outside the control of producers can affect output and allow to estimate the
parameters of the technology plus the inefficiency term of each producer. If the
production frontier is quadratic as in eq. (4.10), we can write the following














where vi is the two-sided noise component and ui = −θi is the nonnegative techni-
cal inefficiency component of the error term that guarantees that R(1,xi, si, θi) ≤
r(1,xi, si;β).
14The alternative would be a deterministic frontier that while parametric, hence permitting
to estimate the parameters β of the technology, would attribute all deviations from maximum
production to inefficiency.
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We also want to take into account the possibility that some exogenous vari-
ables z may influence the efficiency of producers.15 We thus specify the asym-
metric component with the following
ui = γ0 +
PX
p
γpzpi + ei, (4.22)
where p = 1, .., P are the exogenous variables that affect the technical efficiency
of producers.16
In the composed error models it is usually assumed that the noise component
is iid and symmetric, distributed independently of ui. Even if ui and vi are
distributed independently of xli, the estimation of eq. (4.21) by OLS does not
provide consistent estimates of β0, since E(εi) = −E(ui), where εi = vi − ui,
and does not provide estimates of producer-specific technical efficiency. In other
words, while OLS estimation results for the coefficients besides the intercept are
consistent, to have consistent estimates of β0 and estimates of the producer-
specific inefficiency terms ui, other estimation methods are required, all based on
specific distributional assumptions for ui and vi.
Maximum likelihood (ML) methods and methods of moments can be used.
For both methods, distributional assumptions are needed for estimating both the
parameters and the inefficiency terms. Different options are available, such as
the half-normal, the exponential, the gamma, but the more common model is
15Notice that, as it is standard in the literature, we consider x to be a vector of variables that
affect the frontier (maximal) level of output, while z a set of variables tha affect the deviation of
output from the frontier, i.e., the technical inefficiency. Both x and z are considered exogenous,
that is there is a lack of feedback from y, the production, to x and z (Wang and Schmidt, 2002).
16Not including the intercept term, γ0, in the mean may result in biased estimators (Battese
and Coelli, 1995: footnote 3).
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the Normal-Half Normal model.17 Stevenson (1980) suggested a generalization
of the half-normal specification, the truncated normal, that can be considered
when the asymmetric error component has a systematic component, such as γ0+PP
p γpzpi, associated with the exogenous variables. Indeed, Kumbhakar, Ghosh





that is the one-sided error component representing technical inefficiency has a
truncated normal structure with a variable mode depending on the z’s. Assuming




u), and that ui and vi are distributed
independently (but not identically), the parameters in eq. (4.21) can be estimated
using MLE.18
With the maximum likelihood estimation method, in the case of the Normal-











where µ is the mode of the normal distribution, which is truncated below at
zero, and Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution. Since the density











17Ritter and Simar suggests the use of simple distributions, such as the half normal or the
exponential. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000: 90) argues that “.. the choice between the two
one-parameter densities is largely immaterial ..”.
18Assuming that the regressors are independent of the error terms, while common a practice
in the literature on stochastic frontier analysis, may be problematic when more than one output
is considered for estimation, like in the case of our restricted production function. Moreover,
when using non-experimental data it is possible that some problems of simultaneous equations
estimation may in fact arise also with respect to inputs.
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u and λ =
σu
σv
are estimated jointly with the technology
parameters β, and φ(·) is the standard normal density function (Kumbhakar and
Lovell, 2000).
The log-likelihood function for a sample of I producers, recognizing that the
asymmetric error term has a systematic component, is a simple generalization of
that of the truncated normal model with constant mode µ being replaced by the
variable mode µi = γ0 +
PP
p γpzpi (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000: 267). We thus
have the following






























where K is a constant, µ∗i =
σ2v(γ0+ Pp γpzpi)−σ2uei
σ2








, and ei = vi−ui =
Ri(1, s,x, θ)− ri(1, s,x;β) are the residuals obtained from estimating eq. (4.21).
Using ML, once we obtain estimates of ei = vi−ui, it is possible to obtain the
information about ui by using the conditional distribution of ui given ei (Jondrow
et al., 1982). For a Truncated normal specification, with ui ∼ N+(µ, σ2u), and
with the frontier production function defined directly in terms of the original
units of production,19 it is given by














Given that f(u|e) is distributed as N+(µ∗, σ∗2), the mean (or the mode) can be
used as a point estimate of ui. Using the mean, given by









and noticing that we are working with the original units of production, i.e., not
in log form, we can go from the point estimates of ui to the estimates of the





where bui is given by E(ui|ei) (Battese and Coelli, 1988).
Notice however that regardless of which estimator is used, the estimates of the
technical inefficiency are inconsistent and nothing can be done to overcome this
problem with cross-sectional data (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000: 78). A possible
19Battese and Coelli (1988, 1993, 1995) and Coelli (1996) derive the predictor for ui and
for the technical efficiency distinguishing between the case in which the production frontier is
expressed either in the orignal units or in log form, e.g., Cobb-Douglas.
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solution to this problem comes from panel data analysis. Unfortunately, as we
explain in the next sections, some of the data do not vary across years and so
panel data estimation is not possible. In the next section we present the data used
for the estimation and then the results of the ML estimation using a composite
error model based on the truncated normal assumption of the distribution of the
ui error term.
4.4.3 The data
To implement empirically the methodology presented in the previous sections we
use data provided by the “Istituto Agrario di San Michele all’Adige”, located near
Trento, in the Northern Italian Alps. The mission of this experimental station is
to investigate the best agronomic practices and varieties to match the potential of
different production zones in the region and different trials are undertaken every
year with this purpose.
The data we employ in this paper come from a study performed by the Isti-
tuto, on behalf of SAV, a wine cooperative, to investigate the productive potential
of different varieties of grapes in the fields owned by members of the cooperative.
SAV, the “Società Agricoltori Vallagarina”, located in Rovereto, is a coopera-
tive that transforms the grapes and sells the wine on behalf of members. It
is a relatively small cooperative, with about 700 members and 700 ha (around
1,730 acres) of vineyards, selling on average 10,000 T. of wine every year, mostly
Chardonnay (30%).
Since the late seventies, in an effort to improve the quality of its members’
production, the cooperative has been investigating the different vineyards of its
members, located at different locations, trying to match each production zone
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with the best varieties and agronomic practices. Indeed, using the information
obtained in these studies, the cooperative offers consistent incentives and tech-
nical assistance to members to have their vineyards chosen and located in the
areas that are the most suitable. This is an instance of the more general idea of
terroir, that is the practice of taking advantage and highlighting the differences
and peculiarities of each area in order to transmit them into the wines, so that
every region may have its own specific wines, a relatively common practice in the
European system of appellation d’origine contrôllée (AOC).
The data available for this study were collected during three years, 1994,
1995 and 1996 for a white grape variety, Chardonnay, and a red grape variety,
Merlot.20 These are not the usual experimental data, in the sense that they were
not undertaken in the traditional experimental plots. Instead, the “experiments”
were performed in the vineyards of the members. A sample of members was
selected, and particular attention was given so to avoid those members known
for using “extreme” practices, for instance too much production per ha or very
high quality. Since the purpose of the experiments was to estimate the effects
that the different production areas have on grape production, all farmers were
provided with the standard technical assistance offered to members, and were
hence suggested to follow the agronomic practices regarding labour, fertilizer,
pesticides, etc. that were deemed suitable for their varieties and zone.
Therefore, vineyards located in similar areas and cultivated with the same
variety were to be subject to the same agronomic practices regarding fertiliz-
ers, pesticides, labour, etc. Within every fields considered for the trials, the
researchers of the Istituto could choose the trees that were the subject of all the
20Data is available also for other varieties, but the number of observations is much smaller.
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measurement regarding pruning activities, production levels, grapes characteris-
tics, etc. In addition, the grapes obtained were collected, analyzed and delivered
to the cooperative, where they were paid like all other grapes, i.e., subject to the
same remuneration scheme.
To summarize, members of the cooperative that participated in the experi-
mental study were implementing the agronomic practices suggested by the coop-
erative’s agronomist, and responded to the economic incentives common to all
members. Indeed, their production was paid according to the schemes normally
implemented by the cooperative for its members, which we describe in the fol-
lowing section. Given the nature of the data, as we argue in the section to follow,
we find most appropriate to use a dual approach estimating a revenue function
based on modified prices as we illustrate in the text. We now describe the data
used in the estimation.
The remuneration scheme
SAV, the wine cooperative for which data are available for this study, in 1991
started to implement a remuneration scheme that together with the weight of
grapes considered also sugar content, a scheme that is still in use today, even if
with a partial modification.21 Grapes are thus paid according to quantity and
sugar content.
• Production per ha
The first parameter considered in the payment of grapes is the production
per ha. Indeed, all cooperative members belong to an AOC area and thus
21Before 1991, SAV used to pay only a fixed price for unit of grapes.
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produce grapes for appellation wines. To be eligible for AOC status,22 however,
members need to produce at most a certain amount of grapes per ha, specific
for each variety and region. In the case of Merlot and Chardonnay, the two
varieties under consideration, the limit in Trentino is at 150 quintals/ha.23 In
other words, all the production that is obtained in fields where the unitary yields
is below 150 q/ha can be sold as AOC. If the production is above 150 q/ha,
there is a downgrading of production. Indeed, if the excess production is within
a 20% tolerance, corresponding to 30 q/ha, then it is only partially downgraded
and awarded a (partially) lowered payment. However, if the total production per
hectare is above the ceiling plus the tolerance, i.e., above 180 q/ha, then it cannot
be sold as AOC and gets a more substantive downgrading and price reduction,
since it can be sold only as table wine.
In the SAV cooperative, in particular, if the production of a member is within
the limit of 150 q/ha, the price paid per quintal of grapes is depending only
on its sugar content, as will be shown below. If production per ha, however, is
above this limit, the member incurs into a penalty. Indeed, if production y is
within the limit plus the 20% tolerance, that is if 150 < y ≤ 180 q/ha, then the
quantity of grapes within the 150 q/ha limit is paid in full while the grapes above
the limit are paid only half the sugar-related price. Moreover, if the production
per ha is higher than the limit plus the tolerance, however, then the penalty is
higher: all the production is paid only half of the price based on sugar content.
22AOC wines usually obtain higher prices compared to non-AOC or so so called “table wines”.
These latter receive EU market support through the transformation to alcohol for industrial
use, i.e., distillation, either on a voluntary or compulsory basis.
23A quintal is 100 kilograms or 0.1 ton.
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To summarize, we have the following
Rij =

pj(sij) yij if yij ≤ 150 q/ha,
pj(sij) 150 + (yij − 150) pj(sij)2 if 150 < yij ≤ 180 q/ha,
pj(sij) yij
2
if yij > 180 q/ha,
(4.32)
where Rij is the revenue per ha of firm i for the delivery of the grapes of variety
j, pj(sij) = rij sij is the price received for unit of grapes, rij is the unit price
of sugar for the individual member, sij is the sugar content for the individual
member, and yij is the grapes production (weight) per ha.
• Sugar content
Regarding sugar content, the unit price, i.e., the Euro (Italian lira in 1994-
1996) per unit of sugar content (measured in degrees Babo), is a function of
sugar content delivered by a member compared to the average sugar content of
all the members of the cooperative. Indeed, after all grapes are collected and
transformed into wine, the cooperative computes the mean sugar content, call it
sj, which is specific for each grape variety j. Each member production, i.e., her
sugar content, is then compared to the cooperative mean, and receives a premium
if the sugar content is above the average, or a penalty if it is below the average.
More formally, the pricing scheme for sugar content can be summarized with the
following
rij = rj + (sij − sj) τ j, (4.33)
where rij is the unit price of sugar for the individual member i for the grape of
variety j, rj is the unit price of sugar when grapes have a sugar content equal to
the mean of the cooperative, sij is the sugar content for the individual member i
for the grape of variety j, sj is the cooperative average sugar content for grape j,
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and τ j is the premium (penalty) for unit of content above (below) the cooperative
mean.
In table 4.1 we report the details of the remuneration scheme for Chardonnay
andMerlot over the different years as established by the SAV’s Board of Directors.
For example, in 1994 the mean sugar content for Merlot grapes delivered by
members to the cooperative was 17◦ Babo (column A).24 The payment for grapes
with such sugar content was 86,207 Italian Liras (column B), or 44.52 Euro
(column C) per quintal of grapes, corresponding to rj = 5, 071 Liras per degree
Babo (column D). In case the sugar content of grapes was different from the
mean, the premium (penalty) was 70 liras per tenth of degree Babo (or 700 liras
per degree, column E).
For instance, if the sugar content of a member in 1994 for Merlot was 16.5◦
Babo, and hence below the cooperative mean, the amount received for each degree
Babo was reduced to rij = 5, 071 − (0.5 ∗ 700) = 4, 721 liras per degree. This
would translate into a remuneration of 16.5◦ ∗ 4, 271 = 77, 896 liras (or 40.23
Euro) per quintal of grapes.
From table 4.1 it is possible to notice that SAV paid a premium for sugar
content above average and imposed a penalty for sugar content below average in
the period from 1991 until 1999. Starting from 2000, the scheme allowed only
for penalties, i.e., a discount for sugar content below average, and the premium
is not paid any longer.25
24Both Babo and Brix degrees refer to the sugar content of grapes juice. 1 degree Babo is
equivalent to 0.85 degree Brix.
25According to the SAV agronomist, “... over the years members steadily increased sugar
content up to a level that the market could not remunerate it any more...”. Thus the decision
to allow for a constant unit price, i.e., not a premium any more, for sugar content at or above
172
It is also important to notice that members of the cooperative know the pricing
mechanism in advance but at the time they make production decisions - from the
winter pruning up to the delivery of the grapes to the cooperative’s premises - they
in fact do not know exactly whether they will receive a bonus or a penalty. Indeed,
this aspect depends on how all members perform. In other words, all members
deliver different lots of grapes to the cooperative; the cooperative evaluates all
lots of all members; for each type of grapes the cooperative finds the average sugar
content and the economic value of the average sugar content; for each lot/member,
the penalty or premium is finally determined. The time from harvest to the final
payment received by the member is about one year, during which the cooperative
produces the wines and sell them into the market. During this time period the
producers receive part of the total sum that they are finally awarded for their
grapes, which vary according to the market price received by the cooperative.
Input and output data
Given the nature and the purpose of the trials, the data that are available are
mostly primal, i.e., in physical quantities. The price schedule explained above
allows the computation of the revenues per ha that each member received given
her production per ha and sugar content. However, no information is available
regarding input prices, and on the input quantities little information can be
gathered regarding agronomic practices such as the use of fertilizers, pesticides,
water, etc. Indeed, as already explained, the purpose of the trials was to investi-
gate the potential of different locations-varieties combinations in terms of yields
and quality attributes. Therefore, on the input side, the data we have available
the cooperative mean, but to give a discount for sugar content below the mean.
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was intended to describe different locations, and are the following
- altimetry,
- the number of vines per hectare, which is fixed in the short run given that
vines stay planted for many years,
- the depth of the roots, a measure of the depth of usable soil, a categorical
variable going from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 3,
- the water reservoir, a measure of the water holding capacity, in the range
1-4,
- total calcium, starting from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 5,
- skeleton, a categorical variable (1-4) for the presence of rocks in the soil,
- internal drainage, a categorical variable from 1 (bad) to 5 (too much),
- external drainage, a categorical variable from 1 (slow) to 3 (a lot).
Only few variables were more “in the control of the producers”, and thus
represented some choices by them, such as
- the number of buds per branch, a result of the pruning intensity,
- irrigation, a dummy for the presence of irrigation,
- cultivated, a dummy for the presence of grass or cultivated land between the
vines.
Some descriptive statistics for these variables are reported in table 4.2, 4.3,
and 4.4. Notice that for Chardonnay there are more observations: a total of 648
against 337 for Merlot over the three years.26 On average, Chardonnay trials
were conducted on higher fields compared to Merlot: the average height above
the sea level was around 260 meters against above 200 for Merlot. The number
26The number of observations changes among variables and across years because of missing
and incomplete data.
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of vines per hectare was higher for Chardonnay, around 3200, compared to 2700
for Merlot. This latter variety, however, presented more buds per branch over
the years. For the roots depth, water reservoir and total calcium, there were not
significant differences between the two varieties.
We also have data on weather conditions, but it is coming from a unique
meteoric station, and so we have only variation over the years. As it is standard
practice among practitioners, we consider this data for the last 40 days before
harvest time. Since this latter is different for the two varieties,27 we in fact have
different data on weather conditions between the two varieties. The information
available for weather conditions are related to the humidity and the temperature,
measured as the average of the 40 days considered. In addition, rainfall, radi-
ation, hours of sun, and temperature excursions, are all considered as the total
summation over the last 40 days before harvest time (tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4).
For Chardonnay, being the pre-harvest seasons anticipated 2-3 weeks in Sum-
mer time, they were on average hotter, with more radiation, hours of sun, and
higher temperature excursions. For Merlot, average humidity and rainfall were
higher in 1994 and 1995 compared to Chardonnay. The year 1994 was particularly
rich in rainfall for both varieties.
For the grapes obtained in the different fields, we have information on
- production per hectare,
- sugar content (measured in degree Brix),
- tartaric acid,
27On average, harvest time was the first week of September for Chardonnay, and the third







Over the period 1994-1996, Merlot grapes show higher pH but less total, tar-
taric and malic acidity. Potassium content is higher in Merlot than Chardonnay
(tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4).
We pay a closer look at production and sugar content, since they are the two
most important aspects of grapes production for our empirical implementation of
the pricing scheme. Overall, Merlot is more productive in terms of both grapes
production and sugar content (figures 4.1 and 4.3). Considering the production
per hectare of grapes over the entire period, Merlot is statistically more produc-
tive than Chardonnay (1% significance level (s.l.)),28 but in 1995 there were no
statistically significant differences between the two varieties (figure 4.1). The year
1996 appears to have been the most productive year for both varieties (figure 4.2),
with Merlot reaching an average of 22 tones per hectare (up from 14 in 1995) and
Chardonnay reaching 18 tones/ha (up from 13 in 1995).
Over the period 1994-1996 and for each year considered, Merlot has statis-
tically significant more sugar than Chardonnay (figure 4.3), with a significance
level of 1% (except in 1994, when s.l.=5%). Opposite to the case of production
per hectare seen above, however, 1996 is the year with the least sugar content
(figure 4.4 and tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4). In other words, in 1996 the data show
28The figures 1-4 show kernel estimates. To test the differences between cultivars or years we
performed the Mann-Withney test of equality of medians and the Kolmogoroff-Smirnoff test of
equality of distributions. Results of the tests are reported in the kernel figures. All figures and
tests were prepared using Stata 7/SE.
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a very high production of grapes but with lower sugar content: Merlot contains
19.8 degrees Brix, down from an average of 20.5 in 1995, while for Chardonnay
sugar content in 1996 was 19.2◦ Brix, down from 19.9 in 1994.
As explained in the previous sections, we need to estimate a composite er-
ror model where some variables x affect the production possibilities while some
variables z affect the technical efficiency. With this distinction in mind, we par-
tition the available data in the following fashion: y grapes production, s sugar
content in ◦ Brix, x1 the number of buds per branch, x2 total acidity, x3 pH, x4
tartaric acid, x5 malic acid, x6 potassium, z1 altimetry, z2 the number of vines
per hectare, z3 the water reservoir, and z4 total calcium.29
4.4.4 The endogeneity problem
Agronomic reasons suggest that, among the set of variables that are available
and can be used to estimate the production function in eq. (4.12), one needs
to pick the set of exogenous regressors that influence the yields, among these
the variables that could be endogenous, and thus a set of instruments for the
endogenous variables. It is reasonable to expect that s, the quality level, is
endogenous. It is quite well known among practitioners, even though to the
best of our knowledge not explicitly documented, that there might be a trade-off
between quality and quantity and that producers, when taking their production
decisions, may decide on the quantity and quality level simultaneously.
29Notice that we have information on the depth of the roots and scheleton as well, but
these two variables are actually related to the water holding capacity. Indeed, their correlation
coefficients, both significant, were 0.72 and -0.69 respectively. They hence were omitted to limit
collinearity problems and the number of parameters to be estimated.
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A possible instrument for the quality choice s is the lagged price that produc-
ers received for the grapes. For this reason, we need to consider the prices that
producers face when making their producing decisions. In other words, we need
to take into account that the cooperative under consideration is actually using a
remuneration scheme which depends (already) on quality - sugar content - but
also on the production level.
To give explicit consideration to the remuneration schedule faced by the pro-
ducers member of the cooperative, we need to take into account that the data
generating process that underlies the information available for the estimation is
not the one for the usual competitive price taking behavior. In other words, pro-
ducers face a downward-sloping demand curve, i.e., a non-linear pricing schedule,
and thus we follow an intuition put forth by Diewert (1974) to deal with non-
competitive situations using duality theory.
In addition, we want to emphasize that the price discrimination along the
quantity dimension is not really a choice of the cooperative. In other words,
the cooperative is not using quantity restrictions as a way to exercise monopoly
power. This cooperative, like many others in the area, is operating under the AOC
system, with the quantity restrictions exogenously imposed on the producers - and
hence the cooperative - who want to sell their wine with the appellation. Given
the exogenous quantity restrictions, the cooperative tries to maximize members’
welfare providing incentives for quality to capture consumers’ willingness to pay
for quality wines.30 In addition, we are considering Merlot and Chardonnay, two
30In the discussions with the cooperatives’ management in Trentino, it emerged that their
interest is in devising an incentive scheme to pay for quality (not only sugar content). They
never mentioned or discussed the need for quantity restrictions or the like.
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varieties that are pretty common in many other places in the world and so have
plenty of substitutes.31
Moreover, to deal with the price being dependent on the quality level, and to
be consistent with the theoretical part of this study, we would use a restricted
revenue function where we represent the optimal quantity choice given the quality
choices of a representative member with the following
R(p(s, y),x, s, θ) = sup
y
{p(s, y) y : y ∈ P (x, s, θ)} , (4.34)
= p(s, y∗) y∗,
where y∗ is the optimal choice for grapes production, and p(s, y) is the price re-
ceived for unit of grapes, which depends on s, the sugar content for the individual
member, and recognizes that in our empirical setting it is also depending on y,
the grapes production.
To deal with non-competitive situations using duality theory, Diewert (1974)
argues that when the output set is closed and convex and if the pricing schedule
is differentiable at y∗, the objective function in eq. (4.34) can be linearized with
respect to y around the observed production choice vector y∗. This linearized
version will be tangent to the production surface at y∗, i.e., it will be a support-
ing hyperplane to the convex output set when the producer is monopolistically
optimizing, or more specifically for our case, when facing a non-linear pricing
schedule. It is then possible to apply the well known duality results and employ
31Different may be the case with local varieties, common in the Trentino region as well, but
which we not consider here. The choice of quantity restrictions by the AOC governing body,
however, could be seen as a way to restrict output, but we think this is a different matter from
the one modeled in this study, in which the output restriction could be seen as an imperfect
way to obtain higher quality from producers.
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the usual econometric techniques. In other words, we have the following
sup
y
{ep y : y ∈ P (x, s, θ)} ≡ eR(ep,x, s, θ), (4.35)
= epR(1,x, s, θ),
where ep = p(s, y∗) + p0(s, y∗) y∗ is the marginal revenue32 of the producer for
her choice of output level, eR(ep,x, s, θ) is the producer’s true (restricted) revenue
function, and R(1,x, s, θ) is the producer’s (restricted) production function. No-
tice that the second line of eq. (4.35) above comes from the linear homogeneity
in prices of the (restricted) revenue function.
The estimation of the restricted revenue function can proceed as usual, i.e.,
either estimate the revenue function or the revenue function together with the
supply equations derived by using Hotelling’s lemma, replacing the observed price
by the appropriate marginal prices (Diewert, 1982). In our case, the price schedule
that each member faces represents her demand schedule and hence it is exogenous
allowing the dual estimation of the revenue function.33
Referring to the price schedule facing each producer and represented in eq.
(4.32), notice that the pricing rule is not everywhere differentiable. We thus con-
sider piecewise differentiability and consider a pricing rule that is almost every-
where differentiable. In particular, consider that only at y = 150 q/ha it is not
32Diewert (1974 and 1982) actually calls it the marginal price or shadow price of output.
33In suggesting this approach for a monopolist, Diewert noticed that from an empirical point
of view its drawback is that the slope of the demand curve facing the monopolist must be
known to the outside observers of the market. In our setting, however we have the knowledge
of the demand curve, i.e., the pricing schedule, that each firm is facing so that the appropriate
marginal prices can be calculated. To the best of our knowledge, this approach originally
suggested in Diewert (1974) has never been applied.
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differentiable, but the right and left derivatives do exist.34 The marginal revenue
schedule for the producers is the following35
epij =

pj(sij, yij) if yij ≤ 150 q/ha,
pj(sij ,yij)
2
if yij > 150 q/ha.
For the information on the prices pj(sij , yij), one could assume that producers
have perfect foresight. Indeed, one could postulate that besides the “mechanics”
of the pricing scheme producers know also the mean sugar content for the coop-
erative, sj, and the unit price of sugar for grapes with a mean sugar content, rj.
In addition, it could be assumed that each member does not behave strategically
with respect to the group and that she cannot influence the group mean.36
To conclude, to take into account the endogeneity problem of sugar content
one could instrument it using the lagged price. Indeed, if sjt is the optimal
choice of firm j at time t, a possible instrument could be ep(sjt−1, yjt−1), the
marginal price received by firm j at time t − 1 for producing quality sjt−1 and
production level yjt−1. One may argue that producers’ decisions are related to
prices they received the previous year, but which are predetermined.37 Using this
instrument it is possible to take into account the endogeneity problem using the
34However, in the actual dataset used for this study no observation was found at exactly 150
q/ha.
35See appendix A.2.2 for the derivation.
36In models of moral hazard and relative performance, it is common to exclude the individual
performance from the computation of the mean to which she is benchmarked to (see, e.g.,
Bogetoft, 1995). Here we do not have all the observations that would be needed to compute
the group’s mean. In addition, notice that here we do not model a moral hazard problem.
37In fact, as we explained earlier, producers receive the final payment of grapes delivered in
the year t − 1 to the cooperative at around the harvest time of year t. The possible problem
with this price, however, is that it could influence also the choice of production level.
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General Method on Moments with a composite error model (Olson, Schmidt, and
Waldman, 1980).
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Estimation and technical efficiency
We report first the results of the ML estimation of the composite error model in
eq. (4.28) for the pooled data, i.e., for both cultivars and for the three years
considered (table 4.6). Notice that quite few of the coefficients are significant,
including that on the sugar coefficient which is negative and significant at the
10% s.l. Two of the coefficients of the explanatory variables for the inefficiency
term, the z’s, appear significant. At the bottom of the table we report the
estimates of the variance for both error components, σ2v and σ
2
u, which shows a
clear predominance of the variability for the symmetric component σ2v.
We also report the estimates of the technical inefficiency expressed in original
units, that is bui calculated by eq. (4.30), in table 4.8. Notice that since we are
using the production data in the original units, i.e., not in log form, the values
reported are expressed in terms of reduced production. Thus the most inefficient
unit is almost 32 quintals of grapes less efficient than the frontier. To cast the
results on the technical inefficiency in terms more familiar for the reader, that is
in percentage form, we report also the estimates of eq. (4.31) in table 4.8. Notice
that the average efficiency is about 91%, with the most inefficient producer being
only 75%-efficient compared to the producers on the frontier.
We calculate (and report) the values in original units since bθi = −bui and
hence we can estimate the optimal quality choices in eq. (4.15), in particular the
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second term in the right hand side. Indeed, we also report the results for the
estimation of the “correction factor”38 for the demand parameters, i.e., for the
first part of the right hand side of eq. (4.15), and that takes into account the
production technology and producers’ heterogeneity. Notice that on average this
factor has a value of -15.4◦ Brix, going from a minimum of -15.9 to a maximum
of -14.9. Considering that on average the sugar content actually chosen by the
producers in the sample is about 20◦ Brix, it means that the correction factor is
about 75-80% of the actual choices, with a difference between the most and the
least efficient producer of the order of 5-6%.
We estimate also the pooled data with dummies for the year and the
cultivar (second set of columns, table 4.6). The dummies for both years and the
cultivar are indeed significant. Notice also that some of the results are different.
First of all, more explanatory variables, i.e., the x’s, are now significant. Three
of the coefficients on the z’s, the variables explaining the inefficiency, are now
negative and significant. In addition, the symmetric component σ2v is much lower,
while slightly higher appears the asymmetric one, σ2u.
Of particular interest are the results on bui, the inefficiency term in the original
units. The mean value is now higher, around 47 quintals, going from around
zero to almost 126 quintals. Thus taking into account the heterogeneity across
years and cultivars sensibly decreases the technical efficiency of the producers
under consideration. This translates into a slightly bigger correction factor in
eq. (4.15) - its average value is about -15.8◦ Brix - but more importantly with
38We refer to the following expression appearing in eq. (4.15), which we label correction














, where bβ is the estimated coefficient and x is the mean
of the variable across observations.
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more variability, going from -17.5 to -12.9 ◦ Brix (table 4.8). In terms of technical
efficiency, this corresponds to about 83% of mean technical efficiency, going from
a minimum of 49% to 100% (table 4.8).
Comparing across the two specifications, with and without dummies, we can
indeed see the differences by looking at the distributions of the efficiency scores,
i.e., their kernels (see figure 4.5). The figure on the left shows the model with
no dummies for the years and cultivar, while the one on the right is estimated
with those dummies. As can be seen, the model without the dummies has a
distribution with a mode above 0.9 and it is not very dispersed. On the contrary,
the model with the dummies has a mode around 0.8 and it is more dispersed.
Moreover, notice that the efficiency score for Chardonnay39 appears bimodal in
both model specifications. In figure 4.6 we report the efficiency distribution across
years (again for both model specifications, with and without dummies). As in
the previous figure, the major difference is between the model with and without
dummies, where in this latter the mean technical efficiency is higher and less
dispersed.
We perform the same analysis, that is estimating the technology and the tech-
nical efficiency, after dividing the pooled data into the two cultivars, Chardonnay
and Merlot. We report first the results of Chardonnay, starting with the model
in eq. (4.21) - see table 4.6, last columns - and then including also the dummies
for the years (table 4.7, first column). Although the data available allow for more
observations than Merlot, the estimation of the model for Chardonnay appears
39Notice that we estimate the pooled sample for both cultivars and all years, thus imposing
the same common technology frontier, but we actually show the results distinguishing for the
two different cultivars (in figure 4.5) or the different years (figure 4.6).
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more problematic. Indeed, when using the model without the dummies for the
years, convergence could not be obtained.40
However, when estimating the model Chardonnay with dummies for the
year, results appear quite similar to the pooled sample, even though fewer x’s
variables appear significant. Among the z’s, vines density and water reservoir
appear negative and significant. Technical efficiency results are quite similar to
the pooled sample with dummies model: rather low (on average 82%), leading
to a correction factor slightly bigger (-15.8) and more dispersed (from -17.7 to
-11.9 ◦ Brix). In figure 4.7 we report the distribution of the technical efficiency
scores for Chardonnay with both model specifications, with the already explained
caveats for the results of the model without dummies.
Considering Merlot, in the estimation without the dummies for the years,
none of the explanatory variables for the inefficiency term z’s are significant
(table 4.7). The inefficiency term in original units, bui, is quite low (around 15.6
q), corresponding to an average technical efficiency of around 92%. However, the
correction factor is quite similar to the values already seen, that is an average
of -15.2 ◦ Brix, and with a limited range, going from -15.7 to -14.7 ◦ Brix (table
4.8).
When estimatingMerlot with dummies for the years, fewer of the explana-
tory variables x’s are significant, even though the 1996 dummy is significant at
the 5% level. Of the z’s variables affecting the inefficiency term, only the density
40It appears that the Hessian matrix is singular and thus not invertible impeding the clas-
sical Newton-Raphson optimization algorithm to find a solution to the maximum likelihood
problem. To derive the standard errors a generalized inverse (produced by dropping one or
more rows/columns) is used instead for the variance covariance matrix. This explains why the
standard errors for the z’s variables for Chardonnay are missing (table 4.6, last column).
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of vines is significant and negative (table 4.7). The inefficiency is now larger,
reaching an average of 23.4 quintals of grapes, corresponding to a mean technical
efficiency of about 89%. The correction factor is slightly bigger, about -15.6 ◦
Brix, going from -16.32 to -14.9 ◦ Brix. In figure 4.8 we report the technical
efficiency score distributions for Merlot across the years and for the two model
specifications. The distributions appear rather similar between the two specifi-
cations, with 1996 having the highest efficiency and 1995 the lowest.
4.5.2 The optimal quality choices
In this section we report the results of the simulation for the optimal quality
choice, that is s(θ) of eq. (4.15). For this simulation we need an estimate of the
demand parameters a and b. To make the simulated quality choices comparable
to the choices actually made by the producers in the SAV cooperative from which
the data were originated,41 for the value of b we use the value of sugar (euro per
degree Brix) that was associated with the average content for the specific year
and cultivar, as can be inferred from table 4.1 discussed earlier.42 Using the
41Notice also that even if useful for comparison purposes, this is just an approximation. The
average sugar value obtained in this fashion indeed is calculated from the total revenues for
the wines produced (for each variety) minus the costs born by the cooperative to transform the
grapes and selling the wines, divided by the total sugar content produced by all members. We
also refer here only to a subset of the members, those for which valid experimental production
data is available.
42In table 4.1 in fact the values refer to degrees Babo. The b value obtained in this fashion
is 3.05, 4.79 and 4.91 Euro/degree Babo for Chardonnay respectively for 1994, 1995, 1996; and
2.62, 3.51 and 4.75 for Merlot in the same years. Similar values were obtained in a hedonic
study of red grapes in the nearby province of Verona. Perali (1996) estimates the marginal
price for the quality charactersitics of the grapes (Corvina, Rondinella and Molinara) used for
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pricing scheme actually implemented we obtain also some starting values for a
needed to calibrate the simulation.43
We report the different cases for the parameters a and b in table 5. For each
variety, we take the values of a and b that can be inferred from the payments
made by the SAV cooperative (table 4.1) in those years. We calculate the average
across years of the parameter - either a or b - and then create two other different
values for each parameter by adding and subtracting 50%.44 In this fashion we
can construct 3x3=9 cases, reported in table 4.9. We thus report the 9 different
cases resulting from the different combinations of the values for parameters a and
b. We also report the same cases for the pooled data sample, where we take the
average of Chardonnay and Merlot mean parameter values and then add/subtract
50%. Notice that for all samples, case 5 has exactly the parameter values that
can be inferred from table 1 (actually the mean across years).
In tables 4.10 and 4.11 we report the results for the quality choices, comparing
Bardolino, a red wine produced in Verona that is usually is not aged but drank quite young.
Using data for the period 1983-1993, he reports that the marginal price for sugar content was
about 2.65 Euro per ◦ Babo at 1993 constant prices.
43Given the sugar content of grapes and the pricing scheme of the SAV cooperative, we
calculate the unit price of the grapes as a function of sugar content. We then calculate the
vertical intercept by interpolation to find an estimate of a. We obtain values in the range
a ∈ [−128,−94]: for Chardonnay, -102, -121 and -122 respectively in 1994, 1995 and 1996; for
Merlot, -105, -94 and -128 in the same years.
44For instance, the average value of a across years for Chardonnay is a = −115 and so we
obtain:
a1 = −(115 ∗ 50%) = −58;
a2 = a = −115;
a3 = −(115 ∗ 150%) = −173.
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the actual choices and those simulated with the 9 cases explained above, again
distinguishing for the pooled, Chardonnay and Merlot samples. In all samples,
we can notice similar results. First of all, in almost all instances the average
value of the simulated optimal choices of sugar is higher than the actual choices.
In case 5, when the parameter values for a and b are similar to those obtained
from the payments made by the cooperative, the simulated quality choices are
somewhat around 50% higher than the actual choices. The closest simulation to
the actual choices is the one with the parameters of case 9, where the average of
the optimal quality choices is around that of the actual choices. This is a result
common to all samples and model specifications.
In addition, in all cases the simulated quality has lower variability than the
actual quality choices. This is an expected result, since in the simulation we “take
away” the variability coming from the symmetric error component σ2v, while we
are left only with the asymmetric component σ2u via the estimate of the technical
efficiency, bθ, that enters the correction factor in eq. (4.15).
A clearer picture of the results can be formed by looking at the distribution of
the actual and simulated quality choices. In figures 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 we report
the kernel estimates of the distributions for the actual choices, those of case 5
(with parameter values similar to those inferred from the actual payments to the
producers), those of case 9 (with sugar level similar to the actual choices), and
those of case 1.
In the pooled and Chardonnay samples we can observe that the distributions
of the simulated choices with the specification without dummies are much less
dispersed than those of the actual choices, while in the model with the dummies
the distributions have quite the same dispersion. Notice also that the distribu-
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tions of case 9 are quite overlapping with those of the actual choices. In the case
of Merlot, on the other hand, both model specifications lead to the simulated
choices distribution that are considerably less dispersed than those of the actual
choices.
Summarizing, the optimal quality choices derived in the theoretical and em-
pirical part of the paper - although quite sensitive to the choice of the demand
parameters used to calibrate the simulation - appear higher and often less variable
across producers than the choices actually made. Using the demand parameters
that can be inferred from the pricing scheme used by the SAV cooperative actu-
ally leads to simulated choices that are on average 50% higher than the actual
choices. On the other hand, to obtain quality levels comparable to the actual
ones, one needs to start from an inverse demand for quality that shows higher
willingness to pay for quality (case 9 ).
Although this result might be related to a wrong calibration of the simu-
lation,45 notice that over the period under consideration (from 1991, when the
pricing scheme for sugar was introduced, to 2003, the last year for which data
is available) the average sugar content in the cooperative in fact increased quite
consistently over time, as can be seen from table 4.1. This may show that the
cooperative wanted to increase the sugar content provided by the members and
to obtain it they might have decided to pay a price higher than the market to
set producers’ deliveries to a higher quality equilibria. In other words, the co-
operative may have induced farmers to produce grapes with more sugar content
45As explained earlier, there could some selection bias in the use of only the subsample of
members for which production data is available. Or simply the way we infer the demand
parameters a and b from the actual payments made by the cooperative could be just imprecise.
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using higher than the market prices for a transition period. Indeed, as we will see
shortly, the cooperative lowered the premium for above average quality starting
in 2000, presumably when it reached some sort of steady state equilibrium more
in line with market demand conditions.
4.5.3 The pricing scheme
In this section we report the results of the optimal pricing rule obtained by eq.
(4.17)46. We obtain results that appear quite symmetrical to those obtained for
the optimal quality choices. Indeed, with almost no exceptions, we obtain price
levels that are lower that those received with the actual mechanisms implemented
by the SAV cooperative (table 4.12 and 4.13). In particular, in case 5 (where
the demand parameter values appear closer to those inferred from table 4.1 of
the payments made by the cooperative), the average price received for quintal
of grapes would be 10% or less than the actual price received. To obtain prices
that are comparable to those actually obtained we need to consider case 9, which
again would be consistent with a more optimistic evaluation of the demand for
quality and hence consumers’ willingness to pay for sugar content (or alcohol
content, for that matter).
For a better understanding of the results, we plot the pricing schemes - the
actual and the simulated ones - as a function of sugar content (figures 4.12,
4.13 and 4.14). The comparison with the actual pricing rule used in the SAV
cooperative is indeed quite interesting, showing that the pricing scheme derived
in this study using the same demand parameters (case 5 ) indeed results quite
different from the one adopted by the cooperative. Notice in particular that in
46Th same results would be obtained using eq. (4.18).
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the actual pricing mechanism the level of prices paid by the cooperative is much
higher than that emerging from the simulation using similar demand parameters.
This result is quite common in all samples and model specifications, even though
it is easier to see in the model with dummies where the dispersion is greater.
Paying higher prices is equivalent to having an enhanced slope of the pric-
ing schedule, and a steeper pricing schedule has more “incentive power”, in the
sense that paying a higher unit price for sugar induces higher sugar production
by members. As we explained in the previous section, this may be due to the
poor demand information we based our simulation upon. Or it could signal that
to increase the quality delivery of members the cooperative initially offered a
relatively high price for sugar.
Indeed, starting from the year 2000, the cooperative under consideration re-
duced the prices for sugar, in particular deciding that only the penalty for sugar
content below the group’s average was to be enforced, while the premium for
above average sugar production was not paid any longer. This may mean that
the actual pricing schedule implemented in 1994-1996 was in fact too steep, i.e.,
too high, for the market demand and thus the actual willingness to pay for sugar,
i.e., alcohol content.47 On the other hand, the fact that the “penalty” part of
the pricing scheme is still enforced may be due to the requirements - in the form
of the minimum quality standard in terms of sugar content - needed in order to
qualify as AOC grapes.
As a last piece of evidence regarding the pricing scheme, we report its rela-
tionship with the technical efficiency scores (figure 4.15). As can be seen, the
47Another possible explanation is that the market demand may have changed in the mean-
time.
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simulated price paid (case 9) appears increasing with the efficiency level,48 espe-
cially in the model with the dummies. On the other hand, the actual price paid
is decreasing with the efficiency level.49
4.6 Concluding remarks
In this study we derive the optimal quality choices and the pricing mechanism
for quality for a group of producers and we implement them empirically. First,
we derive the theoretical pricing scheme using a simple model for a group of
producers that needs to decide on how to pay for quality, i.e., sugar, in grapes
production. We find that the optimal quality choices depend on the efficiency
level of farmers and on the trade-off between quality and quantity. In addition,
the optimal pricing scheme simply “reflects” market demand willingness to pay
for quality. Being the pricing scheme dependent on technology parameters, we
then estimate the production technology using a stochastic production frontier
that takes into account producers’ heterogeneity. We then simulate the optimal
quality choices and pricing schedule, and compare them to those actually made by
a group of producers for which we are able to estimate the production technology.
A critical piece of information needed for the implementation of the theoretical
pricing scheme is the estimation of the technology. In this study we use a primal
approach, i.e., a restricted production function estimation based on a stochastic
production frontier and thus an error composite model, because we can rely on
48This is because the simulated quality choices are increasing with the efficiency level. This
result is not reported here but available on request.
49For clarity’s purposes we do not show all the observations for the actual choices but only
their linear regression fit.
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quasi-experimental data for which input prices are not available. This approach,
however, may suffer from endogeneity problems. Given data availability, dual
approaches - either based on profit or revenue function estimation - could be
implemented, probably attenuating the endogeneity problem.
Another important piece of information, needed for actually implementing the
optimal contract, is the estimation of market demand for the quality attributes
of the product or commodity under consideration. In this study we consider
grapes for wine production and we infer some market demand information from
payments actually made by the cooperative under investigation. Although this
information may not be the ideal one for empirical implementation purposes, we
are able to derive a pricing scheme and show that in fact the cooperative seems
to be paying the sugar content more than what we can predict from the market
information we have available. This difference may be due to the poor market
demand data we use, or may be related to some missing aspects of the analysis.
Indeed, the paper makes some simplifying assumptions. We do not assume
any informational asymmetry between the group’s management and producers.
This may be realistic in some settings, while in others it may be questionable. In
addition, the actual pricing mechanism observed for the set of producers analyzed
in this study is a relative performance scheme in which each individual producer is
given a premium (penalty) if she is producing more (less) sugar than the group’s
average. Relative performance schemes are usually explained as a mechanism
to transfer the common risk from producers when there are problems of hidden
action, an informational asymmetry which is not modeled here but that could
be quite relevant in many settings given also the uncertainty due to changing
weather conditions.
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The paper also does not model the group’s aversion for inequality or the
concern that each and every member may need to obtain a certain minimum
return from her grapes. It can be argued that different pricing mechanisms can
have rather different distributional impacts, and to the extent that cooperatives
and other producer groups may have some concern for equity in addition to
efficiency, this could be quite an important aspect that could explain the actual
remuneration choices with different incentive power used by cooperatives and
producer’s groups.
It is reasonable to expect that the higher is the “power” of the pricing schedule,
the greater is the inequality among the members of the group in terms of price
received per unit of grapes. In other words, the pricing mechanism should serve to
increase efficiency, i.e., to reflect market demand and enhance production from
more efficient producers, but it has also an impact on the income distribution
across the members of the producers’ group. To the extent that greater efficiency
may imply greater inequality in returns to members, an inequality averse group
may choose a less powerful pricing scheme. In the paper we just mention some
of these implications of different pricing schemes, but we believe that this topic
deserves a much more thorough investigation.
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Table 4.1: Pricing schedule for sugar content, SAV
MERLOT A.O.C.
Type Premium
Year Degree Degree £./q €./q £./ ◦B £./G◦ +/-
A B C D E
1991 Babo 16.50 73,079 37.74 4,429 +/- 70
1992 Babo 16.00 56,304 29.08 3,519 +/- 70
1993 Babo 16.00 48,240 24.91 3,015 +/- 50
1994 Babo 17.00 86,207 44.52 5,071 +/- 70
1995 Babo 17.40 153,294 79.17 6,800 +/- 70
1996 Babo 17.00 156,400 80.77 9,200 +/- 90
1997 Babo 17.10 178,883 92.39 10,461 +/- 120
1998 Babo 17.40 162,180 83.76 9,321 +/- 120
1999 Babo 18.00 216,810 111.97 12,045 +/-200
2000 Brix 21.50 235,010 121.37 10,931 -200
€. €./G◦ +/-
2001 Brix 21.00 229,196 118.37 5.64 -0.100
2002 Brix 20.50 226,563 117.01 5.708 -0.105
2003 Brix 22.70 199,455 103.01 4.538 -0.130
CHARDONNAY A.O.C.
Type Premium
Year Degree Degree £./q €./q £./ ◦B £./G◦ +/-
A B C D E
1991 Babo 16.70 128,306 66.26 7,683 +/- 90
1992 Babo 16.00 75,392 38.94 4,712 +/- 70
1993 Babo 16.50 57,503 29.70 3,485 +/- 50
1994 Babo 17.50 103,513 53.46 5,915 +/- 70
1995 Babo 17.20 159,616 82.43 9,280 +/- 90
1996 Babo 16.50 156,750 80.95 9,500 +/- 90
1997 Babo 16.90 168,476 87.01 9,969 +/- 120
1998 Babo 17.40 145,800 75.30 8,379 +/- 120
1999 Babo 18.00 188,100 97.15 10,450 +/- 200
2000 Brix 21.50 202,210 104.43 9,405 -150
€. €./G◦ +/-
2001 Brix 21.50 245,916 127.00 5.91 -0.080
2002 Brix 20.50 242,131 125.05 6.10 -0.085
2003 Brix 21.90 222,707 115.02 5.252 -0.080
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Table 4.2: Inputs and Outputs
1994 1995
Variable Mean St. dev. Min Max Mean St. dev. Min Max
Chardonnay Chardonnay
Altimetry 262.69 94.90 170 500 259.04 90.61 180 500
Vines 3146.74 774.71 1500 5000 3193.69 789.80 1500 5000
Buds 23.62 6.74 10 42 27.02 8.59 9 62
Roots 2.42 0.85 1 3 2.31 0.89 1 3
Water 2.30 1.02 1 4 2.18 1.01 1 4
Calcium 3.35 1.14 1 5 3.44 1.16 1 5
Scheleton 2.62 0.88 1 4 2.67 0.89 1 4
Int. Drainage 3.57 0.92 1 5 3.66 0.85 1 5
Ext. Drainage 2.76 0.51 1 3 2.78 0.49 1 3
Irrigated 0.70 0.46 0 1 0.70 0.46 0 1
Cultivated 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.05 0.21 0 1
Grapes/ha 146.58 60.12 32 356.7 134.02 57.00 14.8 362.1
Sugar (s) 19.90 1.36 15.7 25.4 19.56 1.37 13.2 22.8
Total ac. 8.55 1.66 5.6 16.07 10.57 1.80 6.75 15.54
pH 3.16 0.14 2.81 3.65 3.17 0.11 2.89 3.44
Tartaric ac. 6.53 0.81 3.62 8.88 7.87 0.85 5.91 10.01
Malic ac. 3.96 1.50 0.86 9.5 5.64 1.52 2.65 9.99
Potassium 1.48 0.20 0.78 2.34 1.62 0.21 1.02 2.26
Mean hum. 58.0 - - - 62.0 - - -
Mean temp. 22.6 - - - 20.1 - - -
Rainfall 172.2 - - - 61.7 - - -
Radiation 14045.0 - - - 11824.0 - - -
Sun hours 321.7 - - - 266.4 - - -
Temp.exc. 593.4 - - - 534.3 - - -
Table 4.3: Inputs and Outputs - cont.ed
1996 1994
Variable Mean St. dev. Min Max Mean St. dev. Min Max
Chardonnay Merlot
Altimetry 260.28 91.20 180 500 209.75 65.11 180 450
Vines 3175.78 778.32 1500 5000 2727.78 703.21 1500 4100
Buds 31.22 11.08 8 89 30.01 8.49 7 58
Roots 2.41 0.85 1 3 2.32 0.95 1 3
Water 2.30 1.01 1 4 2.48 1.23 1 4
Calcium 3.37 1.14 1 5 3.35 1.37 1 5
Scheleton 2.63 0.86 1 4 2.28 1.05 1 4
Int. Drainage 3.58 0.87 1 5 3.33 1.05 1 5
Ext. Drainage 2.77 0.48 1 3 2.57 0.57 1 3
Irrigated 0.69 0.46 0 1 0.49 0.50 0 1
Cultivated 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.11 0.32 0 1
Grapes/ha 182.05 73.62 40 451 158.33 63.51 48.6 345
Sugar (s) 19.23 1.02 16.2 21.7 20.15 1.47 17 24.6
Total ac. 11.87 1.45 8.4 16.98 6.33 1.53 4.29 11.91
pH 3.21 0.12 2.9 3.63 3.58 0.18 3.05 3.95
Tartaric ac. 7.10 0.55 5.62 9.02 6.39 1.01 4.27 9.93
Malic ac. 5.74 1.05 3.36 8.07 2.80 1.22 1.2 6.36
Potassium 1.70 0.18 1.15 2.04 1.78 0.24 1.06 2.51
Mean hum. 67.4 - - - 63.0 - - -
Mean temp. 19.7 - - - 20.7 - - -
Rainfall 124.6 - - - 274.9 - - -
Radiation 10927.0 - - - 12349.0 - - -
Sun hours 253.7 - - - 281.7 - - -
Temp.exc. 509.9 - - - 549.2 - - -
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Table 4.4: Inputs and Outputs - cont.ed 2
1995 1996
Variable Mean St. dev. Min Max Mean St. dev. Min Max
Merlot Merlot
Altimetry 203.49 53.51 180 450 203.25 55.07 180 450
Vines 2701.16 644.86 1800 4100 2650.00 621.46 1800 4100
Buds 28.85 9.54 12 61 37.60 14.43 16 97
Roots 2.51 0.82 1 3 2.53 0.81 1 3
Water 2.74 1.13 1 4 2.78 1.11 1 4
Calcium 3.51 1.23 1 5 3.43 1.29 1 5
Scheleton 2.33 1.01 1 4 2.28 1.03 1 4
Int. Drainage 3.23 1.06 1 5 3.18 1.03 1 5
Ext. Drainage 2.56 0.59 1 3 2.55 0.59 1 3
Irrigated 0.53 0.50 0 1 0.50 0.50 0 1
Cultivated 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.05 0.22 0 1
Grapes/ha 140.54 64.82 11 364.9 220.68 83.69 44 522.9
Sugar (s) 20.49 1.68 13.5 23.9 19.82 1.28 16.3 22.5
Total ac. 9.60 2.45 4.95 17.74 8.73 1.04 6.49 14.37
pH 3.35 0.14 3.13 3.89 3.45 0.47 3.15 8.4
Tartaric ac. 7.34 0.93 3.71 9.78 5.42 0.70 2.77 7.21
Malic ac. 3.92 1.11 1.67 8.02 3.69 0.70 2.07 6.88
Potassium 1.73 0.17 1.15 2.26 1.92 0.16 1.5 2.34
Mean hum. 68.5 - - - 65.5 - - -
Mean temp. 17.6 - - - 17.1 - - -
Rainfall 89.2 - - - 83.0 - - -
Radiation 9439.0 - - - 9470.0 - - -
Sun hours 214.9 - - - 220.0 - - -
Temp.exc. 477.0 - - - 504.9 - - -
197
Table 4.5: Legend of Inputs and Outputs
Unit of
Label Variable measure
Altimetry Altimetry (z1) mt.
Vines Vines per hectare (z2) no.
Buds Buds per branch (x1) no.
Roots Roots depth◦ 1-3
Water Water holding capacity◦ (z3) 1-4
Calcium Total calcium◦ (z4) 1-5
Scheleton Scheleton◦ 1-4
Int. Drainage Internal Drainage◦ 1-5
Ext. Drainage External Drainage◦ 1-3
Irrigated Irrigated◦ 0-1
Cultivated Cultivated◦ 0-1
Grapes/ha Grapes production per ha 0.1 t./ha
Sugar (s) Sugar content (s) ◦Brix
Total ac. Total acidity (x2) gr./l.
pH pH (x3) 1-14
Tartaric ac. Tartaric acidity (x4) gr./l.
Malic ac. Malic acidity (x5) gr./l.
Potassium Potassium content (x6) gr./l.
Mean hum. Mean humidity* %
Mean temp. Mean temperature* ◦C
Rainfall Rainfall** mm.
Radiation Radiation** cal./sqcm.
Sun hours Sun hours** no.
Temp.exc. Temperature excursion** ◦C
◦ Categorical variable
* Average conditions for the last 40 days before harvest
** Summation for the last 40 days before harvest
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Table 4.6: Estimation results of stochastic frontier
Sample -> Pooled data Pooled + dummies Chardonnay
Variable Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z|
Buds per branch (x1) 3.88 0.54 10.36 0.07 -10.15 0.26
Total acidity (x2) -94.03 0.08 -95.57 0.04 38.63 0.64
pH (x3) -551.08 0.15 -638.92 0.06 325.67 0.73
Tartaric acidity (x4) -83.34 0.31 -96.35 0.19 119.21 0.42
Malic acidity (x5) 61.79 0.42 73.99 0.29 -49.15 0.70
Potassium content (x6) 534.41 0.09 230.49 0.40 197.15 0.67
x1x1 0.01 0.47 -0.03 0.06 0.02 0.45
x2x2 0.52 0.77 1.84 0.25 -2.36 0.37
x3x3 12.73 0.49 8.86 0.59 -96.76 0.73
x4x4 -8.80 0.01 -8.19 0.01 -20.36 0.00
x5x5 -4.06 0.20 4.27 0.14 -5.21 0.28
x6x6 39.75 0.55 22.90 0.69 -2.50 0.98
x1x2 -0.02 0.95 -0.34 0.33 0.69 0.21
x1x3 3.18 0.39 -0.16 0.96 12.94 0.02
x1x4 -0.66 0.16 -0.19 0.64 -1.79 0.03
x1x5 -0.03 0.95 0.17 0.71 1.00 0.18
x1x6 -1.82 0.50 -0.91 0.70 -13.85 0.00
x2x3 52.58 0.07 54.20 0.03 -4.70 0.92
x2x4 0.72 0.85 5.11 0.12 -7.80 0.20
x2x5 0.14 0.97 -9.27 0.01 3.30 0.60
x2x6 -13.02 0.53 7.64 0.67 2.53 0.93
x3x4 55.36 0.20 31.11 0.41 -44.78 0.60
x3x5 -57.57 0.23 -56.80 0.18 -26.99 0.71
x3x6 -152.16 0.27 -67.97 0.58 -72.98 0.78
x4x5 13.64 0.01 9.49 0.04 22.53 0.01
x4x6 -55.27 0.06 -29.45 0.25 6.41 0.89
x5x6 2.11 0.94 -10.42 0.69 8.31 0.84
x1s -0.14 0.44 -0.11 0.50 0.12 0.65
x2s 0.54 0.66 -0.88 0.41 0.13 0.95
x3s 14.76 0.34 20.57 0.13 9.34 0.68
x4s 3.21 0.08 4.03 0.01 4.46 0.10
x5s 0.05 0.98 1.07 0.50 0.14 0.96
x6s -3.82 0.70 -2.90 0.74 0.05 1.00




Constant 2073.11 0.07 2664.05 0.01 8.19 1.00
Altimetry (z1) 0.04 0.27 0.02 0.69 0.03 .
Vines per hectare (z2) -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.00 .
Water hold. cap. (z3) 4.71 0.04 -6.51 0.00 -0.07 .
Total calcium (z4) 2.34 0.24 -5.14 0.01 -0.07 .
Constant 15.37 0.52 220.35 0.00 1.03 .
sigma_u2 0.00 1.74 0.00
sigma_v2 3384.38 2566.59 3158.65
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Table 4.7: Estimation results of stochastic frontier - cont.ed
Sample -> Chard.+ dumm. Merlot Merlot + dumm.
Variable Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z|
Buds per branch (x1) 7.29 0.34 26.03 0.06 22.73 0.10
Total acidity (x2) 88.96 0.20 -73.91 0.49 -156.22 0.15
pH (x3) 1075.48 0.18 -732.94 0.38 -956.06 0.23
Tartaric acidity (x4) 10.91 0.93 -227.64 0.12 -178.39 0.22
Malic acidity (x5) -114.12 0.27 172.14 0.37 224.17 0.23
Potassium content (x6) 194.92 0.61 30.63 0.97 -190.05 0.80
x1x1 -0.02 0.31 -0.06 0.11 -0.06 0.07
x2x2 -2.65 0.22 -1.89 0.51 1.41 0.64
x3x3 -290.16 0.21 35.76 0.21 5.27 0.86
x4x4 -15.61 0.00 -2.73 0.55 -2.15 0.63
x5x5 -0.82 0.84 -13.99 0.11 -7.06 0.43
x6x6 45.80 0.53 -29.73 0.80 -68.67 0.55
x1x2 -0.29 0.53 -0.62 0.35 -0.55 0.40
x1x3 6.23 0.17 -11.04 0.13 -9.49 0.18
x1x4 -1.49 0.03 1.10 0.09 0.98 0.13
x1x5 0.78 0.20 -0.66 0.47 -0.57 0.53
x1x6 -7.38 0.02 9.06 0.05 8.40 0.06
x2x3 -0.92 0.98 13.46 0.80 45.51 0.39
x2x4 -2.13 0.67 8.53 0.14 7.66 0.18
x2x5 0.83 0.88 1.65 0.82 -5.07 0.50
x2x6 -0.58 0.98 27.83 0.46 26.93 0.46
x3x4 -1.03 0.99 101.34 0.13 59.54 0.38
x3x5 -6.16 0.92 -21.57 0.83 -65.50 0.51
x3x6 -175.10 0.42 61.98 0.85 220.57 0.50
x4x5 16.21 0.02 11.24 0.17 11.53 0.15
x4x6 -12.37 0.75 -94.18 0.02 -57.55 0.17
x5x6 6.86 0.84 -41.56 0.41 -40.58 0.41
x1s -0.05 0.80 -0.49 0.07 -0.42 0.12
x2s -3.05 0.07 0.82 0.69 1.38 0.49
x3s -3.37 0.86 14.15 0.62 27.42 0.32
x4s 4.96 0.03 3.62 0.22 3.51 0.23
x5s 2.98 0.19 -4.36 0.21 -3.07 0.37
x6s 6.01 0.59 3.62 0.84 -2.07 0.91
Sugar content (s) -29.55 0.61 -70.19 0.46 -115.63 0.22
1995 -24.13 0.00 -0.07 1.00
1996 13.34 0.11 35.35 0.03
Chardonnay
Constant -1551.26 0.37 2759.97 0.35 3892.24 0.17
Altimetry (z1) 0.03 0.38 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.36
Vines per hectare (z2) -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.17 -0.02 0.02
Water hold. cap. (z3) -4.34 0.07 3.79 0.34 0.63 0.87
Total calcium (z4) -1.12 0.59 1.61 0.62 -0.63 0.85
Constant 240.20 0.00 1.46 0.97 52.10 0.14
sigma_u2 1.99 0.01 0.00
sigma_v2 2107.73 3163.94 3003.11
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Table 4.8: Technical efficiency results and correction factors
Sample Variable Unit of # Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
measure
Pooled
ui q 927 16.15 7.80 1.96 31.42
TEi % 927 0.91 0.04 0.75 0.99
Corr. Factor ◦ Brix 927 -15.43 0.28 -15.94 -14.88
Pooled with dummies
ui q 939 46.61 33.14 0.06 125.64
TEi % 939 0.83 0.10 0.49 1.00
Corr. Factor ◦ Brix 939 -15.79 1.22 -17.51 -12.87
Chardonnay
ui q 473 2.62 1.88 0.00 8.42
TEi % 473 0.98 0.06 -0.26 1.00
Corr. Factor ◦ Brix 473 -15.01 0.06 -15.10 -14.81
Chardonnay with dummies
ui q 614 50.23 39.32 0.07 149.83
TEi % 614 0.82 0.11 0.51 1.00
Corr. Factor ◦ Brix 614 -15.80 1.53 -17.74 -11.93
Merlot
ui q 313 15.61 6.66 0.32 31.21
TEi % 313 0.92 0.04 0.73 1.00
Corr. Factor ◦ Brix 313 -15.20 0.21 -15.68 -14.72
Merlot with dummies
ui q 319 23.39 9.46 0.00 44.60
TEi % 319 0.89 0.05 0.71 1.00
Corr. Factor ◦ Brix 319 -15.55 0.31 -16.32 -14.85
Table 4.9: Demand parameter values for the simulations
Samples -> Pooled Chardonnay Merlot
a b a b a b
Cases:
Case 1 -168 1.97 -173 2.13 -164 1.82
Case 2 -168 3.94 -173 4.25 -164 3.63
Case 3 -168 5.91 -173 6.38 -164 5.45
Case 4 -112 1.97 -115 2.13 -109 1.82
Case 5 -112 3.94 -115 4.25 -109 3.63
Case 6 -112 5.91 -115 6.38 -109 5.45
Case 7 -56 1.97 -58 2.13 -55 1.82
Case 8 -56 3.94 -58 4.25 -55 3.63
Case 9 -56 5.91 -58 6.38 -55 5.45
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Table 4.10: Estimated and actual quality choices
Sample Variable Obs Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Pooled
Actual choices 966 19.78 1.40 13.20 25.40
Case 1 927 58.07 0.28 57.52 58.58
Case 2 927 36.75 0.28 36.20 37.26
Case 3 927 29.65 0.28 29.10 30.16
Case 4 927 43.86 0.28 43.31 44.37
Case 5 927 29.65 0.28 29.10 30.16
Case 6 927 24.91 0.28 24.36 25.42
Case 7 927 29.65 0.28 29.10 30.16
Case 8 927 22.54 0.28 21.99 23.05
Case 9 927 20.17 0.28 19.62 20.68
Pooled w/ dummies
Actual choices 966 19.78 1.40 13.20 25.40
Case 1 939 58.43 1.22 55.51 60.15
Case 2 939 37.11 1.22 34.19 38.83
Case 3 939 30.00 1.22 27.09 31.72
Case 4 939 44.22 1.22 41.30 45.93
Case 5 939 30.00 1.22 27.09 31.72
Case 6 939 25.27 1.22 22.35 26.98
Case 7 939 30.00 1.22 27.09 31.72
Case 8 939 22.90 1.22 19.98 24.61
Case 9 939 20.53 1.22 17.61 22.24
Chardonnay
Actual choices 636 19.58 1.29 13.20 25.40
Case 1 473 55.62 0.06 55.42 55.71
Case 2 473 35.36 0.06 35.16 35.45
Case 3 473 28.56 0.06 28.37 28.65
Case 4 473 42.00 0.06 41.80 42.09
Case 5 473 28.54 0.06 28.34 28.63
Case 6 473 24.02 0.06 23.82 24.11
Case 7 473 28.62 0.06 28.42 28.71
Case 8 473 21.83 0.06 21.63 21.92
Case 9 473 19.55 0.06 19.35 19.64
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Table 4.11: Estimated and actual quality choices - cont.ed
Sample Variable Obs Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Chardonnay w/ dummies
Actual choices 636 19.58 1.29 13.20 25.40
Case 1 614 56.41 1.53 52.54 58.35
Case 2 614 36.15 1.53 32.28 38.10
Case 3 614 29.35 1.53 25.49 31.30
Case 4 614 42.79 1.53 38.93 44.74
Case 5 614 29.33 1.53 25.46 31.27
Case 6 614 24.81 1.53 20.94 26.76
Case 7 614 29.41 1.53 25.55 31.36
Case 8 614 22.62 1.53 18.75 24.57
Case 9 614 20.34 1.53 16.48 22.29
Merlot
Actual choices 330 20.16 1.52 13.50 24.60
Case 1 313 60.26 0.21 59.78 60.73
Case 2 313 37.79 0.21 37.31 38.27
Case 3 313 30.25 0.21 29.77 30.72
Case 4 313 45.15 0.21 44.67 45.62
Case 5 313 30.22 0.21 29.73 30.69
Case 6 313 25.20 0.21 24.72 25.68
Case 7 313 30.31 0.21 29.83 30.79
Case 8 313 22.78 0.21 22.30 23.25
Case 9 313 20.25 0.21 19.77 20.72
Merlot w/ dummies
Actual choices 330 20.16 1.52 13.50 24.60
Case 1 319 60.60 0.31 59.91 61.37
Case 2 319 38.14 0.31 37.44 38.91
Case 3 319 30.60 0.31 29.90 31.36
Case 4 319 45.49 0.31 44.80 46.26
Case 5 319 30.56 0.31 29.87 31.33
Case 6 319 25.55 0.31 24.85 26.32
Case 7 319 30.66 0.31 29.96 31.43
Case 8 319 23.13 0.31 22.43 23.89
Case 9 319 20.60 0.31 19.90 21.36
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Table 4.12: Estimated and actual pricing schemes
Sample Variable Obs Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Pooled
Actual choices 966 64.55 13.97 12.25 132.03
Case 1 927 -53.59 0.55 -54.68 -52.59
Case 2 927 -23.19 1.11 -25.35 -21.18
Case 3 927 7.22 1.66 3.97 10.23
Case 4 927 -25.59 0.55 -26.68 -24.59
Case 5 927 4.81 1.11 2.65 6.82
Case 6 927 35.22 1.66 31.97 38.23
Case 7 927 2.41 0.55 1.32 3.41
Case 8 927 32.81 1.11 30.65 34.82
Case 9 927 63.22 1.66 59.97 66.23
Pooled w/ dummies
Actual choices 966 64.55 13.97 12.25 132.03
Case 1 939 -52.89 2.41 -58.64 -49.51
Case 2 939 -21.79 4.82 -33.27 -15.02
Case 3 939 9.32 7.22 -7.91 19.47
Case 4 939 -24.89 2.41 -30.64 -21.51
Case 5 939 6.21 4.82 -5.27 12.98
Case 6 939 37.32 7.22 20.09 47.47
Case 7 939 3.11 2.41 -2.64 6.49
Case 8 939 34.21 4.82 22.73 40.98
Case 9 939 65.32 7.22 48.09 75.47
Chardonnay
Actual choices 636 67.62 13.63 14.05 141.69
Case 1 473 -54.54 0.14 -54.96 -54.35
Case 2 473 -22.72 0.27 -23.57 -22.34
Case 3 473 9.24 0.41 7.97 9.81
Case 4 473 -25.54 0.14 -25.96 -25.35
Case 5 473 6.28 0.27 5.43 6.66
Case 6 473 38.24 0.41 36.97 38.81
Case 7 473 2.96 0.14 2.54 3.15
Case 8 473 34.78 0.27 33.93 35.16
Case 9 473 66.74 0.41 65.47 67.31
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Table 4.13: Estimated and actual pricing schemes - cont.ed
Sample Variable Obs Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Chardonnay w/ dummies
Actual choices 636 67.62 13.63 14.05 141.69
Case 1 614 -52.85 3.25 -61.09 -48.71
Case 2 614 -19.36 6.49 -35.80 -11.09
Case 3 614 14.28 9.74 -10.38 26.70
Case 4 614 -23.85 3.25 -32.09 -19.71
Case 5 614 9.64 6.49 -6.80 17.91
Case 6 614 43.28 9.74 18.62 55.70
Case 7 614 4.65 3.25 -3.59 8.79
Case 8 614 38.14 6.49 21.70 46.41
Case 9 614 71.78 9.74 47.12 84.20
Merlot
Actual choices 330 62.90 14.48 11.01 112.90
Case 1 313 -54.33 0.38 -55.21 -53.46
Case 2 313 -26.81 0.75 -28.56 -25.09
Case 3 313 0.87 1.13 -1.77 3.45
Case 4 313 -26.83 0.38 -27.71 -25.96
Case 5 313 0.69 0.75 -1.06 2.41
Case 6 313 28.37 1.13 25.73 30.95
Case 7 313 0.17 0.38 -0.71 1.04
Case 8 313 27.69 0.75 25.94 29.42
Case 9 313 55.37 1.13 52.73 57.95
Merlot w/ dummies
Actual choices 330 62.90 14.48 11.01 112.90
Case 1 319 -53.70 0.56 -54.97 -52.30
Case 2 319 -25.55 1.13 -28.08 -22.77
Case 3 319 2.75 1.69 -1.05 6.93
Case 4 319 -26.20 0.56 -27.47 -24.80
Case 5 319 1.95 1.13 -0.58 4.73
Case 6 319 30.25 1.69 26.45 34.43
Case 7 319 0.80 0.56 -0.47 2.20
Case 8 319 28.95 1.13 26.42 31.73
Case 9 319 57.25 1.69 53.45 61.43
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A.1 Appendixes First Essay
A.1.1 The EU regulation on Producers‘ Organizations
In 1996 the European Union (EU) enacted a regulation concerning the common
market organization for fruits and vegetables (Reg. EU 2200/96). Its main fea-
ture is that the organization of markets should be based mainly on Producers‘
Organizations (PO), with the EU partly financing both initial (50%) and opera-
tional expenses (2% per year). According to EU, the regulation is enacted in order
to assure quality standards enforcement, supply control, environmental-friendly
technologies adoption and producers’ co-financing of policies.
POs can be any juridical person or firm with the aim of :
- planning production in order to meet demand;
- promoting supply concentration and commercialization;
- reducing production costs and regular producer prices;
- promoting environmental-friendly technologies;
and should be run by participating farmers who control them democratically
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and finance them through a contribution fee based on their working with the PO.
The constitutional statute of the PO should specify the rules and the fees to be
paid, the fines for violations, the democratic rules of farmers control and the rules
for new entries.
The farmers who on a voluntary basis decide to participate in the PO must
do the following :
- participate in one and only one PO and apply its rules;
- sell all the production to the PO;
- give all the required information to the PO;
- pay the fees for participation.
Note that if producers belonging to a PO reach a fraction of 2
3
of those in
a productive region, their rules can be extended to all producers in the region.
In addition, PO should manage the supply control through the retirement of
production from the market that was originally managed by national agencies
(e.g., AIMA for Italy). Last thing to note, producers, handlers and middlemen
can form inter-profession associations with the aim of providing market informa-
tion, promoting market coordination with studies on market demand, promoting
high-quality produce and their better valuation through advertisement and EU
certification, promoting IPM technologies adoption.
A.1.2 The regulator‘s problem (first-best)
In this section we find the solution of the same quality provision problem when
faced by a regulator with the same information structure of the PO - perfect
observability of quality but no information on the cost structure of the individual
producers - and an utilitarian social welfare function with unitary weights. In
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L)− c(q(θL), θL) ≥ y(θH)− c(q(θH), θL),
(ICH) y(θ
H)− c(q(θH), θH) ≥ y(θL)− c(q(θL), θH),
(PCi) y(θ






The constraints are defined as in eq. (2.2). It can be shown that only the
low-quality type‘s participation constraint is binding. The problem can be de-



















There exists infinite solutions to the first step of the problem, and all must
be on the budget constraint line between the points A and B of fig. 3.2. In any
of these solutions the IC constraints do not need to hold and so the solution of
the first step, assuming the PCL is to the left and above B and PCH is to the




i) = np(Q) − F . The second step maximization problem











where the auxiliary variable α ≥ 0 is defined as q(θH) ≥ q(θL)+α. Remembering




i), we obtain the following first order conditions
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]− nH cq(q(θH), θH)− nL cq(q(θL), θL) ≤ 0, q(θL) ≥ 0,
p0(Q)nH − nH cq(q(θH), θH) ≤ 0, α ≥ 0,
which after some manipulations and assuming interior solutions becomes the
following:
p0(Q) = cq(q∗(θH), θH),
p0(Q) = cq(q∗(θL), θL).
A.1.3 The no-bunching result
To show that there is no bunching, we use a proof by contradiction and we start
from the first order conditions of the problem of eq. (2.2), which, respectively for








H), θL)− cq(q(θL), θL)]nL
n









− cq(q(θH), θH) ≤ 0,
α ≥ 0,
where pq(Q) and cq(·) are the first derivatives with respect to q. Using the fact
that n = nL + nH , after some manipulations we obtain the following:
[pq(Q)− cq(q(θH), θH)]nL
n




H), θL)− cq(q(θL), θL)]nL
n
≤ 0, q(θL) ≥ 0,
[pq(Q)− cq(q(θH), θH)]nH
n





Now, to have bunching means that we have α = 0, i.e., qL = qH . Then the




L), θH)− cq(q(θL), θL)]nL
n
.
Note that the term on the right hand side of the inequality is < 0, which
implies that also the term on the left hand side is less than zero, i.e., pq(Q) −
cq(q(θ
L), θH) < 0.
Adding the inequality deriving from the first order conditions for α to the first
order conditions for q(θL) reported above, and using qL = qH when needed, lead
to the following inequality: pq(Q)− cq(q(θL), θL) > 0. But the two inequalities:
pq(Q)− cq(q(θL), θL) > 0,
pq(Q)− cq(q(θL), θH) < 0,
are in contradiction since cq(q(θ
L), θH) < cq(q(θ
L), θL).
A.2 Appendixes Third Essay
A.2.1 Survey
A survey among the wine-cooperatives in the North-East of Italy was conducted
in 1998-99. Among other things, the cooperatives were asked about the relative
importance given to the possible objectives pursued by their management. We
report here the results in decreasing order of importance. For each possible an-
swer, the interviewed person in the cooperative (either the CEO or the Chairman
218
of the Board of Directors), could give a ranking from 1 (low importance) to 7
(very important). The results are in table A.1.
The most important objective for the cooperatives interviewed is the fact
that members should be treated equally, probably a response which could be
motivated by the management’s fear of being accused of discriminating among
members. This answer obtains a score of 6.8 out of 7, and 53 cooperatives out
of 65 indicated it with the highest mark of importance. The second objective
indicated is for the cooperative to represent a secure market outlet for members’
supply. It receives an average score of 6.3, and 51 cooperatives out of 65 give
the maximum importance. The objective of price and income enhancement is
seen very important by 34 out 65 cooperatives and its average score is 5.8. The
quality enhancement of members’ products is on average getting a score of 5.5,
receiving the highest importance from 30 cooperatives.
A.2.2 Marginal Price
Starting from equation (4.32) we can derive the expression for the marginal price
ep = p(s, y∗) + p0(s, y∗) y by noting the following
pij =






if 150 < yij ≤ 180 q/ha,
pj(sij ,yij)
2





0 if yij ≤ 150 q/ha,
−75 pj(sij ,yij)
y2ij
if 150 < yij ≤ 180 q/ha,




pj(sij, yij) if yij ≤ 150 q/ha,
pj(sij ,yij)
2
if 150 < yij ≤ 180 q/ha,
pj(sij ,yij)
2
if yij > 180 q/ha.
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Table A.1: Management’s Objectives in Cooperatives
Objective Mean St. dev. Min Max # max
n=65
Equal treatment for all 6.8 0.5 2 7 53
Sure market outlet 6.3 1.7 1 7 51
Income/price enhancement 5.8 1.6 1 7 34
Quality enhancement 5.5 1 1 7 30
Management professionality 5.2 1.7 1 7 17
Local development 5.1 1.6 1 7 10
Cooperative values 4.9 1.6 1 7 11
Treatment based on quality 4.4 2.5 1 7 26
Price stabilization 4 1.8 1 7 2
Services to members 3.9 1.8 1 7 6
Increase bargaining power 3.8 2.1 1 7 4
Feeling of ownership 3.7 1.9 1 7 7
Members' training 3.6 2.1 1 7 4
Members' involvement 3.4 1.6 1 7 2
Members' social networking 3.3 1.9 1 7 4
Members' cost savings 2.3 1.8 1 7 3
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